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Thesis abstract
At the end of the twentieth century, Pierre Bourdieu and Umberto Eco were two of the
most prominent intellectuals in France and Italy. Yet, in spite of the fact that France and
Italy are neighbouring countries and have been, historically, exercising an on-going
cultural influence upon each other, there is no systematic comparative study of these
two intellectuals. This study responds to this absence by offering, within the framework
of an interdisciplinary project, a thorough analysis of some of the key themes of the
thought of Bourdieu and Eco. By addressing how Bourdieu’s and Eco’s work
contributes to a better understanding of the creative and the interdisciplinary nature of
intellectuality, this study explores the following hypothesis: those scholars who become
known to the general public as public intellectuals are often interested in exploring and
in testing the limits of disciplinary fields. In so doing, they challenge the norms that
define academic professionalism and the growing specialisation of knowledge in
academia. By highlighting the differences, as well as the similarities in the approaches
of Bourdieu and Eco, this study shows that critical engagement is defined by the very
disciplinary boundaries and structures it attempts to challenge and question. This study
demonstrates that interdisciplinarity does neither exclude nor render obsolete existing
disciplines. On the contrary, solid grounding in one discipline facilitates the production
of interdisciplinary knowledge. As the examples of Bourdieu and Eco show, disciplines
can be transcended only once they are fully mastered. Once fully mastered they appear
in their contingency, not as absolute statements but rather as vehicles towards
knowledge.
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5Note
In providing references to works, I have provided complete references in every chapter.
When further referring to works, I have provided information about the author and the
title, and page numbers when required. Sometimes I have used a shortened version of
the title, but I have avoided using abbreviations. When referring to the same work
several times within the same pages, I have provided page numbers within the main
text. In these cases, I have duly indicated in a footnote the works to which these page
numbers refer to.
In indicating quotations, I have been using single quotations marks throughout the text.
I have used, sporadically, double quotation marks to denote metaphorical or non-literal
uses of terms.
6Introduction
Various claims have been made in the last twenty years or so about the decline of the
historical figure of the public intellectual.1 Such claims have been made against the
background of global changes that have redefined the economic, the social and the
cultural climate of the world we live in. These changes have largely been facilitated by
the fall of communism as a political force antagonizing capitalism, by the rise of global
markets, and by the emergence of the information society.
As sociologist Zygmunt Bauman maintains, societies renew themselves and their
self-representing narratives by trading one set of arguments and intellectual assumptions
for another. In a similar configuration (one which explores the idea that social reality is
a dynamic process in which things are transformed, rather than disappear) there is ample
space for reassessing the idea of the decline of the figure of the public intellectual. In
place of terms such as decline, fade, or disappearance, contemporary information
societies offer us another term: updating. In a world where strong oppositions such as
the one between capitalism and communism have been replaced by the ideological
conformism of the globalised market, one can say that intellectuals have lost some of
their traditional target of political criticism. Yet, it is perhaps elsewhere other than in the
sphere of political discourse that one could look in order to identify symbolic arenas
within which intellectuals find a new potential for self-expression.
Against recent reshaping of Western cultures and societies, contemporary
intellectuals may have had to re-invent their role, or simply adapt it to new
configurations. Pierre Bourdieu and Umberto Eco have engaged, as public intellectuals,
with the main questions (both local and global) that have emerged on the cultural
agenda of our times. Even when such questions brought about additional categories
around which to narrate (and to experience) contemporary western societies, the
popularity of Bourdieu and Eco as public intellectuals not only has remained
                                                 
1 See for instance Richard Posner, Public Intellectuals. A Study of Decline (Cambridge US: Harvard
University Press, 2004).
7unchanged, but has increased over the years. What has allowed Bourdieu and Eco to
maintain the relevance of their role of public intellectuals has been their capacity to
interpret such role creatively. A creative interpretation of the role of intellectual
involves the capacity to reframe some of the major intellectual debates of our time, so as
to present them in a novel, original and attractive way. In the case of Bourdieu and Eco,
this creative reframing was initiated, crucially, in the first stages of their scholarly
careers. This study plays close attention to the formative years of Bourdieu and Eco, by
showing how their prominence as intellectuals has grown out of a critical engagement
with intellectual movements that structured the debates in the humanities during the 60s,
particularly in France.
At the end of the twentieth century, Bourdieu and Eco were two of the most
prominent intellectuals in France and Italy. Yet, in spite of the fact that France and Italy
are neighbouring countries and have been, historically, exercising an on-going cultural
influence upon each other, there is no systematic comparative study of these two
intellectuals. This study responds to this absence by offering, within the framework of
an interdisciplinary project, a thorough analysis of some of the key themes of the
thought of Bourdieu and Eco. This research combines these two thinkers in order to
explore some of the processes of critical engagement that characterize the expression of
intellectuality in contemporary Western societies. Intellectuals like Bourdieu and Eco
operate as mediators between disciplinary communities composed by professionals, and
a public of non-specialists. What makes an intellectual a public intellectual is, precisely,
the fact that he or she writes for or speaks to a non-specialist public alongside a
specialist one. Some academic disciplines, in this sense, shape the intellectual
sensitivity of its members in such a way as to facilitate the passage from the academic
field to a larger public debate. In semiotics, sociology, critical theory and cultural
studies for instance, conceptual languages are often deployed in order to discuss social
and cultural practices across society.2 Since the 60s and 70s, such disciplines have
enjoyed a high degree of interpenetration between disciplinary frameworks and
questions having a widely acknowledged social, cultural and political resonance.3
                                                 
2 See Bruce Robins, Secular Vocations. Intellectuals, Professionalism, Culture (London: Verso, 1993).
3 In some cases, disciplinary jargon can be an obstacle to the passage from academic disciplines to the
public sphere.
8This study combines different disciplines and research areas, in order to show
how intellectuality constitutes itself through a richness and diversity of approaches and
disciplinary horizons. The category of intellectual, in this sense, conceals a remarkable
diversity and plurality in the ways in which critical engagement is expressed and
publicly acknowledged. By highlighting the differences, as well as the similarities in the
approaches of Bourdieu and Eco, this study tries to account for some of the ways in
which critical engagement unfolds as a discourse of knowledge, as well as a discourse
on or about knowledge. Similarly, it shows that critical engagement is, on some level,
influenced by disciplinary boundaries and structures, while on another level it
challenges these boundaries and structures.
Since I consider myself a sociologist who is interested in literature or a literary
critic who is interested in sociology4, comparing Bourdieu and Eco was a rather
appealing option when I embarked on this research. Even if these two thinkers are in
many respects quite different, they represent well the wide range of nuances in the
spectrum of possible expressions of contemporary intellectuality. The rigour of
Bourdieu’s sociological analysis and the playfulness and indeterminacy of literature
associated with Eco’s fictional work, are perhaps two instances illustrating how the
ways of public intellectuality are many and diverse. In the eye of the general public,
Bourdieu is usually associated with the disciplines of sociology and political science,
while Eco is mostly known as a novel writer and cultural journalist, and to a lesser
extent as a semiotician.5 Academic disciplines like sociology, semiotics, or literary
studies are ways of looking at the world. Each discipline has its own box of tools
whereby its practitioners act upon the real and frame their own considerations, concerns,
arguments, and conclusions. A discipline, in this sense, is part of the experience of
knowledge itself. It shapes the way in which knowledge is apprehended, produced,
assembled, and ultimately ordered according to meaningful reference systems, which
can then be taught as coherent and unified bodies of knowledge.
                                                 
4 I hold a master’s degree in social sciences from the University of Lausanne and one in Italian literature
and philology of romance language from the University of Fribourg (Switzerland).
5 It should be added that Eco is also widely known, in Italy, for his frequent journalistic interventions on
newspapers and weekly magazines. Although less frequently than Eco, Bourdieu was also writing, like
many left intellectuals in France, in Le monde diplomatique and less frequently in Le monde.
9Even if Bourdieu and Eco are different intellectuals, their differences are by no
means irreconcilable. They both share a scholarly interest in art and literature,
continental and analytic philosophy, the study of culture and communication, and
anthropology, which they apply both in their theoretical work as well as when they
speak from the point of view of public intellectuals to a general public. As intellectuals,
they often confront similar issues, such as the way in which the media frame public
debates, or the relation between ideology and individuals. However, because of the
different academic disciplines to which they are associated, Bourdieu and Eco are, as
said, not easily comparable. Often regarded as two very different thinkers, they embody
a different ideal type of the intellectual. Some of their career choices have led them to
develop different and sometimes contrastive expressions of intellectuality. Eco for
instance turned into a popular novel writer in the early 80s and became increasingly
associated with and known to the wide public in this role. Bourdieu, for his part,
consolidated his role as a public sociologist by becoming professor at the Collège de
France in 1981, and by producing work that strengthened his theoretical concerns.
Interestingly, Bourdieu would often point out how his commitment to sociological
knowledge would preclude a more light-hearted experience of the world that he
assigned to artists. Bourdieu’s position exemplifies the idea that a specific disciplinary
commitment, while it grants certain advantages such as rational or systematic rigour, at
the same time excludes other ways to approach knowledge which are just as valuable
and meaningful.
Bourdieu never ventured, as Eco did, in the territories of fiction writing. He was
equally critical of the postmodern irony that disregards disciplinary boundaries, which
is typical of intellectuals like Richard Rorty or Eco. However, while advocating a strong
disciplinary identity, he often claimed a totalising role for sociology within the
intellectual field, thus turning sociology into a master-discipline. Bourdieu often
claimed he held the master key allowing him to access other disciplinary territories such
as philosophy or the history of art. His advocacy of the epistemological power of his
sociological savoir-faire is an interesting example of transdisciplinarity that will be
further discussed in this study. Bourdieu’s sociology is not just an instrument to expand
one’s knowledge beyond traditional disciplinary boundaries: Bourdieu builds a
disciplined world from which one cannot escape, when one realizes that everything is
social. Bourdieu’s social world resembles a carefully designed labyrinth that evokes
10
possible comparisons with Eco’s (and Borges’) interest in the labyrinth as an
epistemological metaphor. While Eco places a labyrinth at the very heart of the
narrative mechanism of Il nome della rosa, Bourdieu multiplies his references to the
presence of social factors accounting for the manifestation of both individuality and
collectivity, thus creating a logic of practice within which there is, so to speak, no way
out of culture and society.6
Disciplines are neither something static, nor object-like entities. They are ways
to organise and reorganize encyclopaedias of contemporary and past cultures. As part of
a rhetoric of knowledge, they demarcate an epistemological space on a map of
knowledge whose reliefs can change according to the eye, or the mind, of the beholder.
This study purports to show how the work of Bourdieu and Eco extends and widens the
epistemological territories covered by the academic disciplines within which these two
thinkers have been formed. In fact, Bourdieu and Eco have contributed both to the
popularization of sociology and semiotics outside of academia as much as they have
opened up new and exciting interdisciplinary experiences. This study tackles some of
the forms and modalities whereby, by addressing the question of disciplinary limits, the
work of Bourdieu and Eco produces an original intellectual output.
Throughout this study, I contend that interdisciplinarity does neither exclude nor
render obsolete existing disciplines. On the contrary, the most interesting, solid and
long-lasting examples of interdisciplinary experiments require a thorough knowledge
and mastering of one or more academic disciplines. As I will maintain, solid grounding
in one discipline, rather than being an obstacle to interdisciplinarity, facilitates it. As the
examples of Bourdieu and Eco show, disciplines, like doctrines, can be transcended
only once they are fully conquered. Once fully conquered they appear in their
contingency, not as absolute statements but rather as vehicles for knowledge.7 Some of
the possibilities initiated by Bourdieu and Eco to create interdisciplinary ways of
                                                 
6 As I will show in chapter two, by practicing a particular brand of self-reflexive sociology, Bourdieu
scrutinizes his own professional career and examines it as a series of moves on the labyrinthine
chessboard of society.
7 It is perhaps on this ground that the different meanings of the term discipline meet and create a common
space of convergence not only between academic disciplines, but also between all kinds of practices
(intellectual, artistic, spiritual etc.) which revolve around the search, the production and the distribution of
knowledge.
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producing knowledge are still partially unexplored, and await to be shaped creatively.
This study is an attempt to respond to this call for intellectual creativity and
interdisciplinarity. If maps of knowledge already exist, it is still possible to draw new
paths within the known territories.
In exploring the triangulation of the ideas of disciplinarity, interdisciplinarity, and
creativity I need to consider the following question. Do Bourdieu and Eco have
something specific which makes them good candidates to illustrate the ideas of
disciplinarity, interdisciplinarity and creativity as defined in this study? I recognize that
there are a number of intellectuals - like Michel Foucault or Roland Barthes, to name
just two - which would perhaps be good examples of the kind of disciplinarity,
interdisciplinarity and creativity I discuss. In this sense, I am aware that the criteria
which guided my choice of Bourdieu and Eco are flexible enough to accommodate
other intellectuals.8
Yet, in another sense the choice of Bourdieu and Eco is symptomatic of one of
the key issues that fostered the centrality of interdisciplinarity within academia. In the
development of interdisciplinarity since the 6os, the humanities and the social sciences
have influenced each other in unprecedented ways. Without losing their relative
independence as autonomous fields of studies, their recurrent interactions have been
very beneficial on both sides. Social scientists have become more aware of issues of
representation, textuality, and interpretation, and humanists have been keener to explore
and integrate within their scholarly investigations methods and insights from
anthropology, sociology and political science.9 Nonetheless, in spite of this reciprocal
influence, not many intellectuals have been able to engage with both fields in the way
Bourdieu and Eco have done so, showing a mastery of the conceptual language and a
thorough knowledge of the key issues and debates that characterize these fields. In this
                                                 
8 However, in arguing that the works of Bourdieu and Eco demonstrate a kind of intellectual creativity
that preserves the duality of disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity, I also engage with a view of creativity
that might not necessarily be very helpful in the case of intellectuals such as Jacques Derrida, for whom
the very notions of disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity might not even apply.
9 See Julie Thompson Klein, Humanities, Culture, and Interdisciplinarity (Albany: State Univeristy of
New York, 2005), especially chapters two and three.
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sense, this study pays tribute to the ability of Bourdieu and Eco to foster the dialogue
between the disciplines of the social sciences and the humanities.
 Intellectuals have always been involved in defining who is an intellectual and
what an intellectual does. The notion of intellectual, as I explain in chapter one, can be
defined in different ways. A number of current understandings of the intellectual tend to
crystallize around political engagement, often within the media. In this study I provide
an alternative definition of the intellectual, one that is turned towards the exploration of
epistemic reflexivity within the academic field rather than outside of it, in the sphere of
political discourse or within the media. The reason for focusing on epistemic reflexivity
within the academic field stems from the following consideration; even if the public
engagement of Bourdieu and Eco is very visible, it is only the tip of an iceberg whose
main body lies in the waters of the academic field. In this sense, the status of public
intellectual of Bourdieu and Eco is the culmination of a long process which for the most
part takes place on the academic stage.
My choice of Bourdieu and Eco was also justified by the continuity that exists
between their work as scholars and their engagement as intellectuals. In this study I
investigate how Bourdieu and Eco problematize the idea of academic expertise without
setting apart the role of scholar from that of public intellectual. In this sense, there are a
number of famous public intellectuals that would not fit this criterion. For instance, in
the case of Noam Chomsky the continuity between the scholarly work and the role of
public intellectual that characterizes Bourdieu and Eco does not exist. Instead, the
scholar and the public intellectual are perceived as separate personae.
In order to dissipate potential confusion as to the object of this study, I wish to clarify
that this study is not, strictly speaking, on the public engagement of intellectuals.
Rather, it describes some of the ways through which knowledge is conceived and
developed by individual intellectuals within the academic field, and focuses on the place
of intellectuals within this field. The main focus is on how intellectual styles develop
within the academic field, and on how the interplay of intellectuality, interdisciplinarity
and creativity can account for it.
This study provides an analysis of knowledge practices academics are already
familiar with. But what is, one might ask, the point of examining these practices?
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Reflecting upon knowledge cultures places one in a position to examine things that are
often taken for granted. Being familiar with something does not necessarily mean being
fully aware of something. Sometimes people do things because they have learned to do
them, but they are not always in a position to account for or question what they do.
Doing something does not automatically entail that one knows why or what one is
doing. Precisely for this reason, I am hoping to raise the awareness of the presence of
knowledge cultures that are defined by practices, norms, and values that have a direct
impact on the way academics conceive knowledge. The point is precisely that when one
examines practice, one might be well placed to explain why we do certain things rather
than others. When one knows what one is doing, one is already in a position to do things
differently. The privilege of theory (if theory has a privilege) is that it allows one to
observe things from a different point of view: not necessarily a better one, but a
different one. Theory is the other side of practice, but it is by no means unrelated to it:
the academic field is particularly fertile for showing the links between the one and the
other.
The general question I am addressing concerns how intellectuals manipulate
symbolic resources such as conceptual languages, theories, and methods in order to
negotiate their position within the intellectual field. I am interested in looking at how
thinkers come to hold prominent positions by working out an intellectual self-narrative
that is both creative and interdisciplinary. Intellectuals like Bourdieu and Eco are
“conceptual artists”, therefore the choice of concepts that assume a central place in their
theoretical orientation is of primary importance. Concepts such as open work, model
reader or overinterpretation, in the case of Eco, of self-reflexivity, field and habitus in
the case of Bourdieu, are not only among the most important items in the conceptual
vocabularies of Bourdieu and Eco. These concepts also play a central role in this study:
they are privileged routes into the examination of the work of Bourdieu and Eco.
The concepts academics develop are relevant inasmuch as they constitute an
intellectual trademark. Like the signature on a work of art, concepts constitute a mark of
identity, because they allow one to associate these concepts with a specific thinker.
When concepts are closely associated with thinkers, they often account for intellectual
originality and novelty. The concepts of Bourdieu and Eco that will be discussed in this
study have been considered, in their respective contexts of elaboration, as original and
novel. They have been essential in the careers of Eco and Bourdieu inasmuch as they
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have allowed them to craft a powerful position within relevant intellectual debates.
These concepts have appeared essential to these debates, and have been presented by
their authors as the adequate response to theoretical dilemmas. The proposed solutions
to these dilemmas often came, as I will argue, under the form of the possibility of
unifying the contingent with the contextual, the individual with the social background,
the agency with the structure. The concepts for which Bourdieu and Eco have become
known have a characteristic synthesising power that allows the reconciliation of
opposing views. A concept is by definition a synthesis of different elements. Concepts
encode a whole explanation in one word; but not all concepts show the propensity to
unify or reconcile opposing views: some may be used with the intention to question or
support a given point of view, but might be lacking dialectical flexibility.
In examining Bourdieu’s and Eco’s concepts, I will emphasize their strong
dialectical element. I will also argue that the epistemic strategies which are concealed
behind Eco’s and Bourdieu’s concepts demonstrate a creative manipulation of
intellectual resources in view of maximizing academic profit. As it sometimes happens
in the case of highly sophisticated debates, it is often not clear whether a solution is
proposed in order to solve a problem or if a problem is created in order to call forth and
justify a solution. The same can be stated for the key concepts of Bourdieu and Eco that
will be examined in this study. Have these concepts been elaborated only in order to
respond to a debate or to a pre-existing problem, or have they also contributed in
creating the problems they are supposedly offering the solutions to? This question is
very relevant. It emphasizes the very existence of strategies whereby something is
presented, from a certain viewpoint, as problematic, and underlines the fact that
concepts come to be regarded as valuable and long lasting contributions to widely
accepted bodies of knowledge. The academic field is a place where things are, unlike
other places, often presented as problematic. Assuming a critical posture is a
preferential option for academics; approaching things as being essentially complex is
part of what they do.
Creating a question that challenges the state of knowledge, whether within the
confines of a discipline or more globally, is one of the strategies academics employ in
order to express their belonging to a particular institutional context. In many cases, both
the problem and the solution to the problem are worked out interdependently. In fact, it
is often said that asking the right questions is as important as finding the right answers.
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Some of the concepts of Bourdieu and Eco will be analysed accordingly: they can be
understood as questions as well as answers to theoretical problems. In order to work out
solutions to a problem or in order to frame a problem in a new way, academics
sometimes employ creativity and interdisciplinarity as preferential strategies.
Interdisciplinarity and creativity thus refer to ways in which knowledge is selected,
organised, combined, interpreted as well as presented. In spite of this, these notions are
not generally used in order to explain the development of an intellectual style. They are
often seen as merely derivative of a thought of an author, or used in order to label a
thinker so as to stress his or her versatility. In this study I will consider
interdisciplinarity and creativity as an integral part of the thought of Bourdieu and Eco.
I propose that interdisciplinary and creativity is what makes the work of Bourdieu and
Eco distinctive.
Even if thus far I pointed out that interdisciplianrity and creativity are common
practices within academia, I want to stress how the work of Bourdieu and Eco constitute
a rather peculiar case: a case in which interdisciplinarity and creativity also create
favourable (if not ideal) conditions for the exercise of public intellectuality. Creativity
and interdisciplinarity appear as rather unique when they are combined with the exercise
of public intellectuality. If, as I argued earlier, this study does not engage with the
practice of public intellectuality per se, it does nonetheless present interdisciplinarity
and creativity as being somehow constitutive of public intellectuality. Furthermore, I
intend to submit the notions of interdisciplinarity and creativity to an analytical exercise
with the aim of re-assessing some of the current understandings of these terms. When
exploring these notions, I have tried to keep a balance between applying them as an
interpretative grid as opposed to considering them as the product of discourse analysis
on the works of Bourdieu and Eco.10
When examining the intellectual styles of Bourdieu and Eco, I will refer to their
extensive body of work in a selective manner. In general, I will comment on their works
in accordance with the specific agenda set out by individual chapters. In most chapters, I
seek a balance between the exploration of a theme in relation to Bourdieu and Eco and
within the context of a more general study of intellectual styles. Chapter two and
                                                 
10In order to preserve a balance between an inductive and a deductive approach, it was important to have a
few preliminary lines of investigations as well as a preliminary critical assessment of the notions of
interdisciplinarity and creativity, which I have provided in chapter one.
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chapter three illustrate this choice. In chapter five my choice of works will take into
consideration a particular historical period, so as to focus on the early moments of the
careers of Bourdieu and Eco. In chapter four the choice of works is subordinated to a
more general theoretical aim; in this chapter I focus on some of the aspects of the work
of Bourdieu and Eco I have introduced earlier in the study. In chapter six I examine
some works Bourdieu and Eco published when their status of intellectuals had already
been largely established. As in chapter four, I relate the analysis of Bourdieu’s and
Eco’s key concepts to a more general line of argument.11
I am aware that the choice of works of Bourdieu and Eco might appear, in some
chapters, rather eclectic and unsystematic. In other chapters the reader might find it
easier to find a chronological line of enquiry. It seems important to me to stress that the
organising principle of this study is topological rather than chronological, and that the
choice of works has been subordinated to the particular thematic development this study
takes. I wanted to frame my own narrative about intellectual styles, how they develop,
how they become an intellectual trademark, and how they contribute to the definition of
one’s identity. In the landscape of post-modern aesthetics and theory, and in the artistic
and intellectual movements growing out of the 70s and 80s and beyond, style is often
equated with a way to carry a message forward.12 In focusing my attention on how
intellectual styles develop, I examine how Bourdieu and Eco develop some of the long
lasting features of their intellectual profile by creatively combining symbolic resources
present in the intellectual field.
Another point I wish to stress is that this study provides a multidisciplinary
framework. This is apparent in the flexible use of conceptual languages I display, as
well as in the change of perspective I adopt when I want to diversify my approach.
Essentially I am pursuing a set of questions moving across disciplinary territories.
Amidst the range of possible approaches available to a socio-cultural analysis of the
academic field, I have largely privileged two lines of enquiry. The first tends towards
literary theory and the second could be loosely defined as sociology of knowledge. I
                                                 
11 The same concepts of Bourdieu and Eco will be discussed in different chapters. In each chapter I add
something to what I have previously said about these concepts, but I also offer a different context within
which I show the relevance these concepts take from different angles.
12 The exhibition Postmodernism. Style and Subversion, 1970-1990 held at the Victoria and Albert
Museum, London (24 September 2011-15 January 2012) illustrates well the centrality of style in art and
popular culture from 1970 to 1990.
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trust that the multidisciplinary framework within which this study has been conceived
will not create difficulties in following my line of reasoning: I hope that such
framework will be seen as a richness, as well as suitable to the topic this study purports
to explore.
In the final part of this introduction, I shall give an overview of the chapters’ content.
Chapter one discusses the relevance of the notion of interdisciplinarity in relation to
public intellectuals’ creativity and with regards to Bourdieu and Eco. This chapter offers
an overview of the themes discussed in the study. It gives important information about
the structure of the study and about the particular angle from which Bourdieu and Eco
will be approached. It introduces the different research fields that inform the writing of
this study, thus setting the stage for my discussion of intellectuality, interdisciplinary
and creativity.
In chapters two and three I look at the development of the careers of Bourdieu
and Eco as manifesting the interplay between intellectuality, interdisciplinarity, and
creativity. I emphasize some of the dynamics whereby disciplinarity as well as
interdisciplinary knowledge are constituted. Such dynamics include critical
confrontations between disciplines, interpenetrations of disciplines, as well as the
exploration of an epistemological topos across disciplines. In these chapters I also
pursue the discussion on the significance of the concept of intellectual narrative
developed in chapter one. By reference to the notions of self-reflexivity and intellectual
polyphony, I illustrate how intellectual styles implement creative thinking and foster the
development of interdisciplinary theory.
More specifically, in chapter two I discuss Bourdieu’s poetics of the intellectual,
suggesting that Bourdieu’s sociological savoir-faire and his disciplinary expertise lie at
the very heart of his role of intellectual. I examine how the practice of a very peculiar
brand of self-reflexive sociology engages Bourdieu in posing the question of the
relation between the social-scientific intellectual and the knowledge practices he
engages with. I also stress the way in which Bourdieu discusses the position of
sociology within the French intellectual field, how he portrays the figure of the
sociologist as an agent provocateur challenging the disciplinary boundaries, and the
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epistemological standards, of distinguished academic disciplines such as philosophy or
history of art.13
Chapter three deals with the ways in which Eco’s intellectual project has taken
the shape of a flexible intellectual polyphony thanks to which Eco has been able to play,
often within the same text (as in the case of Il nome della Rosa (1980)) the multiple
roles of critic of mass culture, semiotician, fiction writer, and post-modern intellectual.
The chapter examines the notion of intellectual polyphony in relation to the increase of
Eco’s readership. It pinpoints how Eco’s intellectual profile develops within a profound
continuity of his theoretical concerns. Eco’s theoretical concerns revolve around the
idea of culture as a fundamentally dynamic and creative process. By introducing Eco’s
understanding of cultural processes, this chapter will also expand on the importance of
creativity with regard to the study of intellectuality. In particular, the novel combination
of existing cultural matrices will be highlighted as one of the main creative components
of Eco’s intellectual polyphony.
The two introductory chapters on Bourdieu and Eco illustrate how individual
thinkers interpret and reframe existing bodies of knowledge that sometimes coexist with
the definition of a particular discipline. In chapter four, I will work along a series of
conceptual couples such as singular and plural, and individual and society, in order to
show the pertinence of an approach considering intellectuals and the contexts in which
they operate as mutually informing dimensions of intellectuality. This chapter proposes
a theoretical framework within which to explore further the considerations of the first
three chapters. The aim is to illustrate how ideas, theories and arguments, thanks to
which intellectuals become known to a general public, are developed within a set of
networks (institutions, social groups, intellectual communities, and disciplinary
structures) without which intellectuals would not be able to define their originality.
While the chapter offers a theoretical framework elaborating the considerations
introduced by the introductory chapters, it also provides new insights supporting the
claims about the interrelations between intellectual creativity and interdisciplinarity.
                                                 
13 My use of the French expression agent provocateur with regards to Bourdieu has been inspired by
Michael Grenfell, Pierre Bourdieu. Agent Provocateur (London: Continuum, 2004).
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Furthermore, this chapter introduces the main lines of research of the new sociology of
ideas, a dynamic field of research that will be integrated in the final part of this study.
One of the ways whereby Bourdieu and Eco have developed interdisciplinary
pathways to knowledge within their own disciplines is by confronting the shortcomings
of structuralism. In chapter five on Bourdieu, Eco, and structuralism I argue that the
pathways whereby academic intellectuals find their own voice go through the critical
engagement between their innermost originality and the accepted authority of theories
that constitute a symbolic force within the intellectual field. In so doing, I illustrate the
importance of the theoretical considerations about the mutually informing concepts of
individual and society elaborated in chapter four. Chapter five suggests how the critical
engagement with the structural paradigm is a key in the development of Bourdieu’s and
Eco’s intellectual trajectory.14 Structuralism is a good example of an interdisciplinary
movement that became very relevant to a range of disciplines in the humanities and the
social sciences. Structuralism’s interdisciplinarity was perfectly compatible with a
disciplinary division of knowledge, given that individual disciplines were implementing
the critical language of structuralism while preserving their disciplinary identities.
Structuralism operates on the basis of a combination of potentially heterogeneous
elements within a single framework, a single formula: the structure. It stresses the
relation between different elements over the individual elements. As Arthur Koestler
eloquently shows, creativity relies on a combination of different matrices or patterns
that have, prior to the combination and taken individually, nothing particularly
creative.15 While, from this perspective, structuralism was clearly a creative force (by
bringing different elements within the same framework), there was also, as Bourdieu
and Eco (among others) have highlighted, something static inhibiting a creative
approach to culture and agency. This chapter helps to see what, according to Bourdieu
and Eco, structuralism left out of its own intellectual agenda, and how this omission
resulted in a lack of creative potential. Moreover, as Bourdieu and Eco maintain,
structuralism’s inclination towards objectivism produced a fracture on an existing map
of knowledge by setting apart two territories: the objective and the subjective. In chapter
five I have recounted, among other things, the story of the attempt at reintegrating the
                                                 
14 The chapter is intended as a specific case study demonstrating the practical implications of the
considerations developed in chapter four.
15 Arthur Koestler, The Act of Creation (1964) (London: Picador, 1977).
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creative subject within the theoretical approaches of Bourdieu and Eco. By pinpointing
the “dark side” of structuralism, Bourdieu and Eco provided the conditions that fostered
the possibility to reintroduce creative agency.
Every chapter of this study illustrates how intellectuals engage with the cultures
within which they operate. If I start this study by examining the notion of cultural
intellectual, I conclude by examining the notion of intellectual cultures. In fact, the
conclusive chapter six, by developing a meta-critical understanding of the intellectual
practices that define academic work, takes a step back from the rather close-up
perspective developed in chapter five. The aim of chapter six is to propose a careful
generalisation of some of the observations developed in the preceding chapters while
offering a consistent argument in favour of the idea that intellectual creativity can lead
to a reflexive view of intellectuality. The chapter attempts to show how some of the key
themes of the thought of Bourdieu and Eco lead to a reflexive awareness of the norms
that regulate academic work. As recent research on creativity has shown, intellectual
creativity, when adequately cultivated, can lead to the development of social wisdom
informed by ethical awareness.16 Chapter six, precisely, looks at how epistemic
reflexivity fosters the development of social wisdom with regards to intellectuality.
                                                 
16 See for instance Kevin Hilton, ‘Boundless Creativity’, in The Dark Side of Creativity , ed. by David H.
Cropley, Arthur J. Cropley, James C. Kaufman, and Mark A. Runco (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2010), pp.134-155.
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Chapter 1: Intellectual Narratives. Intellectuals, Disciplinary
Fields, and Creativity
‘One does not perform acts of criticism by breaking free of the profession’s norms
and constraints whether in the service of timeless masterpieces or in the name of
political liberation, and whenever the claim to have broken free is made you can be
sure that it is underwritten, authorized, and rendered intelligible by the very
disciplinary boundaries it purports to have left behind’.17
‘L’intellectuel est quelqu’un qui se mêle de ce qui ne le regarde pas’.18
1.1. Introductory remarks
This study maps out an interdisciplinary territory within which existing theoretical
projects converge. Some of the concerns of this study emerge directly from the analysis
of a textual corpus dealing with the concept of the intellectual.19 While this chapter
draws some of its main ideas form this textual corpus, it also develops the notion of
creativity, by showing that ideas are generated in a space of interaction between
individual thinkers and structured bodies of knowledge. By identifying research areas in
which the notion of the intellectual can be examined from an interdisciplinary
perspective, this chapter introduces the main themes discussed in the study. It also gives
important information about the structure of the study, about its interdisciplinary
approach, its underlying hypothesis, and about the particular angle from which
Bourdieu and Eco will be approached. 20
My understanding of the expression “intellectual narratives” proposed in the title
is that these narratives are both narratives of intellectuals (narratives that define the
figure and the role of intellectuals) and narratives by intellectuals (narratives that are
                                                 
17 Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), p.179.
18 Jean-Paul Sartre, Situations, VIII. Autour de 68 (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), p.377.
19 Even if perhaps not exhaustive, this textual corpus was fairly representative of the main points raised by
literature on intellectuals. For a list of works see general bibliography.
20At its inception the project was centred on the definition of the intellectual. In its most advanced
developments, it is less concerned with individuals than with communicative processes. The reasons for
the shift of emphasis will be examined in this chapter and thoroughly explored in chapter four.
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thought of and conceptualised by intellectuals). In this double sense of the expression
“intellectual narratives”, intellectuals are both objects and subjects of these narratives.
While intellectuals create narratives, they are also partly defined by them.
In the first sense, intellectuals narrate society and knowledge: by telling a story
about society and about knowledge, they shape the very codes whereby a society
describes itself. A narration, in this sense, is not just descriptive, but also prescriptive:
intellectuals propose conceptions of societies and knowledge around particular values,
such as reason, order, or stability. Every society, in this sense, depends upon some kind
of normative frame. Normative frames designate, at various levels of social life, what is
acceptable, desirable, but also conventional or deviant.
More generally, normative frames are guidelines according to which different
scenarios can be interpreted against the baseline of a common set of norms. As authors
like Zygmunt Bauman and Terry Eagleton maintain, modern intellectuals have had a
privileged role in conceptualising and producing these guidelines and set of norms.21
If intellectuals can be seen as conceptual artists, they are also necessarily part of
the society they describe and contribute to shaping. As such they cannot be said to be
completely outside the narratives they produce. While they have a central role in writing
the script of the social play, they are also part of the script and characters in this play.22
It is precisely this dialectic between narrating society and knowledge and being narrated
by society and knowledge that this study, and this chapter in particular, addresses.23 This
chapter introduces the concept of narrative as a descriptive device: the concept of
narrative lays emphasis on the essentially creative component thanks to which public
                                                 
21 See Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters. On Modernity, Post-modernity and Intellectuals
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), and Terry Eagleton, After Theory (London: Penguin, 2004).
22 Intellectuals find themselves negotiating their definitions of society with regards to definitions and
conceptualisations that are already there, created by previous generations of intellectuals. This chapter,
and more generally this study, will consider from different angles this double aspect (narrating society
and knowledge, and being narrated by society and knowledge). These two aspects of the role of
intellectuals are often interdependent. The role of narrators of society implies that one performs a social
role that is, at least partially, defined within a social setting and against the background of existing
communicative practices.
23 The concept of intellectual narrative will be further developed in chapter two and chapter three. These
chapters will introduce Bourdieu and Eco, and for this reason are quite monographic.
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intellectuals narrate society whilst shaping their own social identity.24 This chapter also
addresses the fact that intellectual creativity develops in settings in which intellectuals
are confronted with social constraints. These constraints tend to limit their creativity
inasmuch as they provide social frameworks fostering conventionalized intellectual
behaviours. However, as this study will maintain throughout its different chapters, these
limits and constraints are also beneficial to intellectual activity, insofar as they provide
an element of challenge and a source of motivation for intellectual engagement of a
creative kind.25
The structure of this chapter is as follows. After introducing the main hypothesis
that this study explores, it will present a historical portrait of the intellectual. This
portrait is not meant to offer an exhaustive description of the history of intellectuals.
Rather, it shows how history is the product of representation. Official written and
spoken representations depend on which sources are considered more authoritative by a
given culture at a given time, and on how these sources are approached, interpreted, and
questioned. Intellectuals have largely contributed in writing and conceptualizing not just
history in general: they have also largely contributed to writing their own history as well
as creating their own myths. Such a role, often underscored, illustrates one of the main
aspects of the definition of the intellectual: the contribution that intellectuals give to
knowledge and culture transcends the narrowness of disciplinary limits in order to
address a much wider public.26
The second part of this chapter focuses more extensively on the figure and the
role of the intellectual against the background of the historical emergence of modern
academia. As I will be showing, modern academia furthers and partly creates the
contemporary disciplinary structures with which we are familiar nowadays. The figure
                                                 
24 Identity is very a complex notion, and many commentators have underlined the increasingly fragmented
forms that it acquires in contemporary western societies. See Zygmunt Bauman, Identity (Cambridge:
Polity, 2010).
25 On the idea that social conventions are both a limiting force and a constructive challenge to the
development of creativity see, among others, The Dark Side of Creativity, ed. by David H. Cropley,
Arthur J. Cropley, James C. Kaufman, and Mark A. Runco.
26 The expression “collective imaginary”, often used to indicate a form of knowledge shared by the
general public, reveals precisely this aspect of the work of intellectuals. What we call collective
imaginary includes, among other things, a particular representation of history, society, and knowledge.
These representations are elaborated by and large by intellectuals, and are part of the knowledge delivered
by institutional systems such as schools.
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of the modern intellectual, as I will show, defines itself against this growing
disciplinarisation of knowledge, by both challenging it and by using the knowledge
resources made available by disciplines. By discussing the presence of disciplinary
structures as a mark of modern academia, I intend to show how intellectuals’
interdisciplinarity constructs itself within the context of a dialogue between disciplinary
communities, and in reference to the presence of a general public.
Against the background sketched out in the second part of the chapter, the third
part will further discuss the interdisciplinary character of the knowledge produced by
intellectuals. I will present more in detail the key research areas, such as intellectual
creativity and the sociology of ideas, which this study explores in relation to the works
of Bourdieu and Eco. I will also show why these research areas are relevant to the study
of public intellectuality. The conclusion of the chapter will offer a synthesis of the main
points addressed, and will briefly introduce the next chapters of the study by addressing
the link between this first introductory chapter and the rest of the study.
1.2. Underlying Hypothesis
By addressing how Bourdieu’s and Eco’s work contributes to a better understanding of
both the creative and the interdisciplinary nature of intellectuality, this study explores
the following hypothesis. Within a given academic discipline, scholars who become
known to the general public as public intellectuals are often interested in exploring and
in testing the limits of disciplinary fields. In so doing, they challenge the norms that
define academic professionalism and the growing specialisation of knowledge of
academia. This study illustrates how knowledge practices that explore disciplinary
limits, while sometimes taking the form of explicit intellectual challenges, are often not
explicitly presented as such. What the study pinpoints is that often, at the very heart of
the thought of an intellectual, and of his or her attitude towards the production of
knowledge, there is not only a rational, but also an emotional and existential response
to these very disciplinary limits.
This hypothesis engages with the definition of the public intellectual given by
Stefan Collini and discussed later in this chapter. According to this definition, the
category of intellectual, besides indicating a ‘socio-professional category’ also denotes
‘those who are regarded as possessing some kind of cultural authority, that is, who
employ an acknowledged intellectual position or achievement in addressing a broader,
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non-specialist public’.27 This study further explores these complementary definitions in
the following way. It shows how creativity is an important aspect that intervenes when
public intellectuals challenge disciplinary boundaries. As a result, creative intellectuals
are likely to produce interdisciplinary knowledge in order to address a ‘broader, non-
specialist public’.28 In this sense, this study suggests the interplay of at least three
notions: intellectuality, interdisciplinarity, and creativity.
1.3. Questioning the notion of the intellectual
Even if this research is based on the work of two particular intellectuals, it does not
limit itself to comparing them. While consistent parts of this study will concentrate on
examining, alternatively, Bourdieu and Eco, in other parts the focus will be turned to
examining some aspects of the study of intellectual processes, with the intention to
move beyond the particular examples. Bourdieu and Eco will often be the starting
points for examining intellectual processes and the way such processes develop.
Conversely, studying the dynamics of intellectual processes will generate questions,
which will be examined in light of the works of Bourdieu and Eco. The theory-oriented
format of this study, and its partial autonomy from the two concrete examples, will be
made sufficiently clear and intelligible throughout the arguments developed within it.
Similarly, the existence of strong interdependences and links between the examples and
the theory will also be made clear.
This study addresses three main areas: the works of Bourdieu and Eco, the
literature on intellectuality, and the research areas considered in relation to this literature
(such as creativity, the new sociology of ideas, etc.). In terms of the chronology of the
study, the question of the definition of the intellectual was the starting point.29 At the
outset, I wanted to discuss the works of Bourdieu and Eco in light of this question. As
the research progressed, it also became clear that this question was going to generate a
slightly different set of questions, which would partly modify the methodological aim of
the project. From a certain point onwards, my initial question was re-elaborated in light
                                                 
27 Stefan Collini, Absent Minds. Intellectuals in Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 46-
47.
28 Stefan Collini, Absent Minds, p. 47.
29 With regards to this Stefan Collini’s Absent Minds. Intellectuals in Britain was particularly important in
providing a few preliminary orienting lines to the project.
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of some specific methodological concerns. As a result, the study became more clearly
focused on the relationship between intellectuals and the social context in which they
operate.
While initially my research focused on the notion of the intellectual, I realized
that by putting forward the notion of the intellectual without further specification, I
would lay exaggerated emphasis on the importance of the individual over the social
context. The very category of public intellectual, at least when used in the singular and
without further specification, presents some limits for a study that combines within a
single methodological framework the singularity of specific intellectuals and the
shaping influence of the social context. Historically, some of the most widely known
definitions of the intellectual, like the one put forward by Karl Mannheim or by Alvin
Gouldner, depict intellectuals as free-floating thinkers without consistent and limiting
bonds with the social context. Looking back at Gouldner’s definition of the intellectual,
Frank Furedi, the author of Where have all the intellectuals gone?, laments that ‘in
retrospect, one is struck by the inflated significance attached to the role of the
intellectual in the past. Gouldner’s caricature of the rise of a new class of intellectuals
appears today as an incomprehensible anachronism’.30
For the reason described above, it seemed appropriate to lay emphasis on the
idea of intellectual processes, by recurring to concepts such as intellectual narrative,
rather than on intellectuals as individuals. Without wanting to undervalue the idea of the
free-floating thinker, it appears that, in the context of the conception and the production
of ideas and theoretical worldviews shared and/or discussed by intellectual
communities, intellectual freedom goes hand in hand with the existence of constraints of
different kind, both practical and theoretical. As Louis Menand points out, intellectual
freedom is constantly challenged by the possibility of coercion, and ultimately depends
on finding a common ground between the interests of different social groups.31 The
notion of intellectual, like that of individual, focuses on individual aspects of
intellectual creation at the expenses of the social and communicative dimensions, which
                                                 
30 Frank Furedi, Where Have all the Intellectuals Gone? (London: Continuum, 2006), pp. 29-30. For the
notion of the intellectual as discussed by Mannheim and Gouldner, see Karl Mannheim, Ideology and
Utopia (London: Routledge,1936) and Alvin Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the
New Class (New York: Seabury Press,1979).
31 Louis Menand, ‘The limits of academic freedom’, in The future of Academic Freedom, ed. by Louis
Menand (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996) p.7.
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are necessarily intersubjective and collective.32 Moreover, the notion of intellectual,
when considered from a scholarly perspective, is not exempt from the kind of criticism
that reshaped the idea of author in contemporary literary theory. As Michel Foucault
suggests in the very first sentence of the essay ‘What is an author’, ‘the coming into
being of the notion of “author” constitutes the privileged moment of individualisation in
the history of ideas, knowledge, literature, philosophy, and the sciences’.33 What
Foucault’s sentence underlines is that the emergence of the idea of author is historically
concomitant with a larger phenomenon of individualisation.34 The notion of author is
the product of the intersection of several social and disciplinary discourses, and
therefore it is inextricably linked to the social background that informs the meaning of
these discourses and gives them a special place at the crossroads of particular
disciplinary paths. Hence, the historical emergence of the modern definition of the
notion of intellectual can be seen as being part of the larger phenomenon of
individualisation that Foucault is articulating.
1.4. Intellectuals and history
The collective noun intellectuals, as we understand it today, came into use in France
around 1898 and shortly afterwards in Italy. It started circulating within the press at the
beginning of 20th century France, when a group of artists claimed the revision of the
trial against Alfred Dreyfus, and published the so-called ‘manifeste des intellectuels’.35
Since then, the meaning of the term has acquired both positive and negative
connotations. This is because the intellectual provokes contrasting views; he or she
generates seriousness as well as laughter, admiration as well as derision, approval as
well as criticism, respect as well as disrespect. Such contrastive views are unsurprising:
intellectuals are figures negotiating their roles on the borderline between normality and
                                                 
32 On the inter-subjective nature of the notion of academic freedom see for instance Richard Rorty’s
contribution to the volume edited by Louis Menand; Richard Rorty, ‘Does Academic freedom have
philosophical presuppositions?’ in The future of Academic Freedom, pp.21-43.
33 Michel Foucault, ‘What is an author?’ in The Foucault Reader, ed. by Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin
Books, 1991), pp.101-120, p.101.
34 See also the work of Norbert Elias on the process of individualisation in western societies: Norbert
Elias, The Civilizing Process. Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000)
35 See Pascal Ory and Jean-François Sirinelli. Les intellectuels en France. De l’affaire Dreyfus à nos jours
(Paris: Perrin, 2004); Stefan Collini. Absent Minds. Intellectuals in Britain; Zygmunt Bauman.
Legislators and Interpreters.
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eccentricity. They are often seen, rightly or not, as challenging the authority of
specialists, and are deemed responsible for questioning the limits and the boundaries of
knowledge.36
In Absent Minds. Intellectuals in Britain Stefan Collini notes that the noun
intellectual can be divided into three main uses. The first one denotes a ‘socio-
professional category within a comprehensive classification of types of occupation’.
Intellectual, in this specific sense, is often opposed to manual, on the ground that it
denotes a sphere of activity in which ‘a primary involvement with ideas and culture’ is
central. The term here often has a discriminative value against those occupations ‘whose
orientation and purpose are more directly practical’. The second sense of the term
intellectual, as Collini notes, ‘may be called “the subjective sense”’. This sense
‘emphasises a particular commitment to truth seeking, rumination, analysis, argument,
often pursued as ends in themselves’. Collini terms this sense subjective, as ‘it is
difficult to isolate any external markers of membership to this category’. The third sense
of the noun intellectual ‘focuses on those who are regarded as possessing some kind of
cultural authority, that is, who employ an acknowledged intellectual position or
achievement in addressing a broader, non-specialistic public’. This use, notes Collini,
may be termed the ‘cultural sense’.37
Without losing sight of the interplay between these three meanings, this study
focuses more specifically on the interplay between the intellectual as a ‘socio-
professional category’ and the ‘cultural sense’ of the noun intellectual. However, a
quick look at the extensive literature on intellectuals reveals that the figure of the
intellectual is a multi-faceted one. For this reason, it would be wrong to think that,
                                                 
36 ‘Initially, therefore, the term entered common currency in France carrying a freight of mocking and
pejorative associations, but, as so often in such cases, those to whom the term was applied came in time to
claim it proudly as a self-description’. In Stefan Collini, Absent Minds. Intellectuals in Britain, p.21.
Collini offers some insightful examples of linguistic usage of the word revealing the negative perception
of intellectuals. Some of these examples insist on the ‘particular form of pretentiousness or self-
importance’ of intellectuals, on their use of an ‘inappropriately abstract or complex vocabulary’ pointing
to an ‘unjustifiable intellectual superiority’ (p.24). Accordingly, an intellectual is often depicted as
someone who ‘is occupied with theory and principles rather than practice (…) aloof from the world (…)
and car(ing) little for the ordinary pleasures of the senses’ (p.27). While Collini mainly surveys the
linguistic usage of the word intellectual during the course of twentieth century Britain, as he rightly points
out ‘the layers of meaning and association deposited by the earlier evolution of the word are still available
in certain contexts’ (p.38). All page numbers in the footnote refer to Stefan Collini, Absent Minds.
Intellectuals in Britain.
37 For the passages quoted in the paragraph see Stefan Collini, Absent Minds. Intellectuals in Britain, pp.
46-47.
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beyond Collini’s useful categorization, there is a consensus around the definition of the
term. Even if it is possible to find a common agreement around a core definition, the
ways to express intellectuality are many and diverse, and cannot be inferred from a
single definition.
Even if the term public intellectual often describes a modern
phenomenon, intellectuals have a much longer history.38 In fact, social figures
specialised in the role of creators and mediators of cultures have existed well before the
collective noun intellectual started to become of common use. Such figures have been
identified with various terms. In the Middle-Ages, for instance, the Latin word clericum
indicated a historical precursor of modern intellectuals.39 At the time, the institution of
the church, along with the emerging universities, ensured the communication and the
mediation between the written culture and the people.40 Even if the Middle-Ages did not
use the noun intellectual as it is used today, the adjective intellectual, and the noun
intellect, were important pieces of the philosophical vocabulary of the time, and
constituted a central element in the edifice of medieval theology. In fact, the intellect
designated a sphere of knowledge considered more refined than sensible experience. As
a faculty allowing human beings the possibility of engaging with divine knowledge, the
                                                 
38 ‘The public intellectual has been with us for a long time, even if we ignore the ancient world. His
exemplars include Machiavelli, Milton, Voltaire, and Montesquieu, and his ideologist is Kant, who linked
philosophy to politics through the argument that only morally defensible politics is one based on reason’.
Richard Posner, Public Intellectuals. A study of Decline, p.26.
39 Respectively chierico (Italian) and clerc (French). Both the Italian chierico and the French clerc derive
from the Latin clericu(m) which, following the development of medieval Latin into the romance
languages, gave rise, precisely, to both clerc and chierico. The word, as used in the Middle-Ages, refers
primarily to the religious sphere, and more broadly to a cultivated person who has some degree of
mastering of the written culture.
40 This idea of intellectuals bridging the gap between written and popular culture is also central, as it will
be discussed in chapter two, in Antonio Gramsci’s conception of intellectuals. Gramsci sees intellectuals
as cultural operators ensuring the communication of ideas between social groups. In a similar way in
which the clerc of the Middle-Ages mediates between theological culture and the people, in secularised
societies modern intellectuals mediate between the culture of specialists and different publics. Besides
being designated by the terms clerc and chierico, the intellectual of the Middle-Ages was also named in
other ways: magister, doctor, philosophus, litteratus. All these terms refer, in substance, to someone who
knows Latin, who can read and, possibly, write. As the medieval historian Jacques Le Goff notes, The
Middle Age intellectual ‘è un uomo di libri (che non ama prestare) e della parola e insiste su ciò che lo
differenzia dal lavoratore manuale allontanandolo da lui (...)’. In Jacques Le Goff, ‘L’uomo medievale’,
in L’uomo medievale , ed. by Jacques Le Goff (Roma: Laterza, 2008), pp.1-41, p. 22. Le Goff’s
contribution has been translated by Maria Garin.
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intellect was both an instrument and a mediating point between human beings and
theological truth.41
1.5 Intellectuals: distance and engagement
Intellectuals, as a social category, are defined in relation to society and to the values that
society holds. At the same time, as creators of cultural discourses, they influence how
societies represent themselves; intellectuals often set the tone of important debates on
such questions as the place of individuals within society. Intellectual discourses, when
fully developed, leave a mark in the way in which particular historical periods are
defined and perceived by the posterity. Historical periods can be discussed, for this very
reason, as intellectual narratives, in the double sense indicated in the introductory
section. Sharing a common view of history organised around specific periods is possible
insofar as there is a common set of cultural codes that allows for a common
understanding of history. At the same time, cultural codes offer themselves to the
possibility of re-interpretation and re-writing. As Eco does for the Middle-Ages, history
can become a creative occasion, a pretext that not only allows a re-interpretation of
history but it also enables Eco to re-deploy his general theory of semiotics within the
context of a work of fiction.
While intellectuals have been able, at different historical moments, to redefine
the boundaries of knowledge, they have also provided scientific and philosophical
grounding for their enquiries. Knowledge needs a centre around which it can be
coherently organised, refined, and expanded. Theology, and the idea of God, provided
such an organisational centre in the Middle-Ages and partly beyond. With the
emergence of modern science, and with the increasing authority of direct observation
over the sacred texts, the concept of reason gradually sets out to become the new centre
around which to organise the discourse of truth. Reason, as Descartes suggests in the
seventeenth century, is the guiding idea around which both the widening and the
                                                 
41 As M. Fumagalli Beonnio Brocchieri points out, ‘la “conoscenza intellettuale”(opposta alla
“conoscenza sensibile”) era quel tipo di conoscere che superava lo strumento dei sensi spingendosi a
cogliere le forme’. In M. Fumagalli Beonnio Brocchieri, ‘L’intellettuale’, in L’uomo medievale, pp. 203-
237, p.203.
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deepening of the horizon of knowledge are to be achieved. After René Descartes, such a
position is more or less systematically re-enhanced.42
It is well known that the faith in the power of reason, and in the narrative of
progress, stands at the centre of the project of the Enlightenment. Such project
culminates in Denis Diderot’s and Jean Le Rond d’Alembert’s widely known
Encyclopédie, an intellectual device aimed at both grounding and disseminating the
politics of reason and progress. A modern encyclopaedia is both a summa of the
knowledge and a very detailed statement of the dominant intellectual mood of the time.
Because of their extensiveness, modern encyclopaedias are read and explored by
individual readers selectively and according to their taste, needs and curiosity. Given the
abundance of both implicit and explicit cross-referencing, encyclopaedias also invite
and stimulate a transversal or intertextual reading. Encyclopaedias encapsulate their
own ideal reader, individuals with a constant and compulsive need to know all there is
to know. While extensive knowledge, and a mind capable of absorbing a great amount
of information, are attributes of the ideal reader, empirical readers of encyclopaedias,
motivated by a more personal and contingent intellectual endeavour, might pursue their
own pathways by selecting very limited regions on the map of knowledge. As a middle
way between an ideal reader and an empirical one, Diderot’s description of the eclectic
philosopher suggests a possible way to address the extensiveness of knowledge of
encyclopaedias, without renouncing a vigorous critical sense. Interestingly, many of the
traits that define Diderot’s eclectic philosopher suit very well, even nowadays, the
definition of a critical intellectual:
L’éclectique est un philosophe qui, foulant aux pieds le préjugé, la tradition,
l’ancienneté, le consentement universel, l’autorité, en un mot tout ce qui subjugue la
foule des esprits, ose penser de lui-même, remonter aux principes généraux les plus
clairs, les examiner, les discuter, n’admettre rien que sur le témoignage de son
expérience et de sa raison (…) L’ambition de l’éclectique est moins d’être le
                                                 
42 This said, alternative paradigms of knowledge, less dominated by the notion of reason, have always
been available. More recently, for instance, the postmodern critique of the logocentrism of knowledge has
questioned the centrality of the notion of reason in the Western world.
32
précepteur du genre humain que son disciple: de reformer les autres, que de se
reformer lui-même. 43
As this passage suggests, reason grounds criticism as well as intellectual
endeavour. Free critical minds, in the words of Diderot, dissipate doubt and prejudice.
The outward look, which the philosopher casts on the outside world, triggers inner
change; reason becomes the centre around which the reformation of the self can be
achieved.
The “long” history of the intellectual offers a repertoire of ways of performing
the role of the intellectual. However, by defining the intellectual field as a space of
controversy, ongoing discussion and potential dissent, sociologists such as Bourdieu
and Randall Collins draw attention to the fact that the intellectual field is often
structured around competing positions and schools of thoughts. Along with eclecticism,
critical spirit, and the capacity to unify different domains of knowledge within the frame
of an individual’s discourse, other important traits define the figure of the modern
intellectual, as a result of the internal controversies that shape the structure of the
intellectual field. The combination of detachment and engagement, for instance, figures
in a number of famous modern attempts at defining the civic and ethical mission of
intellectuals.
The ways in which the categories of detachment and engagement have been
interpreted and claimed by different intellectuals reveal important lines of tension with
regard to the understandings of the figure of the modern intellectual. In fact, salient
representations of twentieth century intellectuals show a recurrent dialectic between, on
the one hand, the narrative of the intellectual in the ivory tower, whose distance from
society can be both conceptual and physical, and the narrative of the engaged
intellectual, for whom active participation in politics is essential, on the other.44 The
engaged intellectual of the twentieth century emerges in the aftermath of the Dreyfus
affair and establishes an important type, which is brought to a climax by French
philosopher and writer Jean-Paul Sartre immediately after the Second World War.
                                                 
43 Denis Diderot, entry ‘Eclectique’ of the Encyclopédie, in Denis Diderot, Oeuvres complètes, vol. VII
(Paris, Hermann, 1976), p.36.
44 On the modalities of this participation see Jean-François Sirinelli, Intellectuels et passions françaises.
Manifestes et pétitions au XXe siècle (Paris: Fayard, 1990).
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While participation and direct intervention in the arena of political debates, often
defines modern intellectuals’ style, the idea of the ivory tower intellectual strongly
persists as a valid counter-example of the engaged intellectual. The problem concealed
under the dialectic between engagement and detachment can be expressed as follows.
How can intellectuals be engaged and at the same time be detached enough as to be able
to assess society from an objective point of view? Drawing on the idea of detachment,
in La trahison des clercs (1927), Julien Benda criticises intellectuals’ support for
nationalistic causes during the interwar period in France and Germany. Benda argues
that French and German intellectuals embraced political passions rather than trying to
establish critical distance.45 Coherent with this view, he defines his model of intellectual
in terms of the capacity to oppose the contingency of history by embracing
universalistic values. Against this view, Paul Nizan, in Chiens de garde (1932) accuses
intellectuals of losing their time in abstract reasoning with no relationship to the
impending problems of everyday life. Accordingly, as Nizan maintains, intellectuals
prefer the comfort of the ivory tower of bourgeois culture to concrete problems of the
human condition.46
Asserting the idea of detachment or that of engagement can be seen as part of a
strategic argument in order to mark a position within the intellectual field so as to claim
a privileged stance with regard to the ethical mission of intellectuals. Similarly, at the
beginning of the twentieth century, the concepts of distance and engagement start to
play an important role in the efforts that new emerging disciplines make in order to gain
legitimacy within the modern university. The discipline of anthropology, for instance,
elaborates the so-called method of participant observation, thus trying to overcome the
potential contradiction deriving from being both an insider and an outsider of the culture
                                                 
45 As Benda argues, modern intellectuals prefer to ‘magnifier le monde réel –pratique- de l’existence’ and
‘rabaisser le monde idéal ou proprement metaphysique’!; in Julien Benda, La trahison des clercs (Paris:
Bernard Gasset, 1927), p.123.
46 See for instance the following passage from Nizan’s Chiens de garde: ‘Quand on entend que la
Philosophie parle encore de relations et de rapports, de phénomènes et de réalités, d’élans vitaux et de
noumènes, d’immanence et de transcendence, de contingence et de liberté, des âmes et des corps, quand
on entend M. Brunschvig qui est le plus grand homme de cette pensée-là faire un cours sur la Technique
du passage à l’absolu, on ne voit pas comment ces bacilles de l’esprit, ces produits tératologiques de la
méditation pourraient expliquer aux hommes vulgaires que nous convoquerons avec une complaisance
sans lassitude la tubercolose de leurs filles, les colères de leurs femmes, leur service militaire et ses
humiliations, leur travail, leur chômage, leur vacances, les guerres, les grêves, les pourritures de leurs
parlements et l’insolence des pouvoirs; on ne voit pas à quoi rime la Philosophie sans matière, la
Philosophie sans rime ni raison’. Paul Nizan, Chiens de garde (Marseille: Agone, 1998), p. 43-44.
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that one wants to describe.47 A rhetoric of detachment becomes also an important aspect
when attempting to define the place of literary studies in the landscape of modern
academia. In this case, the idea of detachment is brought about in order to differentiate
between different approaches to textual analysis, in the hope of creating something
which one could call the “literary”.48
1.6 Antonio Gramsci’s organic intellectual and the organisation of culture
In spite of the strategic use to which the categories of engagement and detachments are
subject, one should beware of the temptations to essentialize these two concepts, to treat
them as given, or to think that these concepts function only once dichotomized. On the
contrary, there is no reason why intellectuals should confine themselves to either one of
these two alternatives. As it will be shown, In Apocalittici e integrati (1964) Eco
addresses the problem of detachment and engagement in the context of the theories of
mass culture. In doing so, he illustrates a specific form that debates between distance
and engagement take.49 As Eco points out, the two options of detachment and
engagement are not mutually exclusive, but can be combined and asserted conjointly.50
Antonio Gramsci’s conception of the organic intellectual, developed in the same
years as those of Benda and Nizan, insists precisely on the combination of detachment
and engagement. According to a famous sentence by Gramsci,’tutti gli uomini sono
intellettuali (…) ma non tutti gli uomini hanno nella società la funzione di
                                                 
47 See Mondher Kilani, Introduction à l’anthropologie (Lausanne: Payot, 1996), pp. 47-63.
48 For an overview of the debates over the disciplinarization of literature at the beginning of the twentieth
century see the chapter ‘Interdisciplinary English’ in Joe Moran, Interdisciplinarity (New York:
Routledge, 2010) p. 17-44. Moran points out that literature is something extremely difficult to define in
terms of a discipline with clear-cut boundaries: ‘literature is about everything –love, sex, friendship,
family relationships, ageing, death, social and historical change, religious faith, intellectual ideas, and so
on-. In short, it is about life in all its diversity, and this is hard to accommodate within the narrow
parameters of a discipline’. In Joe Moran, Interdisciplinarity, p.19.While the fact that literature, as Moran
puts it, ‘is about life in all its diversity’ makes the field of literary study a ground for recurrent disputes
about the nature of the “literary” (or about the plausibility of the existence of something called the
“literary”), it also makes it an extremely dynamic and interdisciplinary space open to a wide range of
approaches.
49 Chapter three will discuss further the importance of Apocalittici e integrati (1964) in Eco’s early career.
Eco published the book in a moment in which, in Italy, the distinction between high culture and low
culture was still very much operative and supported by the dominant crocean aesthetics. Eco challenges
Croce’s idea that the value of works of art resides beyond social or communicative practices. Against
Croce, Eco de-substantializes the notions of art and literature in order to analyse them as forms of social
communication.
50 This point will be discussed in chapter three, particularly with regards to Eco’s Apocalittici e integrati.
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intellettuali’.51 In a footnote, Gramsci specifies that ‘così, perché può capitare che
ognuno in qualche momento si frigga due uova o si cucisca uno strappo della giacca,
non si dirà che tutti sono cuochi o sarti’.52 The footnote adds something important to
Gramsci’s sentence in that it emphasizes that, even if all human beings are capable of
thinking, it does not follow that they are all intellectuals. For Gramsci every person is a
potential philosopher, but lacking the necessary sharpness of vision characterizing
intellectuals, knowledge takes often the shape of, as Ugo Dotti points out, ‘un aggregato
caotico di concezioni disparate, inconsapevolmente e passivamente assorbite dai diversi
ambienti sociali e culturali nei quali ciascuno è automaticamente coinvolto sino alla sua
entrata nel mondo cosciente’.53
For Gramsci, there are two types of intellectuals: organic and traditional ones.
Traditional ones, like priests or teachers, have a fixed place in society. As Barbara A.
Misztal notes, Gramsci’s ‘traditional intellectuals, unlike organic intellectuals, do not
represent or serve any group of interest; they are, like Benda’s intellectuals, spiritual
leaders who defend universal values’.54 Organic intellectuals, on the contrary, define
themselves by being bound to a social class. Their task is to be the leaders of a cultural
process culminating in the transformation of society. Organic intellectuals represent the
concerns of a specific social class to the dominant classes.55 Since they operate within
the symbolic space of superstructures, they are also mediators between theoretical and
practical knowledge. This role implies that intellectuals, while dwelling in the
conceptual realm of ideas, are also able to experience the conditions of the social group
to which they are organic. 56
                                                 
51 Antonio Gramsci, Gli intellettuali e l’organizzazione della cultura (Torino: Einaudi 1966), p.6.
52 Antonio Gramsci, Gli intellettuali e l’organizzazione della cultura, p.6.
53 Ugo Dotti, Storia degli intellettuali in Italia, vol. III, Temi e ideologia dagli illuministi a Gramsci
(Roma: Editori Riuniti,1999), p.272.
54 Barbara Mistztal, Intellectuals and the Public Good (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007),
p.18.
55 Gramsci grants intellectuals a peculiar place within society, in that he considers them to be ‘funzionari
delle superstrutture’. In Antonio Gramsci, Gli intellettuali e l’organizzazione della cultura, p.9.
56 James Martin points out that Gramsci’s organic intellectuals, differently from traditional ones, possess
the capacity to have ‘a superior grasp of a common goal that remained only implicit in the mass’. In
James Martin, ‘Between ethics and politics: Gramsci’s theory of intellectuals’ in Antonio Gramsci.
Critical Assessment of Leading Political Philosophers, ed. by James Martin, vol. III, Intellectuals, Culture
and the Party, p.136. However, Martin is right to point out that for Gramsci ‘the superior cognitive
capacities of these intellectuals did not diminish the necessity of their continually involving themselves in
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Gramsci, as he indicates in a letter of 1931, believed to have made a substantial
innovation in the study of intellectuals. Such innovation consisted in positing a
definition of intellectuals that would go ‘beyond denoting a restricted artistic or
philosophical “intelligentsia” to include all those employed in the organisation and
elaboration of ideas throughout society’57. In defining intellectuals in such a way, he
implicitly refuses to consider, like Mannheim or Benda, intellectuals as a separate class
having an autonomous status within society.58
Gramsci is also very much concerned with how to organise culture in such a way
as to allow for a form of individual liberation within the working class. For Gramsci,
one of the obstacles to an adequate organisation of culture lies in the education system,
which he sees as an institution promoting an exaggeratedly ornamental and
encyclopaedic culture. Moreover, Gramsci’s definition of culture is set against the
background of a larger polemic against positivist science. For Gramsci culture is
synonymous with ‘presa di coscienza di sé, del contesto sociale in cui si è inseriti, della
realtà storica di cui si fa parte’.59 His particular understanding of knowledge relies on an
effort to conceptualize individual autonomy and freedom. The cultural process he
fosters proceeds from individual self-knowledge and culminates in the knowledge of the
historicity of the individual within the larger picture of society. As he puts it, culture is:
                                                                                                                                    
the life of non-intellectuals’ (p.137). Martin’s line of argument brings the focus on how Gramsci’s
definition of organic intellectuals seeks to transcend traditional conceptions of intellectuals defined in
terms of a penchant for abstract thinking. Gramsci’s definition of organic intellectuals becomes
interesting when it takes into account the link between practical and theoretical knowledge. Hence,
Gramsci defines organic intellectuals against a certain idea of aloofness, of the non-participation in the
tumultuous stream of life; Gramsci’s definition of organic intellectuals questions the idea of a
disembodied faculty, such as reason or the intellect, capable of accessing a superior form of knowledge.
Julien Benda, a contemporary of Gramsci insists, on the contrary, on the importance of the non-
involvement of intellectuals within political issues. In this sense, Gramsci precisely purports to disengage
himself from such conceptions of the intellectual. He argues that social groups and their respective
intellectuals are defined, as Martin puts it, in terms of a ‘reciprocal and mutually informative (…)
relationship between “feeling” and “knowing”‘(p.137).
57 James Martin. ‘Between ethics and politics: Gramsci’s theory of intellectuals’, p.131.
58 The expertise of intellectuals as conceived by Gramsci can also be, as Max Weber would put it, of
bureaucratic nature. Intellectuals’ expertise, since it is not located within a single social class, is
distributed in different areas of society; every social class having, Gramsci believed, its specific
intellectuals. Misztal also notes that Gramsci’s particular contribution has been to stress ‘the idea that
intellectuals, not social classes, are essential to the working of modern societies’ Barbara Mistztal,
Intellectuals and the Public Good, p.18.
59 E. Garin, Con Gramsci (Bari: Editori Riuniti,1997), p.82.
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Organizzazione, disciplina del proprio io interiore, è presa di possesso della propria
personalità, è conquista di coscienza superiore, per la quale si riesce a comprendere il
valore storico, la propria funzione nella vita, i propri diritti e i propri doveri.60
Gramsci, in other words, stresses the importance of culture as a process through which
the individual progressively conquers the knowledge of his or her own involvement
within history and society.
As social commentators like Bruce Robbins point out, with the increasing
professionalization of modern academia, intellectuals often perform their roles on the
terrain of academia rather than, as Gramsci would have wished, across the whole social
spectrum.61 Faced with the increasing disciplinarisation of knowledge, contemporary
intellectuals often re-interpret Gramsci’s idea of the organic intellectual when bridging
the gap between different disciplines; or, in the case of most public intellectuals, when
venturing into crossing the divide which separates professional academics from a non-
professional audience.
1.7 Two central concepts within this study: Bourdieu’s habitus and Eco’s open
work
It sometimes happens, in the careers of intellectuals, artists, or scholars, that a theme
dominates the experience of writing. When this happens, such a theme operates as a
creative force informing a large part of the production of these intellectuals, artists, and
scholars. Eco’s concept of open work and Bourdieu’s concept of habitus can be said to
represent such a creative force. The conceptual contributions of Bourdieu and Eco
within, but also beyond, their respective disciplines, is one of the central themes (a sort
of narrative strand) of this study. In the introduction to this study I have, in fact,
underlined the importance of some of the intellectual strategies that Bourdieu and Eco
adopt within their works, and I have suggested how the ways in which they formulate
theoretical problems might be relevant within the context of this study. In this section I
shall give more information about the relevance of these intellectual strategies within
this study. Once this clarification is put into place, it will be easier for the reader to
                                                 
60 In Anotnio Gramsci, Cronache torinesi 1913-1917, ed. by S. Caprioglio, 71 (Torino: Einaudi 1980)
pp.100-103. Quoted in E. Garin, Con Gramsci, p. 82.
61 See Bruce Robbins’ previously referenced Secular Vocations. Intellectuals, Professionalism, Culture.
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identify clearly my own particular theoretical concerns (i.e. the specific way in which I
approach and make use of the works of Bourdieu and Eco).62
Even if the works of Bourdieu and Eco could be taken in toto as exemplifying
creativity and interdisciplinarity, I will be addressing their theoretical contribution in a
selective way. I will operate some choices whereby I will illustrate the problem-solving
techniques employed by these two intellectuals when construing major theoretical
debates. Mainly, I will address the theoretical dimension of the work of Bourdieu and
Eco in two ways. Firstly, I discuss their works in a traditionally informed exegetical
way. Secondly, I explore their works as a possibility of building a theory; in this sense,
the works of Bourdieu and Eco will be both starting points as well as transition
moments in the development of the more general argumentative network that sustains
this study.
As pointed out in the introduction, the same theoretical aspects, and the same
concepts of Bourdieu and Eco, will be explored in different chapters so as to have
complementary perspectives. This repetition is a feature of this study: by addressing the
same motifs in different parts of this study, I will show the different levels at which the
works of Bourdieu and Eco articulate and intersect within the unfolding of my
arguments. Two concepts to which this study pays close attention to are Bourdieu’s
concept of habitus and Eco’s concept of open work. In the next sub-sections, I will
argue that the way in which Bourdieu characterizes the habitus (its formation, its
definition and its application) can in some respects be linked to a definition of creative
intellectuality. Habitus also offers a concrete example of how concepts can be both the
medium through which thinkers express their creativity, as well as a way to put forward
a creative strategy. In fact, the concepts of habitus and Eco’s concept of open work are
means to define a creative strategy as much as keywords that Bourdieu and Eco use
(when presenting their works retrospectively, for instance) in order to claim, or re-
construct, a creative strategy.
                                                 
62 The next two chapters will be largely introductory but a more specific and systematic focus on the
problem solving techniques, intellectual strategies and theoretical formulations of Bourdieu and Eco will
appear in the subsequent chapters.
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My contention in this study is that Bourdieu’s concept of habitus conceals a
creative strategy that is altogether not too distant from the one that I identify through
Eco’s semiotic model of interpretation and through the concept of the open work (which
anticipates and in a certain way creates the premises for the full articulation of Eco’s
model of interpretation). The concepts of habitus and open work can be examined as
illustrating a creative approach of theory making. As I pointed out in the introduction,
concepts, when they come to hold the function of representing a complex vision of
things (as it is clearly the case for the concepts of habitus and open work), are good
examples of how language offers the possibility to forge concepts and to define them in
such a way that, while they facilitate the task of visualizing complex models of reality,
they subsume a multi-level description in one word.
1.7.1 Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and its relevance within this study
The Latin word habitus suggests a variety of meanings relating to the idea of habit. The
word, as Bourdieu acknowledges, has been used over the centuries by classic authors
such as Christian philosopher Saint Augustin and, more recently, by philosophers such
as Friedrich Hegel and Edmund Husserl, by sociologists Marcel Mauss, Norbert Elias,
and by art historian Erwin Panowsky.63 In spite of its previous uses, the concept
acquires, in the work of Bourdieu, an unprecedented degree of systematization that
makes it one of the central pieces of his theory of the social world. While highly
systematized and rigorously defined by Bourdieu, the concept still retains a lot of the
semantic ground which defines the idea of habit. In fact, the definition Bourdieu gives
to the concept proceeds from a few ideas commonly associated with the notion of habit,
such as repetition and conventionality.
Bourdieu’s theory of the social world focuses on how individuals think and act
according to a logic that they have gradually acquired as part of a socializing process.
This logic operates as a framework (as Bourdieu calls it, a system of categories) that,
without being entirely individual or being entirely collective, is somehow in between
these two alternatives. The habitus is precisely the name of the framework through
which individuals experience and perceive the social world. To employ a familiar
metaphor, the habitus is like a pair of glasses through which we see the world. Because
                                                 
63 See Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Fieldwork in Philosophy’, in Choses dites ( Paris: Minuit, 1987 ) pp. 13-47,
pp.22-23.
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we are so used to seeing the world through our glasses, we do not notice them anymore;
they have become part of our visual as much as our existential field. In this sense, the
habitus is not merely a mediating mechanism between the social and the individual, or
simply some sort of super-structural reality. Because it is internalised it does not simply
mediate; it also generates meaning and organizes experience. Even if culturally
acquired, it is embodied to a degree to which, as Bourdieu puts it, it becomes second
nature.64 One of the main assumptions behind the habitus is that individuals have been
recurrently exposed to particular models of actions and, as a result of this exposure, they
have internalised them. Once internalised, these models (or frameworks) become an
integral part of who they are. The habitus becomes constitutive of their identity. That is
why the habitus does not only operate as a system of categories through which
individuals perceive action and thought; the habitus also explains how individuals create
action and thoughts as a result of processing experiences.
The habitus regulates the perception, the organization and the conception of
behaviour and cognition in terms of social regularities. The recurrence of patterns in
action and cognition makes it possible to identify the habitus as pertaining to actions
and thoughts that could be broadly defined as conventional (i.e. not just individual but
shared by a social group or class). At some level, a conventional behaviour can be
called a social ritual. When sociologists and anthropologists speak of social rituals they
refer, among other things, to a conventionalised set of actions or thinking processes.
Thus understood, conventionality combines a collective dimension and an individual
dimension. The concept of habitus, as Bourdieu points out, engages precisely with the
interdependencies of agency and social structures:
Les agents sociaux, dans les sociétés archaïques comme dans les nôtres, ne sont pas
(…) des automates réglés comme des horloges, selon des lois mécaniques qui leur
échappent. Dans les jeux les plus complexes, les échanges matrimoniaux par
exemples, ou les pratiques rituelles, ils engagent les principes incorporés d’un habitus
générateur. Ce système de dispositions on peut le penser par analogie avec la
grammaire générative de Chomsky – à la différence qu’il s’agit de dispositions
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acquises par l’expérience, donc variables selon les lieux et les moments. Ce «!sens du
jeu!», comme nous disons en français, est ce qui permet d’engendrer une infinité de
«!coups!» adaptés à l’infinité de situations possibles qu’aucune règle, si complexe soit-
elle, ne peut prévoir.65
The reference to Chomsky’s generative grammar, however marginal it might be when
addressing Bourdieu’s sociology, is particularly relevant here. In spite of the differences
between the two authors, both appear to address a common question: how can one
explain the idea that a finite set or rules can generate an infinite number of occurrences?
Chomsky asked this question about language, enquiring after the possibility that from a
limited number of (grammatical) rules a speaker can obtain an infinite number of
sentences. Mutatis mutandis, Bourdieu asks if a limited number of perceptive categories
and organisational principles can account for potentially infinite outcomes of observable
social behaviours.
The strength and the originality of the concept of habitus is that, while having a
strong abstract component, the coherence of its definition can be corroborated by
empirical or statistical observation. Bourdieu elaborates the concept in a relatively early
phase in his career, between the end of the 60s and the beginning of the 70s. It is from
the combination of his ethnological work in Algeria (where he was employed as an
ethnologist during the Algerian war), his fieldwork in rural France, and his early studies
on artistic practices and on the education system, that the habitus emerges within
Bourdieu’s early writings as a unifying theme. In forging the concept Bourdieu
combines a very subtle and profound theoretical reflection with a series of meticulous
empirical and statistical observations drawn from very diverse social and cultural
milieus. As I will argue in chapter two, as a result of engaging with a large number of
social milieus and by interacting with individuals having very different (and sometimes
contrastive) experiences of the social world, Bourdieu’s writing becomes the meeting
point of different voices and experiences otherwise scattered within the social universe.
One of my contentions in this study is that the ability to combine cultural and social
diversity within a coherent project is one of the main features of creativity and
interdisciplinarity. Bourdieu also stresses how the concept of habitus creatively
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combines the theoretical knowledge resulting from reflection and the direct observation
of social performance. In one of the interviews published in Choses dites he argues that:
Construire la notion d’habitus comme système de schèmes acquis fonctionnant à l’état
pratique  comme catégories de perception et d’appréciation ou comme principes de
classement en même temps que comme principes d’organisateurs de l’action, c’était
constituer l’agent social dans sa vérité d’opérateur pratique …66
Bourdieu uses the concept of habitus in order to articulate the idea that social experience
takes place in a world where individuals adopt strategies that are the expression of their
habitus as well as an attempt to cope with concrete situations that require problem-
solving techniques. Given the variety of situations to which an individual has been
exposed throughout a personal history, the habitus can be quite differently constituted.
Similarly, as it operates as a perceptive filter, the habitus is also likely to stimulate
different responses to situations with which individuals engage. One of the areas where
Bourdieu applies more consistently the concept of habitus (in works such as La
distinction) is the analysis of cultural and intellectual taste.67 When expressing an
intellectual or cultural preference, the habitus becomes an instrument of social
distinction whereby individuals assert their own social identity. Familiarity with
canonical art and literature, and the ability to articulate this familiarity by using a
sophisticated language becomes, in this context, the expression of a bourgeois habitus
that “distinguishes” itself from the differently articulated habitus of the working class.68
The habitus is also a key concept when Bourdieu discusses literature, art, and
intellectuality in works such as Les règles de l’art.69 By paying attention to particular
intellectuals and artists as well as to literary, artistic, and intellectual movements and
theories, Bourdieu applies the concept of habitus in conjunction with the study of social,
cultural, and intellectual fields. The main ideas, theories and conceptual vocabularies
that define historical periods are seen as formative forces for intellectuals and artists
                                                 
66 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Fieldwork in Philosophy’, p.24.
67 See Pierre Bourdieu. La distinction: critique sociale du jugement (Paris: Minuit, 1979).
68 See my discussion of La distinction in chapter two.
69 Pierre Bourdieu, Les règles de l’art. Genèse et structure du champ littéraire (1992) 2nd edn (Paris:
Seuil, 1998).
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inasmuch as they present specific intellectual or artistic sensitivities as particularly
desirable. While intellectuals and artists often develop a habitus which is consistent with
that of a group, they might also develop a spirit of dissent whereby they distance
themselves from the dominant intellectual and artistic moods of their times. As I will
argue in chapter two, in describing his own intellectual itinerary Bourdieu explains
some of his career choices (i.e. the way he defined the direction of his ideas and
endorsed particular theoretical orientations) as stemming from dissatisfaction with the
conceptual and theoretical configurations that dominated the French intellectual field in
the 60s and 70s.
In the pages of Esquisse pour une auto-analyse, Bourdieu points out how the
habitus he acquired through the diversity of his life-experiences predisposed him to
accept sets of ideas or world-views that had a more marginal status when compared to
more “glamorous” theories. 70 Intellectuals also acquire, or sharpen, their habitus (i.e. a
peculiar theoretical sensitivity) through their belonging to particular disciplinary
communities. Bourdieu, in fact, crafts his own profile of public intellectual by reference
to the figure of the sociologist and to the discipline of sociology. In chapter two I
examine the way in which Bourdieu constructs his own profile of intellectual in relation
with his particular brand of self-reflexive sociology. This process of, to paraphrase the
title of James Joyce’s first novel, sketching a self-portrait of an intellectual as a
sociologist, is extremely complex and involves a number of mediations, some of which
emerge through Bourdieu’s writing process. As I will point out, Bourdieu re-
appropriates his public image of intellectual and reconfigures it through a self-reflexive
exercise. Self-reflexivity, I will argue, plays a central part in the construction of the
ethos of the sociologist through which Bourdieu sustains his intellectual self-narrative.
Bourdieu also maintains that one of the most valuables discoveries that sociologists can
arrive at is the lucid awareness that personal and individual experiences are defined (and
thus limited) by the constraining factor of society:
Le sociologue découvre la nécessité, la contrainte des conditions et des
conditionnements sociaux, jusqu’au cœur du «!sujet!», sous la forme de ce que
j’appelle l’habitus. Bref, il porte le désespoir de l’humaniste absolutiste à son comble
                                                 
70 Pierre Bourdieu, Esquisse pour une auto-analyse (Paris!: Raison d’agir, 2004). See my discussion in the
chapter two.
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en faisant voir la nécessité dans la contingence, en relevant le système des conditions
sociales qui ont rendu possible ne manière particulière d’être ou de faire, ainsi
nécessité sans être nécessaire. Misère de l’homme sans Dieu ni destin d’élection, que
le sociologue ne fait que révéler, porter au jour, et dont on le rend responsable, comme
tous les prophètes du malheur. Mais on peut tuer le messager, ce qu’il annonce reste
dit, et entendu.71
(…) la sociologie libère en libérant de l’illusion de la liberté, ou, plus exactement, de
la croyance mal placée dans les libertés illusoires.72
Understood in these terms, the sociological method is for Bourdieu an instrument of
liberation, even when the relative freedom the sociologist enjoys originates in the self-
reflexive awareness that (personal, intellectual artistic, etc.) freedom is always subject to
the constraints of society.
1.7.2 Conceptualising knowledge: From the habitus to Eco’s concept of open work
Bourdieu’s self-description as a sociologist is very consistent with the way he defines
the concept of habitus. As I will point out in chapter two and chapter four, the habitus
reflects the position that individuals hold within social spaces. Within Bourdieu’s
conceptual vocabulary, the habitus offers the possibility to negotiate an approach of
culture and society that stresses the interdependencies and interrelations, rather than the
oppositions, between individuals and social fields. In this study I examine intellectual
creativity and interdisciplinarity with a similar agenda; that is, I examine creativity and
interdisciplinarity as emerging against the backdrop of society (i.e. of social structures
and fields) and I try to conceptualize the peculiarity of the relations that intellectual
creativity and interdisciplinarity entertain with society. My line of enquiry proceeds
from the assumption that the notions of society and that of the individual are commonly
approached as representing separate orders of discourse. By referring to authors such as
Norbert Elias, I try to reconstitute the interdependencies that are negated by the
separation of these notions into two mutually distinctive realms of discourse. In doing
                                                 
71 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Fieldwork in Philosophy’, pp. 25-26.
72 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Fieldwork in Philosophy’, p.26.
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this, I also underline how Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and Eco’s semiotic model of
interpretation represent two examples of how to realize this articulation.73
In fact, Bourdieu’s and Eco’s approach to knowledge engage with a number of
theoretical problems that characterize not only their discipline, but a number of other
disciplines such as philosophy and literary studies. These theoretical problems have to
do, by and large, with the way in which individuals and society interact with one
another. In his approach to knowledge Bourdieu actively develops a kind of foucauldian
archaeology of knowledge with a twofold goal. Firstly, he identifies in the history of
knowledge a series of divisions, ruptures, discontinuities. He then questions the
pertinence of the symbolic lines that are supposedly dividing knowledge into different
factions. Divisions, discontinuities, fractions, and demarcations are part of the process
of the social construction of knowledge. By identifying classificatory fractures within
the intellectual world, Bourdieu intends to pose the problem of the limiting and
constraining effects of such classificatory acts. Secondly, Bourdieu elaborates an
approach to knowledge whose aim is to recompose the divisions that he identifies as
structural as well as structuring features of the intellectual field. In practice, with the
concept of habitus he proposes a creative synthesis bringing under a single conceptual
vocabulary the notions of individual and society. Similarly, he proceeds to recompose
the epistemic fracture between subject and object by elaborating, under the heading of
his theory of practice, a dialectical understanding of these fundamental categories of
modern thought.74
This two-fold epistemological agenda also defines my own approach to
creativity and interdisciplinarity. In fact, throughout this study I consistently follow and
explore two themes in conjunction with the works of Bourdieu and Eco and with some
of the most relevant scholarly literature on creativity.75 The first theme has to do with
crossing the limits of individual disciplines and the second has to do with transcending
mutual oppositions between opposing views. My contention is that, in spite of the
different interdisciplinary pathways brought about by the works of Bourdieu and Eco,
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(1972), 2nd edn (Paris: Seuil, 2000). I will discuss Bourdieu’s theory of practice in chapter five.
75 See the next sections of this chapter for a discussion of literature on creativity.
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the idea of questioning and transcending theoretical categories that are seen as mutually
exclusive is common to both Bourdieu and Eco. As I discuss in chapter three, at the
outset of his career Eco defines his theoretical line through the concept of open work.
The concept of open work refers to what Eco identifies as one of the core features of
avant-garde art and aesthetics. Eco develops it by referring it to the works of modern
writers such as James Joyce and in relation to avant-garde music emerging around the
50s and in the subsequent decades with musicians such Henry Pousseur, Karlheinz
Stockhausen, and Luciano Berio. At the same time he makes it clear that the concept of
open work can be extended, beyond the particular examples to which he refers, to
artworks that encourage the interaction and direct participation of the public in the
production of meaning. According to Eco, the interaction between avant-garde art and
its public implies the possibility of endless transactions of meaning. In this sense, Eco
sees avant-garde art, literature and music as generating a differential stream of
interpretations in connection with their public. In such a configuration, work of art and
public are seen as complementary moments. While being the central theme of Opera
aperta (1962), this understanding of the mutually informing interaction between art
forms and their public sets the tone to much of Eco’s further theoretical contribution.
From the concept that gives the title to his early study (Opera aperta (1962)
translated in English as Open work) Eco will draw further implications in his
subsequent works, especially in Il trattato di Semiotica generale (1975), and Lector in
Fabula (1979). As I will point out in chapter three, these two books constitute a point of
arrival as well as an attempt at elucidating all the implications that can be inferred from
the concept of open work. The foundational question that Eco addresses in Opera
aperta and that he refines in subsequent works is very similar to the one that Bourdieu
addresses through the concept of habitus, or the one raised by Chomsky’s generative
grammar. Under what conditions can an artwork (or any cultural artefact) stimulate a
potentially infinite number of interpretative outcomes? One can posit that a limited
number of elements, such as categories (as in Bourdieu’s concept of habitus) or rules (as
in Chomsky’s generative grammar), can produce an unexpected number of variations,
but is there a rule that can explain how this is happening? While the concept of open
work emphasises how indeterminacy and openness are constitutive of much of avant-
garde art, Eco also points out how such a disposition towards the proliferation of
meaning does not exclude the presence of a structure though which the artwork asserts a
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message. In doing so he operates a similar theoretical movement to that of Bourdieu. As
pointed out, Bourdieu contends that the habitus develops in connection with the
experience of social situations. As for Eco, he maintains that the experience of
interpretation emerges in conjunction with textual spaces that, because they are
configured in a particular way, might encourage particular interpretative strategies as
more reasonable than others.
As Eco explains, the possibility that a text (piece of music, art-work, etc.) might
be about the contingency, the indeterminacy, and the subject-dependent nature of truth
can perfectly well coexist with the possibility of identifying a particular configuration or
framework through which these ideas come to life, even when (as it turns out with
avant-garde art) these frameworks are themselves objects of interpretation as well as
concrete tokens of the instability that defines reality. As Eco maintains, interpretation is
the result of a symbolic encounter between the work of art and its interpreters, but this
encounter is defined within the limits of a pragmatic occasion. Hence, Eco maintains
that the proliferation of interpretative outcomes is not subject to pure randomness but it
is regulated within the confines of a semio-logic. Eco defines openness as the new
cultural paradigm brought about by avant-garde art as much as by modern science and
other disciplines. He contends that there is a clear distinction between openness and
randomness and warns readers about potential confusions between the two.
In developing the line of enquiry of Opera aperta in his subsequent works, Eco
will often engage with structuralist theory. In 1979, in the introduction of Lector in
Fabula, Eco re-asserts the importance of this critical engagement within the formation
of his theoretical orientation:
Ma se la scoperta dei metodi strutturali mi apriva una strada, me ne chiudeva un’altra.
Infatti era dogma corrente, in quella fase della vicenda strutturalista, che un testo
andasse studiato nella propria struttura oggettiva, quale appariva nella propria struttura
significante. L’intervento interpretativo del destinatario era messo in ombra quando
non era decisamente espunto come impurità metodologica.76
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Reader, text, objective structures, interpretation are terms that have marked in important
ways intellectual debates in the history of literary theory and continue to do so.
According to how these terms are manipulated, they define an intellectual strategy. As
Eco points out, structuralism was marked by a tendency to obliterate the creative role of
agency; texts (and cultures) were compared to crystal structures in which a number of
relations would hold together as part of fixed configurations of meaning, thus
overshadowing the role of the reader.77 As Eco argues, ‘(p)ostulare la cooperazione del
lettore non vuol dire inquinare l’analisi strutturale con elementi extra-testuali. Il lettore
come principio attivo dell’interpretazione è parte del quadro generativo del testo’.78
According to Eco, it is the text itself, and not an external intervention on the text, that
creates the possibility of its own indeterminacy. For Eco, a text already includes the
possibility that a structure could be subverted and reconstituted otherwise. However,
without a reader, such a possibility cannot be activated. The reader is precisely the
practical operator that makes interpretative choices and establishes links within the
symbolic space of the text, work of art, or piece of music. But, since Eco views
interpretation as essentially creative, an alternation of construction and deconstruction
of structures would in no case lead to a final ontological structure presiding over the
meaning of a text.
1.8 Defying binary oppositions
As Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi points out, interrelations between individuals, fields, and
domains shape intellectual styles.79 The confrontation between the intellectual and his or
her discipline engages elements that are the expression, on the one hand, of the
individual’s creativity, and of a body of knowledge that has undergone approval and
enjoys the shared support of disciplinary communities on the other.80 In this sense, the
relationship between creative intellectuals and academic disciplines reflects that
between originality, novelty on the one hand, and a certified body of knowledge on the
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other.81  As I will illustrate, Bourdieu and Eco apply in different ways their disciplinary
knowledge when playing the role of intellectuals. Even if they are formed in different
disciplines, Bourdieu and Eco manifest, throughout their career a common interest for
unifying theoretical stances that are often presented as opposed and mutually exclusive.
Over the centuries, disciplines have given different explanations and offered
different sets of justifications in the effort to define the principles that drive human
action and that regulate cognition; the workings of the human mind and the reasons for
actions have been analysed using different vocabularies. While some of these attempts
might have limited themselves to empirically circumscribed examples, some disciplines
have strived to provide explanations going beyond the empirical in order to provide a
foundation and a justification for human thoughts and actions. The notion of reason, as
pointed out earlier in this chapter, is an example of this: over the last two and a half
centuries reason has been the underlying principle of modern definitions of rationality
as provided by, among others, the discipline of economics. Other disciplines such as
social philosophy, sociology, or anthropology have attempted to explain human action
less through the idea of rationality than by recurring to principles and notions such as
society and culture. Within the sets of explanations provided by these disciplines,
society and culture are sometimes seen as pre-existing realities that define and prescribe
what we call the individual.82 Whether arguing for the primacy of the social over the
individual, or for the opposing case, different explanations often ensure the support of a
fraction of a given discipline while attracting dissent from other fractions within the
same discipline or from different disciplines. As Randall Collins and Bourdieu have
shown, in spite of the various degrees to which a particular individual or disciplinary
community can adhere to one position, there is a striking high frequency of debates in
the history of Western thought revolving around opposing and mutually distinctive
factions.
The oppositions between individual and society, between subject and object
(Bourdieu) and between reader and text (Eco) are perhaps the best example of
Bourdieu’s and Eco’s interest in defying binary oppositions. Such an intellectual
                                                 
81 See my discussion of creativity in the next paragraphs.
82 That is not to say that the same discipline cannot accommodate opposition theoretical paradigms. Quite
on the contrary, it is precisely one of my contentions to show that theoretical and methodological
divergences within disciplines constitute a starting point for a creative interpretation of existing debates.
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strategy is employed in order to reframe traditional philosophical debates, so as to
present them under a new light. By recurring to the opposition between subject and
object Bourdieu, for instance, re-interprets the sociological tradition around key figures
like Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. Eco, on his part, manipulates the notions of text
and reader in such a way as to present major hermeneutical traditions from the
perspective of his particular notion of interpretation.83
1.9 The interdisciplinary scope of the research: combining creativity and the new
sociology of ideas
1.9.1 Intellectuals and interdisciplinarity
As suggested thus far, the term interdisciplinarity is used in relation to other terms, such
as creativity, intellectual narrative, and public intellectuality. This study suggests that it
is possible to associate the above-mentioned terms in such a way as to show some
overlaps not only in their definitions, but also in the assumptions that these terms
generate once placed in the context of a research that seeks to combine them. By
seeking to identify the common ground between these terms, this study also intends to
create some solid interrelation between domains of research that are normally explored
independently.
This section will consider further the importance that the term interdisciplinarity
acquires in attempting to understand the creative dimension of the work of intellectuals.
In this study, I use the term interdisciplinarity to explore the dialogue between
disciplines. I sometimes refer to other terms such as transdisciplinarity or
multidsciplinarity. In spite of their slightly different meaning, these terms designate the
co-presence of at least two disciplines within a single research agenda.
Transdisciplinarity refers to the possibility of crossing the boundaries of disciplines,
whereas multidisciplinarity refers to the co-presence of several disciplines. I tend to
prefer the term interdisciplinarity because, in the relevant literature, it is used more
often than transdisciplinarity or multidsciplinarity. Moreover, I feel that the term
interdisciplinarity conveys more directly than the other two terms the creative potential
fostered by the combination of disciplines. Before discussing the meaning of the term
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interdisciplinarity, it is worth drawing attention to the fact that the term discipline has
two main meanings. For this reason, it is worth drawing attention to the fact that the
term discipline has two main meanings. As Joe Moran notes:
The term ‘discipline’ has two principal modern usages: it refers to a particular branch
of learning or body of knowledge and to the maintenance of order and control amongst
subordinated groups such a soldiers, prison inmates or school pupils, often through the
threat of physical and other forms of punishment.84
Aside from the meaning of discipline as body of knowledge, the second meaning of the
term (the maintenance of order and control) appears in the passage to have rather
negative connotations, especially since ‘maintenance of order and control’ come to be
associated with ‘the threat of physical and other forms of punishment’. However, in
spite of the negative connotations associated with the meaning of the term in the above
quotation, there are examples that show how discipline (often in the form of self-
discipline) can acquire a much more positive connotation, and can be seen as something
rather positive and desirable. Such classic works as Saint Augustine’s Confessions
(written between AD 397 and AD 398) or Saint John of The Cross’s 16th century treatise
The dark night of the soul illustrate the positive value that discipline can assume in the
context of one’s spiritual paths and more in general with regards to self-knowledge.
As suggested in the introduction, a discipline should not be defined as something
static. When the term discipline defines the limits proper to a branch of learning, this
does not in any way exclude the possibility that the discipline is a means to attain
knowledge, rather than being an end in itself. In other words, there is, potentially,
something transitive in the idea of discipline as a body of knowledge. One might use a
given discipline as a frame in order to channel and orient the pursuit of knowledge. But
frames can also be used flexibly or even questioned. In fact, in certain areas of
academia, such as philosophy, practitioners are often involved in questioning the
objects, the approaches, as well as the limits proper to their own disciplines. So much
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so, that for many philosophers the questioning of their own discipline is a mark of their
professional vocation.85
Against such background, one can see that disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity
are not antagonistic concepts. Rather, interdisciplinarity is the consequence of a
particular way of approaching disciplinarity. Interdisciplinarity, in this very sense,
represents a constructive way of questioning and challenging limits within knowledge.
At the same time, the term hints at the possibility of a wide-ranging and holistic
knowledge. As Joe Moran observes:
On the one hand, it (interdisciplinarity) forms part of this traditional search for a wide-
ranging, total knowledge; on the other, it represents a more radical questioning of the
nature of knowledge and our attempts to organize and communicate it.86
As chapter six will suggest, if interdisciplinarity represents a way to question effectively
internal divisions of knowledge, such a questioning seems to require some sort of frame
within which practices of knowledge are carried out.
Following these few introductory paragraphs about the definitions of the terms
disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity, the following paragraphs will address, in a more
specific way, the relevance that the notions of disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity will
acquire within this study. In different parts of this study I will emphasize how
Bourdieu’s intellectual itinerary develops through a recurrent confrontation with other
academic disciplines (philosophy, history of art, cultural anthropology). In Eco’s case I
will, as pointed out, stress the interdisciplinary range of his intellectual profile and the
multiple roles that this range of intervention implies: semiotician, public intellectual and
novel writer are three identities which coexist within Eco’s intellectual itinerary and
together provide what I call Eco’s intellectual polyphony.
In emphasizing the disciplinary component of the intellectual itinerary of
Bourdieu and Eco, in the first part of this study I will address the questions of (1) how
Bourdieu and Eco interpret the role of the intellectual, and (2) how this performance
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reflects itself in the general problematic of the relationship between disciplinary
knowledge, interdisciplinarity, and intellectuality. In addressing these questions, I will
also give further depth to the concept of intellectual narrative, by showing how
interdisciplinarity is a central theme around which Bourdieu’s and Eco’s intellectual
self-narrative constitutes itself.87
In the second part of this study I will elaborate a framework within which I will
further discuss the analyses developed in the introductory chapters. I shall argue that
ideas that intellectuals produce and develop owe as much to their singularity and
individuality as to organized bodies of knowledge that exist under the form of academic
disciplines. In this sense I will emphasize how intellectual engagement provides the
ground for challenging and questioning disciplinary boundaries. I will also discuss the
relation between the intellectual and society in such a way as to establish a theoretical
framework that I will progressively refine along the second part of this study. This
theoretical framework will also offer further evidence supporting the relevance of the
concepts of self-reflexivity and of intellectual polyphony which I explored in the first
part of this study.
When I will address Bourdieu’s and Eco’s critical engagement with
structuralism, I will highlight from the outset the constitutive interdisciplinary and
transdisciplinary dimensions of structuralism’s method and approach. Structuralism was
initiated by Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistics but rapidly spread to disciplines such as
anthropology and sociology until it became, in the late 50s and the 60s, one of the
dominant theoretical paradigms within the French intellectual field and beyond.
Bourdieu’s and Eco’s critical engagement with structuralism carries the mark of this
interdisciplinarity. Moreover, in order to attempt to move beyond the theoretical
paradigm of structuralism, Bourdieu and Eco demonstrate a thorough knowledge of the
formal strategies through which structuralism became so attractive to so many
disciplines. At the same time, Bourdieu and Eco identify the weak spot of structuralism:
its lack of intellectual flexibility and mobility. They see structuralist theory as unable to
account for the unpredictability of history one the one hand, and for the freedom of the
subject on the other. As I shall point out, Bourdieu and Eco counter what they view as
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the shortcomings of structuralism by re-examining the dialectical relationship between
the categories of subject and object and individual and social structures.88
Interdisciplinarity, as Moran points out, is a central theme when we advance the
importance of a holistic view of knowledge over the increasing fragmentation of
knowledge that characterizes contemporary Western societies. Against this backdrop, I
will explore the interdisciplinary dimension of the work of Bourdieu and Eco as a
means whereby they develop a holistic view of the intellectual field. In the conclusive
part of this study I will discuss the work of Bourdieu and Eco from a meta-critical
perspective. In this sense, I will engage with some of the ideas developed by Bourdieu
and Eco beyond the localised context of their work. The aim is to understand the
balance between intellectual creativity and unpredictability on the one hand, and
organisation and order on the other. In particular, I will illustrate that if intellectual
creativity fosters the idea that knowledge should be questioned, reorganised, and
reformulated with new conceptual languages, then there needs to be a common
framework flexible enough to guarantee the productivity of the intellectual field.
1.9.2 Intellectuals and creativity
The ability of intellectuals to express their own stances relies on the expression of
creative thinking, and intellectuals find their own voices by using, in an original and
pertinent way, the knowledge resources that are already available to them. As I shall
illustrate, creativity involves, in most cases, an attempt to seek a balance between the
past and the present, between the old and the new, between what already exists and
what can be presented as original and innovative.
Creativity can mean different things according to the approach one takes. For
instance, in Donald W.Winnicot’s understanding of creativity as developed in Playing
and Reality (1971), creativity is something inherent to human behaviour and to the
human cognition.89 In Winnicot’s case creativity, when it comes to explain human
behaviour, constitutes the rule rather than the exception. From Winnicot’s perspective,
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human behaviour is by definition creative. Creativity usually refers to the capacity the
mind has to create mental objects or to attribute new meaning to external objects. In this
case, creativity means more or less something like “fabrication”, in the sense in which
the mind fabricates certain mental objects as a response to the external environment.90
As pointed out by Joyce McDougall, psychological states or unconscious
conflicts motivate or inhibit creative behaviour. McDougall observes how individuals
who are involved in creative professions sometimes suffer from creative blocks due to
unsolved unconscious tensions. Managing effectively these tensions by bringing them
into conscious awareness can lead to the re-establishment of a productive creative
activity in the domains in which these individuals engage.91
According to Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, creativity is characterized by a particular
psychological state that he calls ‘flow’. If a peculiar psychological state can be
identified as relevant to creative behaviour, a general understanding of creativity should
not be reduced or confined to the study of mental or psychological states. Creativity is a
more complex and multi-faceted phenomenon. As Csikszentmihalyi rightly points out,
‘creativity does not happen inside people’s heads, but in the interaction between a
person’s thoughts and a sociocultural context. It is a systematic rather than an individual
phenomenon’92. Csikszentmihalyi further specifies what he means with the ‘interaction
between a person’s thoughts and a sociocultural context’ by referring to three
components: the domain, the field, and the individual. The first component, the domain:
Consists of a set of symbolic rules and procedures. Mathematics is a domain, or at a
finer resolution algebra and number theory can be seen as domains. Domains are in
turn nested in what we usually call culture, or the symbolic knowledge shared by a
particular society, or by humanity as a whole.93
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The second component of creativity, the field, ‘includes all the individuals who act as
gatekeepers to the domain’. In brief, the field includes those professionals who can
legitimate the creativity of given individuals by influencing their success or their
marginality. The third component is the individual who, ‘using the symbols of a given
domain’, comes up with a creative idea or product.94 Thus, the following scenario
applies to the creative process as presented by Csikszentmihalyi:
Creativity results from the interaction of a system composed of three elements: a
culture that contains symbolic rules, a person who brings novelty in the symbolic
domain, and a field of experts who recognize and validate the innovation.95
Csikszentmihalyi’s understanding of creative processes is holistic rather than
individualistic. In this sense it develops concerns that are shared by a number of other
relevant contributions in the study of creativity. In the next few paragraphs the notion of
creativity will be further presented and widened in relation to these contributions and in
to the specific concerns that this study develops.
As pointed out, creativity can be understood as the capacity to pose new
questions in an effective yet unconventional way. Barbara Misztal’s Intellectuals and
the Public Good, for instance, analyses creativity in mainly three ways.96 Firstly,
Misztal asks what creativity is. While identifying several models of creativity
throughout history, she points out how ‘the specialization of the discourse on creativity
in the twentieth century has, on the one hand, fragmented and, on the other hand,
enriched our understanding of the creative process’.97 As Misztal argues, an enhanced
understanding has been fostered, on the one hand, by an increased interest in the
creative nature of scientific processes, especially since Charles Peirce’s theory of signs.
On the other hand, Robert K. Merton pioneered sociological studies of science
highlighting the context-dependent origin of the scientific discourse.98 The second
question Misztal asks is where creativity can be found. She underscores the importance
                                                 
94 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Creativity. Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention, p.28.
95 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Creativity. Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention, p.6.
96Barbara Mistztal, Intellectuals and the Public Good (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
97 Barbara Mistztal, Intellectuals and the Public Good, p. 44.
98 Some of the features of Peirce’s theory of signs and the implications of Merton’s approach to scientific
knowledge will be discussed in subsequent chapters, respectively chapter four and six.
57
of the holistic approach to creativity and of its attempts at unifying the various
psychological approaches to creativity, which traditionally focus on ‘person, process,
product and environment’ separately rather than conjointly. Mistztal stresses that
creativity, rather than being the product of isolated moments, is a slow process that
takes place over a long period of time. She also stresses the centrality of social networks
in influencing the flow of creativity and the processes whereby creativity is publicly
recognised. 99
Creativity, as Misztal maintains, has seldom been integrated into a general
sociological theory. There are, however, a few notable exceptions. The holistic
approach to creativity has been, for instance, effectively explored by Csikszentmihalyi.
As Csikszentmihalyi contends, ‘creativity is (a) process that can be observed only at the
intersection where individuals, domains and fields interact’.100 Since the holistic
approach aims at grasping the intersections between individuals and the social context,
it thus follows, Misztal notes, that knowledge of the different moments and individuals
involved in the creative process is paramount. As she puts it: ‘(…) creativity occurs in a
wide range of situations, and in order to account for it we need to know something
about both the subjective and the objective dimensions of the situation’.101 Scholars in
the psychology of creativity have also stressed the importance of cognitive factors in
shaping creative processes. Teresa M. Amabile, for instance, advocates the importance
of intrinsic motivation as opposed to extrinsic motivation. While intrinsic motivation, as
Amabile points out, deals with the individual’s self-involvement in the accomplishment
of a given task or project, extrinsic motivation is generally seen as external to the
creative process as such.102
Following the pioneering work of Arthur Koestler103, scholars of different
disciplinary backgrounds like Csikszentmihalyi, Misztal, and Margaret Boden104 have
                                                 
99 Barbara Mistztal, Intellectuals and the Public Good, p.49.
100Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Creativity. Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention, p.50.
101Barbara Mistztal, Intellectuals and the Public Good, p.56.
102 See Teresa M. Amabile, Creativity in Context, updated edn (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996). A
reward would be, in this sense, an example of extrinsic motivation. However, Amabile recognizes that
sometimes extrinsic motivation, when duly implemented in the creative process, can be experienced as
intrinsic.
103 Arthur  Koestler, The Act of Creation (1964) (London: Picador, 1977).
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emphasized how creativity consists, among other things, in the capacity to see
interrelations and to operate links between different domains, as well as in the capacity
to unify differences within coherently formulated artistic or intellectual frameworks. In
discussing the different meanings of the term intellectual, Stefan Collini, for instance,
defines public intellectuals as individuals who ‘employ an acknowledged intellectual
position or achievement in addressing a broader, non-specialist public’105. Similarly,
Posner notes that ‘a public intellectual expresses himself in a way that is accessible to
the public, and the focus of his expression is on matters of general public concern of (or
inflected by) a political or ideological cast’106. From this perspective intellectuals,
inasmuch as they frame knowledge in such a way as to bridge the gap between
specialists, or between specialists and the general public, can be legitimately considered
as creative individuals in their own right.
Some of the questions that animate research on creativity, which I have
summarized in the last few paragraphs, will be fruitfully integrated within the scope of
this study. Another, more general question that is relevant to both this study and to most
of the studies of creativity, has to do with how ideas appear, how they are shaped and
refined, and how they circulate within society and social groups. With respect to this,
along with the study of creativity, the other major field of study that has had an
influence on this study is the so-called new sociology of ideas. The advantage of this
field over other similar fields is that there exists a sort of manifesto of the new
sociology of ideas written by American sociologists Charles Camic and Neil Gross,
which presents in a programmatic form the main lines of research and an overall
research program.
                                                                                                                                    
104 Margaret Boden, The Creative Mind. Myths and Mechanisms (1990) 2nd edn (New York: Routledge,
2004).
105 Stefan Collini, Absent Minds. Intellectuals in Britain, p. 47.
106 Richard Posner, Public Intellectuals. A study of Decline, p.35.
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1.9.3 The new sociology of ideas
With the label ‘the new sociology of ideas’, Camic and Gross set out to define an
important field of study that emerged over the last two decades.107 As the two authors
point out, this field of study:
Focuses on women and men who specialize in the production of cognitive, evaluative,
and expressive ideas and examines the social processes by which their ideas –i.e. their
statements, claims, arguments, concepts, beliefs, assumptions, etc. - emerge, develop,
and change 108.
The new sociology of ideas, as discussed by Camic and Gross, brings together insights,
theoretical orientations and arguments coming from specialist areas such as sociology of
science, sociology of culture, and general sociological theory, with the aim of
elaborating relevant ‘tools of sociological analysis to explain why thinkers make the
intellectual choices they do’109. Attention is given to the actual processes through which
knowledge is produced and distributed, as much as on the individuals involved in these
processes. The aim of the new sociology of ideas is to elaborate a general line of
argument to account for the production of ideas within more or less large networks of
people and institutions such as universities, the press, the media, etc., so that emphasis
is placed on the intellectual actors as much as on particular institutional settings in
which ideas are generated.
Perhaps because more directly oriented towards the study of intellectuals and
intellectual processes, or perhaps because of the more structured and transparent
research program, the influence of the new sociology of ideas on this study has been,
comparatively, more systematic than that of the studies of creativity. The impact of the
new sociology of ideas has also been structural, in that I have integrated and clearly
outlined the theoretical and methodological propositions of the new sociology of ideas
in chapter four. The impact of existing research on creativity is perhaps less evident and
direct, and this is for different reasons.
                                                 
107 Charles Camic, and Neil Gross, ‘The New Sociology of Ideas’, in The Blackwell Companion to
Sociology, ed. by Judith Blau (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), pp.236-249.
108Charles Camic, and Neil Gross, ‘The New Sociology of Ideas’, p.236.
109 Charles Camic, and Neil Gross, ‘The New Sociology of Ideas’, p.236.
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Firstly, intellectual processes as I discuss them in this research are one among
many types of creative processes that are approached by research on creativity.
Research on creativity touches upon a variety of cases where creativity is presented as
not directly linked to intellectual processes but rather to artistic, scientific, or everyday
life examples. Obviously, it would be possible to elaborate on how these cases could
eventually be described or considered as intellectual processes, since after all they do
involve, and sometimes are clearly based on, intellectually oriented activities. Secondly,
differently from the new sociology of ideas, studies on creativity are not organised
within a single conceptual umbrella. Therefore, it is easier to refer to single authors
rather than to a constituted and structured body of work. Thirdly, studies on creativity
have been explored at a relatively later stage in this research, whereas the encounter
with the program of the new sociology of ideas came at a moment in which the
elaboration of a methodological frame was a priority. This is also why the new
sociology of ideas left a more visible trace on the methodological thread that underpins
the second part of the research. However, research on creativity and the new sociology
of ideas intersect at many levels, and have both been, and continue to be, equally
inspirational from a methodological perspective.
1.10 Conclusion: intersecting narratives
This chapter has provided a background that will be further enriched with the
observations presented in the following chapters. It has introduced some of the main
questions that the study of intellectuality both implies and generates. The next two
chapters will introduce Bourdieu and Eco, the two intellectuals whose work this study
explores. While introducing some of the questions that will receive further elaboration
in the next chapters, this introductory chapter also presented the originality of the
approach employed in this study. As suggested in the introduction, knowledge is a
dynamic process. Original knowledge does not arise out of nowhere but is developed in
relation to existing knowledge. One of the ways of producing originality consists
precisely in exploring existing maps of knowledge with a new travelling agenda.
In this chapter, I have proposed to chart intellectuality from different
perspectives. In the introduction, I have given a historical overview of the figure of the
intellectual. My intention was to highlight the importance of the concept of narrative,
and the fact that a narrative is a process that can be constructed from different and often
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contrastive points of view. In this sense the concept of narrative informs the chapter in
its entirety. By suggesting a space of convergence (but also a space of tension and
creative accomplishment) between the act of narrating society and the fact of being
narrated by society, I have also outlined the particular approach that this study takes
with regards to public intellectuality.
In the last part of this chapter, I have presented the main research areas that this
study integrates. Research on creativity offers important insights into intellectually
creative processes similar to those that this study will pursue in several directions and in
close relationship with the works of Bourdieu and Eco. The following chapters will
further elaborate on some of the considerations about creative processes that have been
presented in this chapter. Creative processes have been seldom specifically associated
with the study of intellectuality.110 Similarly, the works of Bourdieu and Eco, and their
intellectual self-narratives, will inspire new considerations that will confirm, extend, or
question some of the basic assumptions that animate current research on creativity. As
anticipated by this chapter, research on creativity reaches conclusions that are in many
respects similar to the ones suggested by the new sociology of ideas. The final chapters
of this study will, in fact, integrate some of the main lines of research of the new
sociology of ideas in relation to the works of Bourdieu and Eco.
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Chapter 2: Pierre Bourdieu’s Self-portrait of an Intellectual
as a Sociologist. The Sociologist, the Intellectual, and the Self-
reflexive Mirror
‘Il y a beaucoup d’intellectuels qui mettent en question le monde; il y a très peu
d’intellectuels qui mettent en question le monde intellectuel’.111
2.1 Introduction: Bourdieu’s self-portrait of the intellectual
While the expertise of intellectuals can be associated with the practice of an academic
discipline, creative intellectuals also challenge the division of knowledge into
disciplines. In chapter one, I have called this element of challenge intellectual creativity.
Through the exercise of creative thinking, intellectuals produce interdisciplinary
knowledge. As creative thinking also contains an element of eccentricity and deviance,
the thought of creative intellectuals is also likely to produce controversy, and to be the
object of attentive examination and scrutiny performed by the intellectual community at
large.112
The work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has raised a certain number of
controversies that have proven the vitality and the creative aspect of his work.113 In this
chapter I will pursue further, by discussing specific aspects of the work of Bourdieu,
some of the ways whereby the work of creative thinkers, while it recognizes the
existence of disciplinary limits, it also questions them. Bourdieu’s work, taken as a
whole, suggests that there is a clear continuity between the sociologist and the
intellectual. In this chapter I illustrate how Bourdieu’s sociological practice provides the
ground to engage in the role of the intellectual. Sociology is a discipline strongly rooted
                                                 
111 Pierre Bourdieu, Esquisse pour une auto-analyse (Paris!: Raison d’agir, 2004), p.37.
112 See The Dark Side of Creativity, ed. by David H. Cropley, Arthur J. Cropley, James C. Kaufman, and
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in a methodological as well as in an empirical tradition. Bourdieu, one of the most
eminent representatives of the discipline, was an intellectual whose relevance was
greatly shaped by the practical and theoretical tools defined, by and large, as
sociological method.114
This chapter expands the notion of intellectual narrative discussed in chapter
one. It tackles the importance of Bourdieu’s sociological method from the perspective
of the notion of self-reflexivity.115 Self-reflexivity is the ability to place the self at the
centre of a reflection about intellectual practices. In Bourdieu’s social theory, great
emphasis is placed on the examination of the interrelations between the personal
experience of individuals and the social context that informs this experience.
Furthermore, Bourdieu’s social theory attempts a synthesis between ‘objectivism’ and
‘subjectivism’ by seeking to integrate the experience of the social scientist within object
of knowledge that he or she construes as expert. The integration of the sociologist
within the process of construction of knowledge is aimed at questioning the idea of
objectivity as a form of external knowledge without subject.116 But what are the
implications of placing the epistemic subject (the knowing subject but also the subject
that creates the knowledge) at the very centre of an intellectual self-narrative? And how
does self-reflexivity become in turn an integral part of the process whereby Bourdieu’s
construes his intellectual self-narrative? As I will argue, self-reflexivity is part of a more
general framework through which Bourdieu defines his idea of the intellectual. In
addition to self-reflexivity, other components of Bourdieu’s intellectual profile will be
examined, such as the way in which Bourdieu describes the role of sociology within the
intellectual field, especially with reference to neighbouring disciplines like philosophy
and history of art.
Bourdieu often insists on highlighting the conflicts and controversies
generated by the confrontation between sociology and other disciplines. Such
intellectual confrontations, as I will point out, are themselves parts of a strategy in
                                                 
114 For a comprehensive view of Bourdieu’s sociological method, see Pierre Bourdieu, Jean-Claude
Chamboredon, Jean-Claude Passeron, Le métier de sociologue (1968), 4th edn (La Haye!: Mouton, 1983).
115 My observations about reflexivity and self-reflexivity are partly inspired by Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc
J. D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).
116 See Pierre Bourdieu, Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique précédé de Trois études d’ethnologie
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which disciplines are put into a critical and often controversial dialogue. In this sense,
Bourdieu views other disciplines through his own commitment to the discipline of
sociology. Against this backdrop, Bourdieu defines the sociologist as a figure able to
articulate within a single discourse different and sometimes contrastive experiences of
the social world. Thereby, Bourdieu describes the sociologist as an essentially creative
agent able to address the extreme diversity of experiences present in the social world.
Moreover, Bourdieu’s self-conception as an intellectual implies a link between the
figure of the sociologist and the notion of marginality. As research on creativity
indicates, some of the notions that are central in the understanding of creativity, such as
deviance, should be understood beyond the negative connotations with which they are at
times associated. Viewed as a statistical factor rather than a moral property, deviance
can be understood as an important ingredient in the appearance of recognized forms of
creativity.117 On a similar line of reasoning, this chapter will argue that marginality can
be conceived as a creative factor in the production of knowledge as well as in the
exercise of intellectuality.
2.1.1 The structure and the aim of the chapter
The first part of this chapter will start by comparing Bourdieu’s and Gramsci’s
understandings of culture. Gramsci develops a view of society in which intellectuals are
mediating figures between abstract ideas and empirical realities. The notion of culture,
and its relevance within Gramsci’s view of intellectuals, provides ground to discuss
some similarities between Gramsci and Bourdieu. A comparative approach of Gramsci
and Bourdieu, however briefly outlined, is relevant in that it helps to introduce some of
the salient features of Bourdieu’s sociology of culture that are highly relevant to his
intellectual self-narrative. Bourdieu’s definition of social science, as said, orients him
towards assuming the role of intellectual. In this sense, disciplinary commitment is not
an obstacle to public intellectuality, but it can open up important avenues for
transdisciplinary and interdisciplinary knowledge. While being solidly grounded in the
discipline of sociology, Bourdieu can also claim expertise in fields such as literature,
art, and philosophy.
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Bourdieu’s far-reaching sociological project provides a case in point for a form
of transdisciplinarity that preserves the idea of discipline. Bourdieu’s case illustrates
how interdisciplinarity can offer its best, as Stanley Fish and Joe Moran have argued,
inasmuch as it does not ignore the idea of discipline but defines itself in relation to it.
118Against this backdrop, the second part of this chapter explores how Bourdieu’s idea
of sociology challenges the limits that an excessively narrow definition of the discipline
would imply. In fact, Bourdieu’s approach to knowledge provokes discussions with and
reactions from other disciplines whose traditional objects Bourdieu’ sociology
examines. In this part of the chapter I also discuss how in Esquisse pour une auto-
analyse119 Bourdieu clearly illustrates the importance of self-reflexivity when analysing
his own personal and professional trajectory. In discussing Esquisse pour une auto-
analyse, a considerable attention will be devoted to introducing Bourdieu’s concepts of
habitus and field and to discussing these two concepts in conjunction with the
exploration of Bourdieu’s self-reflexive sociology.
The third and last part of the chapter will expand on the discussion of Esquisse
pour une auto-analyse in reference to Edward Said’s understanding of the figure of the
intellectual as he discusses it in the 1993 Reith Lectures.120 Said’s discussion of the
figure of the intellectual can enrich the understanding of Bourdieu’s intellectual self-
portrait in one sensible way. In fact, Said’s account of the role of the intellectual relies,
among other things, on the notion of marginality, which is also central to Bourdieu’s
conception of the social-scientific intellectual.121However usually seen as something
negative, marginality acquires an essentially positive connotation, both in Said and
Bourdieu. As I will show, marginality provides a privileged point of view from which
the intellectual can observe social reality.122
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2.2 The Intellectual: a social figure at the crossroad of cultural discourses
Chapter one has emphasized the contribution of intellectuals in conceptualizing
frameworks within which cultures are conceived and organised. Antonio Gramsci
recognised and reflected upon this specific aspect of the social identity of intellectuals.
He also thought that the organisation of culture was mainly a practical task. As he
points out: ‘organizziamo la cultura, così come cerchiamo di organizzare ogni attività
pratica. I borghesi filantropicamente hanno pensato ad offrire al proletariato le
Università popolari. Contrapponiamo la solidarietà alla filantropia’.123 James Martin,
one of Gramsci’s commentators, refers to what he names as the ‘reciprocal and mutually
informative (…) relationship between “feeling” and “knowing”’ in describing one of the
essential features of Gramsci’s definition of organic intellectuals. 124 This is how
Gramsci himself puts it:
L’errore dell’intellettuale consiste nel credere che si possa sapere senza comprendere
e specialmente senza sentire ed essere appassionato (non solo del sapere in sé, ma per
l’oggetto del sapere) cioè che l’intellettuale possa essere tale (e non un puro pedante)
se distinto e staccato dal popolo-nazione, cioè senza sentire le passioni elementari del
popolo, comprendendole e quindi spiegandole e giustificandole nella determinata
situazione storica, e collegandole dialetticamente alle leggi della storia, a una
superiore concezione del mondo, scientificamente e coerentemente elaborata, il
‘sapere’; (…)125
This passage renders very well the importance that Gramsci attributes to the
combination of rational thinking and feeling that makes an essential part of the makeup
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123 Antonio Gramsci, Il nostro Marx.1918-1919, ed. by S. Caprioglio (Turin: Einaudi, 1980), p. 275.
Quoted in E. Garin. Con Gramsci (Bari: Editori Riuniti, 1997) p.84.
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of organic intellectuals. The capacity to articulate theoretical knowledge with direct
experience, which Gramsci grants to organic intellectuals, is also relevant, as I will
argue, in Bourdieu’s conception of the social scientific intellectual.
Gramsci thought that members of the working class possess the potential to
acquire the kind of specific approach to knowledge he fostered. Hence, Gramsci argued
that intellectuals had a crucial role in promoting an approach to culture based on a
historical understanding of society and of the place that individuals occupy within
society. Gramsci’s particular description of culture is couched in a Marxist vocabulary,
in that he views the realization of socialism resulting from the overcoming of class
struggle:
La realizzazione del socialismo, cioè la fine della lotta di classe, è concepita
dialetticamente dal Marx, … come interiorizzazione della lotta, come una forma di
civiltà originale nella storia dell’uomo, che dal Marx viene definita energicamente e
plasticamente nella concezione di ‘rivoluzione in permanenza’126.
The idea that individuals internalize the cultural and social conditions that define their
place in the social hierarchy is for Gramsci (and for Marx) a central element in the
overcoming of the class struggle. As discussed in chapter one, Bourdieu also recurs,
through the concept of habitus, to the idea that individuals internalize the social
conditions that shape their life experiences.127 However, for Bourdieu the subtlest forms
of cultural domination are not directly visible; individuals are often unaware of their
involvement in certain forms of cultural as well as social struggles. As Shusterman
points out, ‘Bourdieu denies the ability of practicing agents to critique, reinterpret, and
thereby revise their practical logic and behaviour, thus compelling them to sustain the
social domination incorporated in the habitus that allegedly directs their practical
                                                 
126 Antonio Gramsci, Socialismo e Fascismo. L’Ordine Nuovo. 1921-1922 (Turin: Einaudi,1966), p.446.
Quoted in E. Garin, Con Gramsci, p.89.
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reasoning’.128 Accordingly, for Bourdieu the role of the sociologists implies the task of
demonstrating that social reality is not always transparent as it appears to be. While a
comprehensive knowledge of social reality is a possibility offered to the sociologist
Bourdieu, as pointed out, does not grant this privilege to ordinary social agents. Rather,
he argues that individuals experience the social world through a set of cognitive and
perceptive categories (i.e. the habitus) which have been acquired by recurrent
experiences of social situations and by regular interactions with given social milieus. By
perceiving the real through socially acquired categories, individuals have no access to
the mechanisms and social dynamics whereby these very categories have been
structured.129
This question is crucial in the development of Bourdieu’s self-conception as an
intellectual. In fact, Bourdieu’s sociology of culture implies the possibility that the
sociologist, contrary to other social agents, is able to abstract him- or herself from the
logic of practice that informs individual strategies and practices. Such a possibility is
theorized by Bourdieu through the notion of reflexivity
It might be useful, at this stage, to draw attention on the two terms of reflexivity
and self-reflexivity. Reflexivity, in its general meaning, involves a capacity for
intellectual abstraction as well as the possibility of critically engaging with experience.
Self-reflexivity aims at addressing the idea of the authorship of knowledge, by
addressing the fact that reflection, and the knowledge that ensues from reflection, stems
from a subject that generates this knowledge by actively interacting with interpretative
frameworks. In this chapter, both terms of reflexivity and self-reflexivity will be used,
with certain prevalence for the latter. Reflexivity will be used in order to make
observations about the general aims of Bourdieu’s sociology, while the use of the term
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self-reflexivity, as indicated in the introduction, signals a clear emphasis on the relation
between the subject or author of knowledge and the process whereby knowledge is
construed. In a complementary sense, sociological reflexivity, as practiced by Bourdieu,
is aimed at bridging the gap between the sociologist’s view of the social world and the
view that is proper to the individuals the sociologist comes across as a researcher. From
this perspective reflexivity, as I will argue throughout this chapter, operates a synthesis
between different experiential frameworks, and provides an intermediate level on which
different frameworks conflate and generate a creative synthesis.
As Arthur Koestler notes, the combination of different frameworks giving rise to
a new and original framework differentiates creativity from purely conventional
thinking.130 Bourdieu’s notion of logic of practice, as I will argue more thoroughly later
on in this study, describes social behaviour in reference to an explanatory framework
that carefully combines scholarly knowledge with the experiential diversity stemming
from the individuals with whom the sociologist engages. In fact, the ultimate goal of
reflexivity is to reconstitute the symbolic structures that inform the logic of practice
governing the cognitive and behavioural strategies of social agents. As Cheleen Mahar
argues, Bourdieu’s social theory emphasizes the importance of symbolic structures;
these structures ‘have to be understood like principles of vision and division, which
allow us not only to create reality, but to believe in that reality, even before it might
exist’131.
As Zygmunt Bauman observes for postmodern intellectuals, mediating cultures
means to be at the crossroad of multiple discourses. This role also entails that
intellectuals are in a privileged position to translate the contingency of truth between
social groups. Being in the position to translate particular cultural views often leads
intellectuals to reflect upon the social and cultural conditions whereby groups
differentiate their worldviews. This role also entails that intellectuals possess a
particular ability in manipulating language and conceptual thinking.132As Michael
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Grenfell observes, Bourdieu argues that ‘in order to manipulate complex conceptual
ideas, it is necessary to possess the requisite mental structures which are in turn a
product of language’133. Gramsci also maintains that the specialist knowledge of
intellectuals has to do with the ability to manipulate language; as James Martin points
out, the symbolic authority of Gramsci’s intellectuals can be described as ‘the capacity
of a social group to maintain its domination by consent to the extent that it succeeds in
having its own language adopted by the intellectuals of other classes or groups’.134
Gramsci, like Bourdieu, argues that institutions such as the school system or the family
play a key-role in shaping the ability of individuals to use language in order to exercise
symbolic power.135As Bourdieu’s sociology of culture illustrates, linguistic capital (the
ability to manipulate language in different social situations) is differently distributed
within society. As I will argue in chapter six, linguistic ability in Bourdieu’s sociology
participates to a more general form of symbolic capital which includes the ability to
manipulate argumentative strategies as well as the capacity to articulate abstract
thoughts in ways that appear particularly suitable to certain forms of intellectual
conversation. In works such as La distinction (1979), Bourdieu argues that the
expression of cultural taste reflects the positions that individuals occupy within the
social world. Supported by empirical cases, he shows the link between the social
position of the subjects he interviewed and the aesthetic perception they express.
Confronted with a picture showing the used hands of an old woman, ‘les plus démunis
expriment une émotion conventionnelle ou une complicité’136. According to Bourdieu,
                                                 
133 Michael Grenfell, Pierre Bourdieu. Agent Provocateur,  p.77.
134 James Martin, ‘Between ethics and politics: Gramsci’s theory of intellectuals’, p.133. Along the same
lines, Bourdieu maintains that journalists impose particular views of political issues not only to the
general public but also to intellectuals.
135 School and family very often reinforce their reciprocal influence. As Gramsci remarks, kids often
develop an early feeling for literary language due to their belonging to the intellectual groups (ceti
intellettuali) within society: ‘In una serie di famiglie, specialmente nei ceti intellettuali, i ragazzi trovano
nella vita familiare una preparazione, un prolungamento e un’integrazione della vita scolastica,
assorbono, come si dice, dall’“aria” tutta una serie di nozioni e attitudini che facilitano la carriera
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il mezzo di espressione e di conoscenza, tecnicamente superiore ai mezzi posseduti dalla media della
popolazione scolastica dai sei ai dodici anni’. Antonio Gramsci. Gli intellettuali e l’organizzazione della
cultura, p.101. Bourdieu’s interest in education is apparent in a number of his works. See Pierre
Bourdieu, and Jean-Claude Passeron. Les héritiers. Les étudiants et la culture (1964), 3rd edn (Paris:
Minuit, 1985)!; Pierre Bourdieu, and Jean-Claude Passeron, La reproduction. Eléments pour une théorie
du système d’enseignement (Paris: Minuit, 1970), and Pierre Bourdieu. La distinction: critique sociale du
jugement (Paris!: Minuit, 1979).
136 Pierre Bourdieu. La distinction,  p.46.
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working class individuals empathize with the picture of the used hands of the old
woman because they see it as entirely compatible with their representation of their
everyday life. These hands are, so to speak, part of a world they recognize as their own;
they are a symbol of their conditions as workers. At the opposite end of the social
spectrum, upper class individuals display a more detached relation to the picture. As
Bourdieu suggests, both reactions demonstrates how social condition influences the way
in which individuals represent the world. While upper class individuals express a
calculated disinterest in the picture, working individuals display an emotional
response.137
2.3 The personal is social: Bourdieu as a self-reflexive intellectual
By laying emphasis on the importance of linguistic ability, on the capacity to
manipulate conceptual and argumentative reasoning, as well as on the expression of
aesthetical appreciation, Bourdieu’s sociology might be seen, as Jeffrey Alexander
maintains, as a form sociological reductionism viewing individual strategies and choices
as the reflection of symbolic structures. Quite on the contrary, Bourdieu’s sociological
approach underscores the interdependencies rather than the oppositions between
sociology and psychology, or between the individual and the social.138 One of the most
striking marks of Bourdieu’s sociology of culture is that it challenges all the major
conceptual oppositions, like subject/object, internal/external, psychological/social,
individual/collective, agent/structure, etc., which, historically, have been feeding
traditional debates in the humanities and the social sciences. For instance, Emile
Durkheim, one of the founding fathers of the discipline of sociology, defined the object
of sociology through the widely known methodological principle according to which
one has to explain the social by recurring to the social. He argued that what one would
consider the most individual and psychologically oriented behaviours, should be
regarded as manifestations of societal logic.139 Durkheim’s thesis, by stating the primacy
of the social over the psychological explanation, underscores the binary opposition
                                                 
137 Pierre Bourdieu, La distinction, p.46.
138 Jeffrey C. Alexander, ‘The Reality of Reduction: The failed Synthesis of Pierre Bourdieu’, in Jeffrey
C. Alexander, Fin de Siècle Social Theory. Relativism, Reduction and the Problem of Reason (London:
Verso, 1995), pp. 128-218.
139 The problem of the relationship between the “individual” and the “social” will be further examined in
chapter four.
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between the psychological and the social.140 Self-reflexivity, as I shall argue in the
following sections, allows Bourdieu to question the binary oppositions between the
subjective and the objective, the private and the public, the personal and the social.
According to recent findings in research on creativity, dialectical and dialogical
thinking define in important ways thinking styles that are highly creative and
innovative. Bourdieu’s thinking style, as I will maintain throughout this chapter, can be
understood in relation to both dialectical and dialogical thinking. According to Robert J.
Stenberg, ‘(d)ialogical thinking involves thinkers understanding significant problems
from multiple points of view and understanding how others legitimately could conceive
of things in a way that is quite different from their own.’ Similarly, Stenberg notes,
‘dialectical thinking involves thinkers understanding that ideas and the paradigms under
which they fall evolve and keep evolving not only from the past to the present but also
from the present to the future’.141Bourdieu’s thinking style, as I will point out, appeals to
both categories precisely because it presupposes the thorough understanding of different
theoretical traditions and schools of thought within the discipline of sociology. Such
thinking style also entails an understanding of how major thinkers in the sociological
tradition such as Durkheim and Weber produced theoretical views that relied on
different and often opposed meta-critical assumptions about the nature of society and
about the place that individuals have within society. Similarly, a thorough knowledge of
the main theoretical positions that have characterized the history of the discipline of
sociology provides Bourdieu with the tools to understand better the historical
contingency of these positions, as well as to operate a new creative synthesis between
them.142
However, Bourdieu needs to draw a line between his understanding of
reflexivity on the one hand and the expression of a semi-spontaneous flow of
confessions on the other. In fact, self-reflexivity à la Bourdieu originates from the
encounter between the singularity of personal experience and the routinized methods
                                                 
140 See Emile Durkheim’s Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique first published in 1895.
141 Robert J. Stenberg ‘Dark Side of Creativity and How to Combat it’ in The Dark Side of Creativity, ed.
by David H. Cropley, Arthur J. Cropley, James C. Kaufman, Mark A. Runco (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), p. 326.
142 Arthur Koestler refers to bisociative thinking to indicate a similar intellectual operation: ‘(t)he
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applied by the discipline of sociology.143 Hence, self-reflexivity allows Bourdieu to go
beyond the solipsistic and self-enclosing horizon of personal experience.144
Bourdieu’s self-reflexive method appeals to Gramsci’s idea that intellectuals
should ‘continually involv(e) themselves in the life of non-intellectuals’.145 Thus, self-
reflexivity underscores intellectual’s ability to combine ‘feeling’ and ‘knowing’. As
Bourdieu puts it:
Sometimes I wonder where I acquired this ability to understand or even to anticipate
the experience of situations that I have not known first-hand, such as work on an
assembly line or the dull routine of unskilled officer work. I believe that I have, in my
youth and throughout the social trajectory which caused me, as always in the case of
upwardly mobile people, to cross through very varied social milieus, taken a whole
series of mental photographs that my sociological work tries to process.146
Bourdieu employs Flaubert’s formula to underline how the practice of sociology offers
the possibility to cross through individual boundaries and to come into contact with the
plurality and the richness of people’s experience and social milieus:
Flaubert said something like ‘I would like to live all lives’. This is something that I
can relate to very well, to experience all human experiences. I find that one of the
most extraordinary rewards of the craft of sociology is the possibility it affords one to
enter into the life of others.147
                                                 
143 See Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Cambridge: Polity
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144 Wacquant makes a case out of this distinction between Bourdieu’s rigorous use of reflexivity and a
supposedly unsystematic idea of reflexivity as discussed by other scholars As Wacquant notes, ‘Bourdieu
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Sociology, p. 36.
145 James Martin. ‘Between ethics and politics: Gramsci’s theory of intellectuals’, p.137.
146 Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, p.205.
147Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant, An invitation to Reflexive Sociology, p.205. For a discussion of the
importance of literature within Bourdieu’s sociology see Jacques Dubois, ‘Pierre Bourdieu and
Literature’, trans. by Meaghan Emery, and Pamela Sing, in Substance, vol. 29, no.3, issue 93 (Special
Issue: Pierre Bourdieu), 2000, pp.84-102.
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‘Enter(ing) the life of others’ as a social scientist is what allows Bourdieu to understand
other people’s experience. At the same time Bourdieu remains vigilant vis-à-vis his own
involvement with the otherness represented by the different social milieus he dips into.
Bourdieu’s public statements, including those which involve his private life, are
also filtered through the method of self-reflexivity. As Loic Wacquant notes, ‘Bourdieu
sees no need to make resounding private revelations, for what happened to him is not
singular: it is linked to a social trajectory’.148 When Bourdieu analyses the academic
field in Homo academicus (1984), when he examines the positions and roles that
different actors take up within this field, he is, volens nolens, very intimately involved
with his object of scrutiny. As he quite explicitly tells Wacquant in an interview: ‘I say
aloud the truth of others by speaking about myself (…) I can be objectivised like
anybody else and, like anybody else, I have the tastes and preferences, the likes and the
dislikes that correspond roughly to my position in social space ‘.149
As the last paragraphs have illustrated, Bourdieu’s involvement with the
intellectual field is marked by a strong commitment to the ethos of the sociologist. In a
text entitled ‘Comment libérer les intellectuels libres?’ published in Questions de
sociologie (1984), Bourdieu criticizes those intellectuals who, eager to express their
views on the issues of the day, abuse their public role by speaking about topics on
which they have no expertise. Bourdieu’s commitment to the sociological method
prevents him from having a naïve approach to the role of the intellectual. Such a
disillusioned view also leads him to assume a critical distance vis-à-vis the detached
intellectual who claims to have no direct involvement with the reality he or she
describes. Bourdieu’s sociological practice leads him to call his own subjectivity into
question, as for instance when he reveals his difficult relationship with other
intellectuals:
La plupart des questions que je pose, et d’abord aux intellectuels, qui ont tant de
réponses, et si peu, au fond, de questions, prennent sans doute leurs racines dans le
sentiment d’être dans le monde intellectuel un étranger. Je questionne ce monde parce
qu’il me met en question, et d’une manière très profonde, qui va bien au-delà du
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simple sentiment de l’exclusion sociale: je ne me sens jamais pleinement justifié d’être
un intellectuel (…)’.150
In Bourdieu’s view, the sociologist comes to assume Gramsci’s ideal of mediator
between “high” and “low” culture: As Bourdieu points out: ‘(c)e qu’on ne pardonne pas
au sociologue, c’est qu’il livre aux premiers venus les secrets réservés aux initiés’151.
In presenting his sociological practice, Bourdieu has always emphasized the
unique position and role of the sociologist, and of sociology as a discipline, within the
intellectual field. Bourdieu also contends that sociology has always been disregarded by
more prominent disciplines such as economics or philosophy. According to Bourdieu,
sociology has always been perceived as less “pure” than philosophy because of its
empirical orientation. Accordingly, Bourdieu pairs the exercise of self-reflexivity with a
peculiar conception of the place of sociology within the intellectual field. As he
mentions in an interview with Antoine Spire: ‘je pense que mon plus grand mérite dans
ma trajectoire ça a été de choisir souvent le moins chic, parce que très souvent la vérité
est à ce prix’.152 Bourdieu maintains that social scientists often venture in territories,
such as the study of art or literature, in which they face the hostility of those wanting to
protect the “purity” of these disciplines from the intrusion of empirically oriented
research methods used by sociologists. In a text entitled ‘Mais qui a crée les créateurs?’
in Questions de sociologie, he observes how the incursion of the sociologist into
disciplinary territories traditionally covered by other disciplines often provoke
contrasting views. The first lines of the text speak eloquently of Bourdieu’s critical
position with regard to the orthodoxy of a certain artistic discourse. As Bourdieu argues:
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La sociologie et l’art ne font pas bon ménage. Cela tient à l’art et aux artistes qui
supportent mal tout ce qui attente à l’idée qu’ils ont d’eux-mêmes: l’univers de l’art
est un univers de croyance, croyance dans le don, dans l’unicité du créateur incréé, et
l’irruption du sociologue, qui veut comprendre, expliquer, rendre raison, fait
scandale.153
The illusion of art’s transcendental values, rendered by Bourdieu’s choice of words and
expressions such as ‘croyance’, ‘don’, ‘unicité du créateur’, stand in patent contrast with
the verbs capturing the disillusioned view of the sociologist. ‘comprendre’, ‘expliquer’,
‘rendre raison’ are all verbs that convey a strong sense of commitment with
knowledge.154 Bourdieu’s critique of the world of art is aimed at those who hold the
belief that art is a separate sphere from the rest of the social world, and therefore see no
possible interest in explaining art through sociology.155If, on the one hand, Bourdieu
insists on sociology’s modest profile when compared with more prestigious disciplines
such as philosophy, on the other hand he argues in favour of the solidity of sociology’s
empirical methods. Nonetheless, he warns against the temptation to think that such
methods are in themselves a guarantee of objectivity. In his inaugural lecture at the
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Collège de France, he observes, for instance, that ‘toutes les propositions que (la
sociologie) énonce peuvent et doivent s’appliquer au sujet qui fait la science’.156
The idea that the personal is social is symptomatic of Bourdieu’s theoretical
efforts to show that what defines individuality, such as tastes in music, art, fashion as
well as intellectual preferences cannot be separated from a more social and institutional
dimension of social reality. For Bourdieu, subjectivity is not something one can
postulate as existing in a sort of territory of total freedom, but it defines itself in relation
to society. As Wacquant points out, ‘(s)ociological reflexivity instantly raises hackles
because it represents a frontal attack  on the sacred sense of individuality that is so dear
to all Westerners, and particularly on the charismatic self-conception of intellectuals
who like to think of themselves as undetermined, “free floating”, and endowed with a
form of symbolic grace’157. When rigorously applied, ‘epistemic reflexivity invites
intellectuals to recognize and to work to neutralize the specific determinisms to which
their innermost thoughts are subjected and it informs a conception of the craft of
research designed to strengthen its epistemological moorings’.158 Self-reflexivity is a
powerful conceptual tool not only within Bourdieu’s sociological practice, but also
within his intellectual self-narrative. This is so because, as it will be shown in the next
sections, self-reflexivity allows for the examination of the very practices which make up
the nature of intellectual work. As Wacquant points out, ‘Bourdieu’s brand of
reflexivity (…) may be cursorily defined as the inclusion of a theory of intellectual
practice as an integral component and necessary condition of a critical theory of
society’159.
2.4 Esquisse pour une socio-analyse. Trajectory, social space, and habitus
In line with Wacquant’s analysis of Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology, Richard Nice points
out that ‘the beauty of Bourdieu’s own thinking is that it explains itself. It explains his
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life. I don’t think that’s true of everybody’s thinking’.160 However, written before the
posthumous publication of Esquisse pour une auto-analyse, these words perfectly apply
to Bourdieu’s book.
Esquisse pour une auto-analyse was first published in German under the title
Ein soziologischer Selbstversuch161 in 2002. Although Bourdieu himself intended to
rework it for the French edition, he was in fact never able to do so.162 The book
comprises a short introductory part followed by three longer parts. The absence of titles
in these three parts conforms to the idea of an esquisse (sketch) giving the book the
flavour of a project that could be further developed, or at least of something that
contains, in nuce, the potential for further developments. In spite of the apparently
undefined character of the project, Bourdieu’s intentio auctoris is made quite clear by
the epigraph: ‘Ceci n’est pas une autobiographie’. The epigraph interestingly echoes
René Magritte’s The Betrayal of Images, a famous surrealist painting featuring the
image of a pipe. Underneath this image a comment states: ‘ceci n’est pas une pipe’.
As in Magritte’s case, Bourdieu outplays the reader’s expectations by suggesting
that Esquisse pour une auto-analyse is something quite different from a traditional
autobiographical account. In the incipit of the introduction, he clearly states ‘je n’ai pas
l’intention de sacrifier au genre, dont j’ai assez dit combien il était à la fois convenu et
illusoire, de l’autobiographie’.163 Therefore, Bourdieu confirms his intention to present
the depiction of his personal itinerary as a sort of anti-biographical manifesto. His own
account develops in a series of descriptions that do not follow a chronological order.164
Against the linear progression that one would expect from a standard autobiography,
Bourdieu’s descriptions follow a circular pattern, or a series of concentric circles in
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which, often, the same period of his life is examined under different perspectives. To
begin with, Bourdieu directs the focus on his childhood and youth in the small village of
Béarn; he then moves on to describe other key moments in his life: the internat and the
experience at the Ecole Normale Supérieure; his beginnings as an ethnologist in
Algeria; his return to Paris and his re-assimilation into the Parisian world; his
conversion from ethnology to sociology; his progression within the field of sociology
and the development of his career as a sociologist. Bourdieu offers the reader several
tranches de vie encompassing three different levels of experience: his personal life, his
career as a social scientist, and his itinerary as a public intellectual. These three levels
intermingle and complete each other, forming a coherent picture in which personal
details are explained from the sociologist’s point of view, and the career as sociologist
illuminates Bourdieu’s self-definition as an intellectual165.
2.4.1 An ‘oppositional’ self-definition of the intellectual
In Esquisse pour une auto-analyse, Bourdieu observes that, although some of the
choices and decisions that played a key-role in his career may seem entirely logical and
self-explanatory, he only became aware of them gradually. The discipline of sociology
has been, as Bourdieu points out, a framework thanks to which he gradually came to
understand those choices that shaped in very important ways his intellectual self-
narrative. The next few sub-sections will discuss the way in which Bourdieu
characterizes the French intellectual field in relation to his particular intellectual
trajectory. Bourdieu qualifies some of his career choices as underscored by ‘refus’ and
‘antipathies intellectuelles le plus souvent à peine articulés et (…) (qui) ne se sont
exprimés de manière explicite que très tardivement’ (p.12). In defining his own position
as a sociologist and intellectual within the French intellectual field, Bourdieu names the
particular institutions, schools of thoughts, theories or authors against which he
gradually elaborated his own particular brand of sociology.
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Bourdieu’s critical observations about intellectuals and the French intellectual
field of the 60s and 70s are informed by two of his most notorious concepts, namely
field and habitus. As Bourdieu notes: ‘Comprendre, c’est comprendre d’abord le champ
avec lequel et contre lequel on s’est fait’ (p.15). As David Schwartz points out, ‘field
(champ) is key spatial metaphor in Bourdieu’s sociology. Field defines the structure of
the social setting in which habitus operates’166. This is how Bourdieu defines field:
A network or configuration, of objective relations between positions. These positions
are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon
their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential situation (situs) in
the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession
commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their
objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, homology, etc.). 167
Field is a concept with a strong spatial and historical dimension. In Esquisse pour une
auto-analyse, it underpins the way in which Bourdieu frames the description of his own
trajectory and career as a sociologist and as a public intellectual. The concept provides a
coherent and explanatory frame in which different levels of description (historical,
social, and spatial) combine. The concept of field can monitor the ‘network of
configuration, of objective relations between positions’ and, more generally, the relation
between individuals and social structures over a certain period of time.168
Field allows for the identification of spatial and temporal coordinates within a
structured social space. When combined with the idea of social trajectory, the concept
of field can account for the positions of individuals within the social space, and for the
development and changes of these positions over a certain period of time. Bourdieu’s
itinerary, explored self-reflexively and sustained by the spatial and temporal dimensions
of the concept of field, offers important insights into the development of his intellectual
self-narrative.169 One of the institutions that profoundly marked the early phases of
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Bourdieu’s intellectual itinerary is the Ecole Normale Supérieure, which Bourdieu
defines as a sort of passage obligé in order to access the ‘hauts lieux de la vie
intellectuelle’ in France (p.16). While it is well known to those familiar with France’s
education system that the ENS is an elitist institution, Bourdieu’s description focuses on
the importance that philosophy had at the time he was enrolled there. The particular
language he uses to describe the ‘processus de consécration’ that produces France’s
cultural elite, suggests that Bourdieu is speaking from the point of view of an
ethnologist describing institutions and rituals reinforcing the spirit of identity and of
common destiny uniting a small group of selected people. Bourdieu, in fact, describes
the ENS as a ‘monde clos, séparé, arraché aux vicissitudes du monde réel!’ (p.20).170
Jean-Paul Sartre and existentialism were very much in fashion in the years in
which Bourdieu attended the ENS. In spite of the dominating presence of the figure of
Sartre, Bourdieu observes that:
La domination de l’auteur de L’Etre et le Néant ne s’est jamais exercée sans partage
sur cet univers et ceux (dont j’étais) qui entendaient résister à l’existentialisme en sa
forme mondaine ou scolaire pouvaient s’appuyer sur un ensemble de courants
dominés: d’abord une histoire de la philosophie très étroitement liée à l’histoire des
sciences (…) (p.21).
By being drawn to explore what he labels as ‘courant dominés’, Bourdieu’s intellectual
itinerary was marked, since the beginning, by alternative and less fashionable views
than Sartre’s existentialism. Nonetheless, by being a student of the ENS, Bourdieu was
well exposed to the dominant philosophical theories of the time. In evoking the situation
of the intellectual field of the period, Bourdieu explicitly draws an opposition between,
on the one hand, a mundane intellectuality associated with Sartre’s existentialism, and
the theoretical positions that challenged this dominant intellectual trend on the other.
Among possible alternatives to the ‘triomphe de l’existentialisme’, Bourdieu mentions
                                                 
170 The practice of ethnological fieldwork has played a considerable role in the initial stages of Bourdieu’s
scholarly career. Bourdieu did his military service in Algeria during the Algerian war. In this period, he
practised empirical methods such as statistics and fieldwork interviews. For the importance of ethnology
and Algeria in Bourdieu’s career see the first part of Marie-Anne Lescourret, Bourdieu (Paris:
Flammarion, 2008) and Deborah Reed-Danahay. Locating Bourdieu (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2005).
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history of science and epistemology (whose main representative of the time were
François Dagognet and Gaston Bachelard) a particular interpretation of Husserl
fostered, among others, by Paul Ricouer, and a rigorous scientific approach to
phenomenology attempted by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (pp.23-24).
By pointing out the existence of oppositional views within the intellectual field,
Bourdieu illustrates, through the concept of field, some significant moments of his
intellectual self-narrative. When illustrating the turning point brought about, in the 60s
and 70s, by the emergence of structuralism and by the revival of psycho-analysis
fostered by Jacques Lacan’s reinterpretation of Freud, Bourdieu underlines the idea that
the field is not a fixed social space but that its relative balance is modified when new
and important intellectual events come into play within the field itself. Against the
background of the popularity enjoyed by Lacanian’s psychoanalysis, sociology was
often perceived negatively:
Ce qui est sûr, c’est que la psychanalyse a été, au moins en France et dans les années
soixante-dix, du côté des activités intellectuelles les plus nobles, les plus pures, bref,
aux antipodes de la sociologie. Science plébéienne et vulgairement matérialiste des
choses populaires, celle-ci est communément perçue, surtout  dans les nations de
vieille culture, comme attachée à des analyses grossières des dimensions les plus
vulgaires, communes, collectives, de l’existence humaine et ses excursus vers la
culture humaniste, prise comme référence ou comme objet, loin d’avoir l’effet d’une
captatio benevolentiae, sont apparus comme des usurpations ou des intrusions
sacrilèges bien faites pour redoubler l’exaspération des vrais croyants. (p.30)
Because of the devaluation of sociology within the French intellectual field throughout
the sixties and seventies, Bourdieu’s research group was often the target of criticism.
Since it promoted empirically oriented research methods, Bourdieu’s research group
was openly in contrast with the ‘distance au role’ that characterized the posture and the
self-narratives of many French intellectuals (p.34). In fact, as David Swartz notes,
‘Bourdieu writes in a country where the ideal of the critical and detached intellectual
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who intervenes actively in the political life of the nation is particularly strong’171. As
said, Bourdieu was very critical as regards the figure of the detached and free-floating
intellectual. He criticized in particular the intellectuels essayistes, the fast-thinkers, and
the doxosophes (the opinion makers): these are particular categories of intellectuals that
Bourdieu forged in order to designate those intellectuals that enjoy considerable media
attention and that tend to monopolize public debates.172 Bourdieu’s representation of the
intellectual, differently from the ideal of the “free-floating” intellectual, is well
grounded in a network of people and institutions. Bourdieu, in fact, often worked
among and was supported by a group of colleagues.173 Moreover, Bourdieu’s idea of
collective intellectual implies a number of specific intellectuals, in the sense that
Foucault gives to this term, working more or less as a recognized team, defining their
commitment to particular research methods and capable of defining their own means of
action.174
2.4.2 The field, the intellectual and the habitus
Why does Bourdieu insist so much, In Esquisse pour une auto-analyse and elsewhere in
his writings, in considering the centrality and the relevance of Sartre within the
intellectual field of post-World War II France? While it is true that Sartre was the
dominant intellectual figure at the time in France, isn’t Bourdieu possibly falling into
the trap of paying too much importance to the media-oriented dimension that Sartre
came to assume as a leading intellectual at the time?175 Possibly, but Bourdieu has
specific reasons to give Sartre so much relevance when discussing the image of the
French intellectual. As he explains in an article published in Les Temps modernes, the
intellectual field as an autonomous social sphere emerged only gradually through
                                                 
171 David Schwartz,Culture and Power. The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, p.219. With regards to the
topic of French intellectuals and their commitment with politics see Intellectuals in Twentieth-Century
France, ed. by Jeremy Jennings (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), and Pascal Ory, and Jean-François
Sirinelli, Les intellectuels en France. De l’affaire Dreyfus à nos jours (Paris: Perrin, 2004).
172 See for instance Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Les doxosophes’, pp. 26-45.
173 See Marie-Anne Lescourret, Bourdieu, pp.259-263, Lescourret discusses how ‘Actes de la recherche
en sciences socials’ (the journal created by Bourdieu) by bringing together several of Bourdieu’s long
time collaborators allowed for the creation of a research group supporting Bourdieu’s scholarship.
174 Fabrice Fernandez, ‘Intellectuel’, in Abécédaire de Pierre Bourdieu, ed. by Jean-Philippe Cazier (Ittre,
Belgium!: Sils Maria, 2006), pp.101-103.
175 For a particularly pertinent analysis of the role of the media in popularizing Sartre’s status of
intellectual see ‘Sartre et l’autobiographie parlée’ in Philippe Lejeune, Je est un autre. L’autobiographie,
de la littérature aux medias (Paris: Seuil, 1980), p. 161-202.
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history. 176 Nowadays it is possible to identify a social domain in which a certain number
of activities are labelled as intellectual, and in relation to which people enjoy
institutional recognition and have a certain cultural authority.
According to Bourdieu, Sartre appeared on the scene of the French intellectual
field at a moment in which the field as such experienced a degree of autonomy that was
unprecedented. As Bourdieu maintains, the constitution of an autonomous intellectual
field is also the condition for the appearance of the autonomous intellectual, ‘ne
connaissant et ne voulant connaître d’autres contraintes que les exigences constitutives
de son projet créateur’.177 Bourdieu also maintains that one of the conditions that allows
for the autonomy of the intellectual field is the possibility one has to recognize this field
among, and to distinguish it from, social fields such as the political or the religious
field. Intellectuals are thus recognized for possessing the distinctive features that mark
the belonging to the field.178As Bourdieu points out, Sartre was particularly versatile in
combing such identity markers, in that he was the living example of how different
intellectual traditions could converge in one single person. As Bourdieu points out:
La singularité de Sartre a consisté à rassembler, par un coup de force qui supposait
beaucoup d’énergie et d’assurance, les éléments du personnage social de l’intellectuel
qui existaient antérieurement, mais à l’état dispersé, et à faire ainsi converger sur lui
un faisceau de traditions et de manières de vivre la vie intellectuelle qui s’étaient
progressivement inventées et instituées tout au long de l’histoire intellectuelle de la
France.179
                                                 
176 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Champ intellectuel et projet créateur!’, in Les temps modernes, n°246, 1966, pp. 865-
906. Quoted in Alain Accardo, and Philippe Corcuff, La sociologie de Bourdieu. Textes choisis et
commentés (Bordeaux: Le Mascaret, 1986), pp. 48-49.
177 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Champ intellectuel et projet créateur!’, in Les temps modernes, n°246, 1966, pp. 865-
906. Quoted in Alain Accardo, and Philippe Corcuff, La sociologie de Bourdieu. Textes choisis et
commentés (Bordeaux: Le Mascaret, 1986), p.49.
178 Randall Collins in A Global Theory of Intellectual Change discusses the symbolic elements marking
the belonging to the intellectual field as having a strong ritualistic dimension. In particular, Collins uses
terms such as ritual chains to describe communication processes whereby ideas circulate among
intellectual communities.
179 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘!Sartre!: ‘l’invention de l’intellectuel total’!’, in Libération, 31 March 1983, pp. 20-
21. Quoted in Alain Accardo, and Philippe Corcuff, La sociologie de Bourdieu. Textes choisis et
commentés (Bordeaux: Le Mascaret, 1986), p. 50.
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Sartre imposed himself as the total intellectual, cumulating prestige and authority as a
critic, as a philosopher, as a playwright and as a novelist. He was equally at ease in his
cabinet as in a Parisian café. As a public figure, he was the French intellectual par
excellence.
It is especially against Sartre’s image of the “total intellectual” and the
popularization of the “free-floating intellectual” that Bourdieu defines his intellectual
self-narrative, thus forging his own commitment as social scientist and as intellectual.180
In the pages of Esquisse pour une auto-analyse, Bourdieu refers to the figure of
Georges Canguilhem as an alternative example to Sartre.181 Canguilhem, who entered
the Ecole Normale Supérieure in 1924, the same year as Sartre and Raymon Aron, is a
major contributor to the history of science and also an intellectual figure that influenced
a whole generation of scholars in France. Succeeding Gaston Bachelard, Canguilhem is
appointed as professor of history of science at the Sorbonne in 1955. In the same period
he also held a post as general inspector and president of the aggrégation jury, where he
had a decisive impact in naming professors, as well as in the pedagogical organisation
of the discipline of philosophy within the French teaching system.182 The influence of
Canguilhem on Bourdieu’s methodological sensitivity is apparent in Le métier de
sociologue (1968), where Bourdieu devotes much attention to the discussion of some of
Canguilhem’s significant texts dealing with the relationship between science (especially
biology) and methodology.
Canguilhem offered Bourdieu the opportunity to conceive an alternative
representation of the intellectual to that of Sartre, in that he was a figure with whom
                                                 
180 See for instance Jean-Claude Passeron about his and Bourdieu’s rejection of the notion of the free-
floating intellectual: ‘(r)écusant le privilège d’objectivité que Mannheim voulait réserver à
l’intelligentsia, du fait qu’elle se trouverait détachée (feischwebende) par sa formation de toutes “racines
sociales”, nous affirmions au contraire que les pires surdités scientifiques se rencontrent d’abord chez les
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d’aujourd’hui, à l’Université comme chez les techniciens, les spécialistes ou les commanditaires, dans la
presse, l’édition ou les appareils politiques.’ Jean-Claude Passeron ‘Mort d’un ami, disparition d’un
penseur’, in Travailler avec Bourdieu, ed. by Pierre Encrevé and Rose-Marie Lagrave (Paris:
Flammarion, 2003) pp. 20-21.
181 Jean-Paul Sartre and Georges Canguilhem have influenced more than one generation of intellectuals in
France and are also known for their political engagement. With regards to the importance of the political
engagement of Sartre and Canguilhem and on their influence on younger generations of intellectuals see
Elisabeth Roudinesco, Philosophy in Turbulent Times (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).
182 Dictionnaire des intellectuels français. Les personnes, les lieux, les moments, ed. by Jacques Juillard,
and Michel Winock (Paris: Seuil, 1996), pp. 217-218.
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Bourdieu could identify. This is also because Canguilhem was known for his modesty
and his scientific rigour, two qualities that clashed with Sartre’s mundanity. 183 In
Esquisse pour une auto-analyse, Bourdieu refers to an affinity of habitus he experienced
with Canguilhem. The habitus, as Bourdieu defines it, is a system of cognitive and
perceptive categories that shape the way in which individuals think, perceive and act
within the social world.184 As pointed out in chapter one, the notion of habitus is central
in Bourdieu’s conceptual system in that it allows for a synthesis between macro-
structures (the fields) and micro-structures (the social agents).
By drawing attention on the consonance of habitus between him and
Canguilhem, Bourdieu conveys the idea that the particular way in which intellectuals
take up a position within the intellectual field has to do with the way in which they
conceive themselves in relation to the most prestigious theories and intellectual key
figures present within the field itself.185 In Bourdieu’s account of his own position
within the French intellectual field, what emerges is an intellectual style that is often
informed by what researchers on creativity call divergent thinking. As Mark A. Runco
points out: ‘divergent thinking is often tied to the potential for creative thought. It is,
however, often misunderstood. It is not a kind of creativity but merely a cognitive
process that sometimes leads to creative ideas. Divergent thinking is cognition that
moves in different directions’.186
As Runco notes, divergent thinking is not in itself a form of creativity. It can
nonetheless be understood as a modality whereby, in particular conditions, intellectually
creative thinking is expressed. In Bourdieu’s case, divergent thinking can also hint at
the intellectual reorientation whereby, from being a philosophy student at the ENS,
Bourdieu gradually moves away from the dominant but also more conventional ideas
                                                 
183 For a well-researched intellectual portrait of Canguilhem see Elisabeth Roudinesco, Philosophy in
turbulent times, pp.1-33.
184 This is how Bourdieu normally defines the notion of habitus. There are a number of ways in which
Bourdieu gives alternative definitions; all of these definitions relate to the idea of a system of cognitive
and perceptive categories shaping the way in which individuals think, perceive and act within the social
world. Accordingly, Bourdieu sometimes stresses one dimension of the concept rather than another. For
some examples of the variations on the common theme of the habitus see Alain Accardo, and Philippe
Corcuff, La sociologie de Pierre Bourdieu. Textes choisis et commentés, pp. 69-83.
185 Further attention will be devoted to the concept of habitus and its relevance within the study of the
intellectual field in chapter four.
186 Mark A. Runco, ‘Creativity Has No Dark Side’, in The Dark Side of Creativity, p.18.
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present in the French intellectual field. The concept of divergent thinking hints precisely
at this shifting away that opened up an alternative view and experience of the
intellectual field and also brought Bourdieu towards a long-lasting intellectual
engagement with ethnology and history of science.187 As pointed out in one of the
previous sections, the thinking styles of dialectical and dialogical thinking, as well as
the capacity to combine existing theoretical frameworks in novel unexpected ways,
feature prominently in Bourdieu’s intellectual profile.
Oppositional thinking also defines in important ways Bourdieu’s intellectual
self-narrative, as demonstrated, for instance, by Bourdieu’s reiterated critique of
Sartre’s intellectual style. Bourdieu’s account of his itinerary in Esquisse pour une auto-
analyse suggests that his intellectual self-narrative is characterized by a slight but very
distinctive tension between the state of the French intellectual field at particular
moments and his own intellectual project. In order to draw attention to these elements of
tension and intellectual dissonance, Bourdieu has often recurred to the idea of the
marginality of the sociologist within the intellectual field. The next sections of this
chapter are devoted to the question of marginality from the point of view of Edward
Said’s conception of the intellectual. Said integrates the figure of the intellectual within
a semantic universe dominated by such notions as marginality, dissent, exile. Against
this backdrop, some of the similarities between Said and Bourdieu will be examined. As
I will show, the notion of marginality is particularly relevant within Bourdieu’s
conception of the sociologist as an intellectual.
2.5 Edward Said’s conception of the intellectual: the intellectual as a privileged
marginal
Said defines the intellectual as ‘an individual endowed with a particular faculty for
representing, embodying, articulating a message, a view, an attitude, philosophy or
opinion to as well as for, a public’.188 Accordingly, intellectuals should be
‘embarrassing, contrary, even unpleasant’ and display a penchant for eclecticism
‘despite all sorts of barriers’. Given such a definition, Said’s central argument is based
on the idea that ‘intellectuals are individuals with a vocation for the art of representing,
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188 Edward Said, Representations of Intellectuals (London: Vintage, 1994), p.9. Page numbers in the text
in the next paragraphs will refer to this edition.
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whether that is talking, writing, teaching, appearing on television’ (p.10). Furthermore,
Said observes that existing literature on intellectuals reveals an exaggerated emphasis
on elaborating a definition of the intellectual and that ‘not enough stock is taken of the
image, the signature, the actual intervention and performance’ of the intellectual.
Contrary to this tendency, Said’s approach stresses the strength of the individual voice
of the intellectual, as when, for instance, he evokes the case of Sartre; whether Sartre
was writing philosophy or fiction, whether portrayed more in his intellectual or
mundane affairs with Simone de Beauvoir, there was a sense, a unity of meaning in
which ‘Sartre was Sartre’ in all of the above situations (p.10).
In developing his argument, Said often drew from literary examples, whether he
wants to make a case out of a particular book or author, or whether he wants to use
literature, and literary theory, as a way to explore the figure of the intellectual.
Literature, when taken as a field for investigating the voice of the intellectual, offers a
valuable point of view in that, while it allows for the exploration of the depths of the
mind, it also addresses the relationship between the writer and the social context. Said
draws his examples from early twentieth century writers like Marcel Proust, James
Joyce, Italo Svevo, Robert Musil and Virginia Woolf, for whom the complexity of
modern society was also their major source of inspiration. As a matter of fact, literary
works that openly express the malaises of a certain society or periods are also valuable
instruments to explore the subtle borderline between “normality” and eccentricity. The
intellectual, if we extrapolate from Said’s argument, is a figure that stands somewhere
on this borderline, in that he/she challenges the status quo from a position in which
he/she ‘speak(s) the truth to power’.189
As Said points out, the main problem intellectuals have to face in contemporary
society has to do with the question of whether they want to promote themselves as
                                                 
189 ‘Speaking the truth to power’ is the title of one of Said’s Reith Lectures in Representations of the
Intellectual, pp. 63-77. For Said, literature is indisputably a case in point for the exploration of the life-
style of intellectuals, as in James Joyce’s A Portrait of an Artist as a Young Man. As Said notes ‘for
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Representations of the Intellectual, p.12. Said’s use of literary sources suggests that when taking literature
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intellectual. The question is rather how literary works, and the insights they allow into consciousness,
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intellectual Said is talking about.
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independent thinkers and display critical advice, or whether they want to be part of the
establishment. As C. Wright Mills observed, intellectuals have to decide between facing
‘a kind of despondent sense of powerlessness at their marginality’ or to side within ‘the
ranks of institutions, corporations or governments as members of a relatively small
group of insiders who ma(k)e important decisions on their own and irresponsibly’(p.15).
The two options Said refers to can be described in terms of a choice to either side with
the weak ones or with the more powerful. As Said points out, Wright Mills qualifies the
effort of the intellectual as ‘involv(ing) the capacity to continually unmask and to smash
the stereotypes of vision and intellect with which modern communications (i.e. modern
systems of representation) swamp us’.190
The idea of unmasking the mechanisms of power, as pointed out in the previous
sections, is particularly present in Bourdieu’s work. Bourdieu’s Sur la télévision suivi
de L’emprise du journalisme (1996), to take an example, addresses the ways in which
modern mass-media fabricate the perception of reality. In this particular sense, Bourdieu
shares Said’s idea of intellectuals’ commitment to knowledge. In fact, Said conceives
the intellectual as someone who expresses a clear resistance to ready-made-clichés.
Similarly, Bourdieu criticizes the fast-thinking and the journalistic habit to reproduce
stereotypical perceptions of social reality.191 Most of Bourdieu’s work, as pointed out, is
in fact rooted in the effort to unmask the social mechanisms through which dominant
classes impose their own vision of the world on dominated classes. Bourdieu’s concept
of violence symbolique draws attention to the ways in which the dominant classes
extend their power over the dominated classes by imposing a system of values that
appears self-justified. Because, precisely, power is often masked under the appearance
of self-justification, to unmask it implies an effort to break with a certain shared
perspective so as to introduce an alternative vision or representation of things. This
often implies, and Said and Bourdieu agree on this, ‘to take into account the experience
of subordination itself, as well as the memory of forgotten voices and persons’ (p.26).
In describing the state of exile, Said provides a good metaphor for the sort of
intellectual he wishes to represent. For Said, exile is not only a physical and
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Intellectuals, p. 16.
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geographical state but also a metaphorical one. He considers that those intellectuals who
express a strong dissident position are also, in a certain way, outsiders within their own
society. Drawing from the idea of metaphorical exile, Said operates a distinction
between those who find themselves in tune with their society and those who, on the
contrary, define themselves by ‘constantly being unsettled, and unsettling others’ (p.39).
Furthermore, Said stresses the fact that intellectuals in exile often ‘tend to be happy with
the idea of unhappiness’ (p.39). Accordingly, they express their identity through the
means of dissatisfaction and dissent.  For Said the state of exile, be it real or
metaphorical, offers a potential privilege in that, as he notes, ‘you tend to see things not
simply as they are but as they have come to be that way’ (p.45).192
2.6 Bourdieu: the sociologist, the intellectual, and the marginal
Marginality, as discussed by Said, can be positive insofar as it grants the intellectual a
sense of autonomy and freedom from all sorts of narrowness related to professionalism
but also from ready-made ideas and explanations.193 In Bourdieu’s case, the idea of
intellectual autonomy is also very strong and central to his intellectual self-narrative.
Intellectual autonomy is not taken for granted: it is conceived in terms of a critical
distance involving an open confrontation with theories, ideas and worldviews that
structure the intellectual and the media field.
Bourdieu’s conception of sociology and of the role of the sociologist within the
intellectual field has a lot to do, as in Said, with a certain idea of marginality. It does not
follow, however, that the sociologist himself is a marginal figure. The case of Bourdieu,
rather, stands as a clear example of someone who gained recognition for being, after
Foucault’s death, one of France’s leading intellectuals.194 As the discussion of Esquisse
                                                 
192Said argues that someone like Theodor W. Adorno was unable to compromise with the forms of
contemporary culture which he saw as resulting from an industrial process. For Said, Adorno is a very
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critique of contemporary society and culture rather than for a wishful and optimistic support of it. As Said
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L. Swartz, ‘From critical sociology to public intellectual: Pierre Bourdieu and politics’, Theory and
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pour une auto-analyse has shown, the importance of marginality is, within Bourdieu’s
trajectory, something of a privilege rather than a disadvantage. It is through a certain
idea of marginality that the sociologist can offer a particular and unique knowledge that
challenges other forms of knowledge present in the intellectual field.195 Bourdieu, as
pointed out, often refers to the idea of marginality to highlight sociology’s and the
sociologist’s position within the intellectual field. In this particular sense, marginality
does not imply exclusion, but rather the capacity to interact from within a sub-field of
knowledge with other sub-fields. In Question de sociologie, as pointed out, Bourdieu
expresses this idea of marginality in a number of ways.196 Moreover, the titles of the
texts that are collected in Questions de sociologie also suggest the interdisciplinary
range of topics Bourdieu has explored in his scholarly career, such as education, history
of art, literature, aesthetics, epistemology, and the media. In brief, these texts offer a
comprehensive view of culture (both in its elite and popular manifestations) under the
gaze of the sociological eye. Bourdieu’s sociology, by offering a modus operandi based
on the systematic questioning of social reality and its appearance, allows for the
coverage of different portions of society by applying the sociological approach
creatively. In order to prove the interdisciplinarity of his sociological method, Bourdieu
shows how sociology is truly the science of the social. Cultural, artistic and academic
discourses are part of the larger whole of society, and as such they can all be subject to
sociological analysis.
Marginality should not necessarily be understood as something negative but
rather as an intellectual condition that facilitates the expression of unconventional and
intellectually creative thinking. Marginality, in Bourdieu’s self-portrait of the
intellectual, is part of a larger network of elements that includes the concept of self-
reflexivity as well as the idea of sociology’s transdisciplinarity. Said’s and Bourdieu’s
                                                                                                                                    
Society, 32, 2003, 791-823. See also Pierre Bourdieu Political interventions. Social science and political
action, texts selected and introduced by Franck Poupeau and Thierry Discepolo, trans. by David Fernbach
(London: Verso, 2008), and Willem Schinkel, ‘Pierre Bourdieu’s Political Turn?’, Theory, Culture and
Society  (London: Sage), vol. 20(6), 2003, 69-93.
195 See Pierre Bourdieu ‘Mais qui a créé les créateurs’, in Questions de sociologie, pp.207-222.
196 Questions de sociologie is among the first works in which Bourdieu explicitly reveals his intentio
auctoris to reach an audience of non-specialists. Bourdieu argues in favour of a sociology which, without
giving up its claims for scientific validity, should nonetheless be accessible to non-experts: sociology,
Bourdieu argues, ‘ne voudrait pas une heure de peine si elle devait être un savoir d’experts reservé aux
experts’. In Pierre Bourdieu, Questions de sociologie, p.7.
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idea of marginality should be understood as a form of privileged marginality rather than
a socially disqualifying one. As pointed out earlier, marginality can also be associated
with the idea of deviance, provided that one uses the concept without the negative
associations to which it is normally linked. Mark A. Runco, for instance, laments that:
One explanation for the unfair treatment of the noun ‘creativity’ is that it is inherently
deviant, and not surprisingly, the concept of ‘deviance’ is itself widely misunderstood.
It is, too often, associated only with unfavourable things. The connotations imply
something undesirable. Yet deviance is, in essence, a statistical property.197
Or, as Arthur Cropley observes with regards to the social perception of creativity:
The essence of creativity is going against the crowd. The development of an individual
identity by each person also involves becoming different from the crowd by ‘creating’
an individual self and a unique identity (…) the creative individual must fight against
society’s pathological desire for sameness.198
As these passages suggest, unconventional and deviant thinking should not be separated
from the description of creative thinking but rather integrated into it. As both Cropley
and Runco point out, the dark side of creativity (if there is a dark side to it) should not
be seen as part of the definition of creativity. On the contrary, Cropley and Runco insist
that the dark side resides in the specific application of creativity, but not in the creative
process itself. Mutatis mutandis, the notion of marginality can be used to describe a
creative process or a particular point of view on reality without necessarily being
inflected with negative connotations.
2.7 Bourdieu’s media criticism
The relative marginality that, according to Bourdieu, defines the position of the
sociologist within the intellectual field is also the key that enables his privileged relation
with knowledge. Marginality can become very flexible and dynamic insofar as it allows
for a re-constitution of a holistic view of knowledge. From this perspective, marginality
is also a condition for the assessment of the relation between the centre and its margins.
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198 Arthur J. Cropley, ‘The Dark Side of Creativity’, in The Dark Side of Creativity, p.8.
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Bourdieu is, at the time of Question de Sociologie, well established as one of the
dominant intellectuals in France. In 1981 his entrance at the Collège de France brought
further institutional acknowledgement to his work as scholar and to his role as public
intellectual. In the years following Question de sociologie Bourdieu increases his
interventions in public debates and raises his profile as public intellectual.199 In 1996
Bourdieu broadcasts two lectures from within the institutional walls of the Collège de
France; he publishes these lectures under the title Sur la télévision suivi de l’emprise du
journalisme, as the first of several books of the collection ‘Raison d’agir’ edited by
Liber, of which Bourdieu himself is the director.
Sur la télévision suivi de l’emprise du journalisme is a good example of how
Bourdieu operates with the specific codes of his sociological discourse in the attempt to
unmask the codes, norms, conventions that operate from within the world of the media.
The fundamental distinction that Bourdieu draws between the doxa (the opinion)
produced by the media and the doxosophes (the opinion makers) on the one hand, and
the sociological discourse on the other, enables him to speak from a point of view that
questions the cultural norms and conventions set by the media. 200Bourdieu’s choice to
address the study of television also draws attention to his role as public intellectual.201
He is well aware that, as a televised speaker, his image is framed by a particular use of
the camera. In order to avoid unnecessary visual effects, he asked the producer to avoid
changes in format or camera angles, two important technical elements which contribute
to shape the way in which spectators perceive media images.202
By drawing attention to the context in which his own discourse is taking place,
Bourdieu intends to show that the way the media portray reality implies the split reality
of visible and non-visible, under the form of the well-known distinction between the
                                                 
199 See the previously referenced David L. Swartz, ‘From critical sociology to public intellectual: Pierre
Bourdieu and politics’, and Willem Schinkel, ‘Pierre Bourdieu’s Political Turn?’.
200 Pierre Bourdieu, Sur la télévision suivi de L’emprise du journalisme. See also Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Les
doxosophes’.
201 With Sur la télévision suivi de L’emprise du journalisme Bourdieu’s unusual role of televised speaker
projects him at the very heart of the object of his criticism. Bourdieu’s public intervention is also a clear
example of what Michael Burawoy calls public sociology. See the introduction of Public Sociology, ed.
by Andrew Abbot, Michael Burawoy, and others, pp.3-23; see also the contribution of Michael Burawoy
to the same volume; ‘For Public Sociology’, pp. 23-67.
202 See the first pages of Pierre Bourdieu,  Sur la télévision suivi de L’emprise du journalisme.
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scene and the behind the scene.203 Similarly, the explicit choice to employ his
sociological savoir-faire in discussing media discourse and, more importantly, to make
use of the medium itself to present his critical arguments makes Bourdieu’s standpoint
more apparent and visible. In order to distinguish himself from an observer displaying a
falsely disinterested look, he instead prefers the eye of the sociologist, solidly rooted in
an empirical and epistemologically controlled practice of reflexive sociology.
Given the conditions that, as Bourdieu argues, submit the media to a purely
economic logic, the role of the sociologist is to construct his or her own standpoint as an
act of resistance with regards to the symbolic violence through which the media impose
their vision of reality. Bourdieu’s efforts, once more, are sustained by the intellectual
project consisting in elucidating the conditions making taken-for-granted realities self-
explanatory. In illustrating such a standpoint, Bourdieu seems, at times, to be calling for
an attempt to change the règles du jeu (rules of the games) of the media by subverting
its internal mechanisms. The questions that Bourdieu poses do not come only from his
position as public intellectual, they also stem from his firm commitment to see
sociological knowledge progress form the margins to the centre.  Flaubert, Bourdieu
writes, ‘ aimait à dire: “il faut peindre bien le médiocre”. C’est le problème que
rencontrent les sociologues: rendre extraordinaire l’ordinaire; évoquer l’ordinaire de
façon à ce que les gens voient à quel point il est extraordinaire’. 204
2.8 Conclusion
This chapter showed how Bourdieu’s practice as a sociologist is solidly intertwined
with his role of intellectual. I proposed that what makes this link so solid is Bourdieu’s
use of self-reflexivity. Self-reflexivity, paired with a constant and reiterated effort to
define the role of the sociologist and of sociology within the intellectual field,
constitutes one of the most important features of Bourdieu’s intellectual self-narrative.
                                                 
203 Bourdieu’s conception of sociological truth relies on the notion of a fundamental split between
visibility and invisibility, between appearance and truth. Referring to Gaston Bachelard, Bourdieu notes: ‘
on connaît le mot de Bachelard: “il n’y a de science que du caché”. Le sociologue est d’autant mieux
armé pour dé-couvrir ce caché qu’il est mieux armé scientifiquement, qu’il utilise mieux le capital de
concepts, de méthodes, de techniques accumulé par ses prédécesseurs, Marx, Durkheim, Weber, et bien
d’autres, et qu’il est plus “critique”, que l’intention consciente ou inconsciente qui l’anime est plus
subversive, qu’il a plus intérêt à dévoiler ce qui est censuré, refoulé, dans le monde social.’ Pierre
Bourdieu, Questions de sociologie, pp.22-23.
204 Pierre Bourdieu, Sur la télévision suivi de l’emprise du journalisme, p.20.
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The originality and the strength of Bourdieu’s intellectual profile stem from the fact that
the study of the intellectual field and of intellectuals stand at the centre of his
intellectual project. Moreover, Bourdieu transformed his personal and sometimes
conflicting relationship with the intellectual world into a substantial part of his social
scientific study of intellectuals.
Bourdieu’s self-portrait as an intellectual presents his social and intellectual
itinerary as a marginal one, when compared with the career of more glamorous and
media oriented intellectuals. Yet, Bourdieu’s profile is the result of a multiform,
interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary journey that contributed to forge a solid
commitment to a definition of the intellectual that stands, at least from Bourdieu’s
perspective, in clear contrast with the Parisian “mundane” intellectual style. In this
respect, Bourdieu’s use of the idea of marginality serves the purpose of better defining
his intellectual self-narrative, by arguing from a position that grants him the role of a
critical intellectual engaged in unmasking the mechanisms of domination that perpetrate
social inequalities. Bourdieu belonged to those intellectuals that, like Edward Said,
firmly believed that taking an oppositional stance is an essential requisite not only for
the definition of the intellectual, but also in expressing an underlying solidarity with the
weak and the marginal ones.
Even when Bourdieu became, after Foucault, France’s major public intellectual,
he continued to negotiate his identity of public intellectual between a self-description
emphasizing the role of the marginal intellectual, and his ideal of sociology’s unique
and privileged position of science de la science within the intellectual field. By the time
Bourdieu became France’s leading intellectual he had already created, through the
practice of a sociology very strongly turned towards self-reflexivity, a powerful self-
reflexive mirror, which perhaps served him, also, as a protection against the intrusion of
public attention in his own private life. What many people failed to see is that behind
Bourdieu the public intellectual there was Bourdieu the sociologist holding a self-
reflexive mirror.
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Chapter 3: Umberto Eco’s Intellectual Polyphony: the Critic
of Mass Culture, the Intellectual, and the Fiction Writer
‘La semiotica, in principio, è la disciplina che studia tutto ciò che può essere usato
per mentire’. 205
3.1 Introduction. Re-reading as a post-modern intellectual strategy
Challenging the legitimacy of existing positions or states of affair, conceptualizing
alternative views of society or of social fields, or simply combining existing views in
order to produce an original and challenging vision, is what defines creative
intellectuals. Creative intellectuals do not simply repeat: they re-contextualize. As they
re-contextualize, they innovate.206 As producers of meta-cultural discourse, intellectuals
possess the capacity to move, as Richard Rorty would say, from one language game to
another. At the same time, they are also able to frame the specific language game in
which meta-cultural discussions take place.207 Some intellectuals also have a recognised
ability to engage not only with the cultural narratives of the present but also with those
of the past.  In this sense, Umberto Eco’s profound knowledge of the Middle-Ages,
along with his expertise in aesthetics and his mastering of the theory and the practice of
the post-modern discourse, make him an intellectual whose voice is truly polyphonic.
Eco is able to access different fields of knowledge, making his intellectual enterprise a
matter of a co-presence of a multiplicity of discourses solidly interlinked within an
interdisciplinary framework. Thanks to his erudition and to his expertise as a
semiotician and critic of popular culture, Umberto Eco has been able to produce the
                                                 
205 Umberto Eco, Trattato di semotica generale (1975), 19th edn (Milan: Bompiani, 2008), p.17.
206 This is one of the aspects most often highlighted by scholarly studies on creativity. See for instance
Arthur Koestler, The Act of Creation (1964) (London: Picador, 1977); Margaret Boden, The Creative
Mind. Myths and Mechanisms (1990), 2nd edn (New York: Routledge, 2004); Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi,
Creativity. Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention (New York: HarperCollins, 1997).
207 As an example of the way in which Richard Rorty discusses the concept of language game in relation
the figure of the intellectual see Richard Rorty, ‘The last intellectual in Europe: Orwell on cruelty’ in
Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989),
pp.169-189.
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enormously successful novel Il nome della rosa (1980), a fascinating mix of Medieval
ingredients, of popular culture in the form of a plot obeying to the conventions of a
detective novel, and of post-modern chic. Such a combination of disparate elements
contributed in shaping a very powerful textual matrix imbued with inter-textual links
leading to an almost endless chain of references, both fictional and non-fictional.
Re-reading, or re-interpreting, the past is one of the key-features of
postmodernity and of postmodern aesthetics. Eco participated extensively, both as a
theorist and as a novel writer, in the post-modern mood of re-interpreting the past. The
Middle-Ages constitute a key to the understanding of his international success as a
semiotician, as a fiction writer, and as a public intellectual. As chapter one has shown,
reading, or re-reading the past, is one of the many modalities of the exercise of
intellectuality. Intellectuals define their own self-narrative in reference not only to
current debates, but also in terms of a tradition and history. Il nome della rosa is an
example of a text that, as post-modern texts often do, openly refers to other texts. This
post-modern strategy is not, in the case of Eco, a purely aesthetical one. It is also part of
a self-conscious commercial strategy. As Margherita Ganeri has illustrated, the success
of Il nome della rosa can be described through the phenomenology of a well-
orchestrated caso letterario.208
3.1.1 Constructing the concept of intellectual polyphony
This chapter addresses the question of the enlargement of Eco’s readership that
accompanied the commercial success of Il nome della rosa in relation to the
diversification of Eco’s intellectual voice. The link between the enlargement of the
readership and the diversification of Eco’ intellectual voice will be examined as a
progressive process whose creative genesis will be retraced through Eco’s previous
works. In order to show how the diversification of Eco’s intellectual narrative is a long-
term process, I will refer to particular works so as to mark possible stages of this
process. The chapter emphasizes how, in spite of a diversification, Eco’s intellectual
                                                 
208Margherita Ganeri, Il ‘caso’ Eco (Palermo: Palumbo, 1991). Margherita Ganeri considers Eco’s novel
from a literary as well as an extra-literary perspective, illustrating how the success of Eco’s Il nome della
rosa constitutes a perfect illustration of how cultural products, the literary market, and the entertainment
industry function interdependently. Ganeri’s study is well supported by the fact that the enormous, and in
many ways unexpected, success of Il nome della rosa constitutes ‘un primum e per ora un unicum assoluti
nella storia dell’editoria italiana’ In fact, Il nome della rosa is one of the most successful event enjoyed by
the Italian editorial industry. Margherita Ganeri, Il ‘caso’ Eco, p.65 for the passage quoted.
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itinerary develops against the background of a profound continuity of his theoretical
concerns. It does so in mainly three ways. Firstly, it explores the development and the
diversification of Eco’s intellectual itinerary through the concept of polyphony. Eco’s
authorial voice is polyphonic since it embraces a large variety of topics. As a result,
Eco’ intellectual project is fundamentally comprehensive of a variety of cultural
manifestations that to a specialist’s eye might appear heterogeneous.209 Secondly, the
chapter shows how Eco’s intellectual polyphony can be examined synchronically as
well as diachronically. The process whereby Eco diversifies his intellectual self-
narrative is cumulative, in that intellectual diversification can be seen as developing
over a period of time but is also identifiable within the same text or work. In this sense,
the notion of polyphony will be used to illustrate how the same textual space, as in the
case of Eco’s novel Il nome della rosa, can contain a multiplicity of discourses self-
consciously orchestrated by an author. Thirdly, this chapter examines how Eco’s
intellectual polyphony (the co-presence of different cultural levels and experiences) is
related to intellectual creativity as well as to an interdisciplinary practice of
intellectuality.
Eco’s intellectual polyphony will also be addressed in relation to Eco’s
involvement in post-modern debates and, more generally, as illustrating some of the
main characteristics of the post-modern intellectual.210 Against this backdrop, I will
discuss some of Eco’s ideas on the figure of the intellectual and the understanding of
intellectuality he presents in Apocalittici e integrati (1964).211 In particular, I will be
stressing how Eco’s discussion of cultural consumerism shapes in important ways his
understanding of the figure of the intellectual. As a complement to the discussion of
Eco’s Apocalittici e integrati, I will also comment on some of the essays of Roland
Barthes’ Mythologies (1957) dealing with the figure of the intellectual.
                                                 
209 I am referring, among other things, to the distinction between “high” and “low” culture, and to how
such a distinction was implicitly at stake when a part of the Italian intelligentsia considered with
scepticism Eco’s initial positioning within the Italian intellectual field. See especially the introductory
pages of Umberto Eco, Apocalittici e integrati (1964) 7th edn (Milan: Bompiani, 2003).
210 In developing this last point, I will draw from Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and interpreters. On
Modernity, post-modernity and intellectuals (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987).
211Apocalittici e integrati allows for a consideration of Eco’s interaction with different forms of cultural
production.
99
3.1.2 Intellectual polyphony: a matter of creativity
As Arthur Koestler points out, the creative process usually starts as an early synthesis of
symbolic matrices. In this early synthesis, the importance of intuition is paramount.212
The initial intuition is thus followed by what Graham Wallas has termed a period of
incubation, which eventually gives rise to a proper theoretical synthesis.213 As pointed
out in chapter one, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi argues that creativity develops in the space
of interaction between individuals, domains and fields. In other words, the creative
intuition has to undergo a more or less long process whereby it is integrated within a
domain and it also needs to be recognised by the relevant gatekeepers active within a
particular field of knowledge.214 From this perspective, the critical reactions that
followed the publication of Eco’s Opera aperta (1962) and Apocalittici e integrati
(1964) illustrate particularly well such dynamics. While these works are now considered
decisive in defining a line of research along which Eco elaborates his critical approach
to art and social communication, at the time of their publication there was a
considerable resistance towards the interdisciplinary methodology Eco was
elaborating.215 Such an interdisciplinary methodology is particularly well exemplified,
as I shall illustrate, by Eco’s notion of open work. The idea of open work exemplifies
Eco’s intentions to cross the boundaries of disciplines in order to identify similarities in
the way in which disciplines as diverse as music, art, and mathematics represent the
world.
3.2 The notion of polyphony and the open work
This section will introduce the notion of intellectual polyphony in relation to the early
stages of Eco’s intellectual itinerary. The notion of polyphony derives from musical
language, where it refers to the co-presence of two or more melodic voices. The term is
also commonly applied to suggest how many sounds an instrument can play at once. In
                                                 
212 Arthur Koestler, The Act of Creation, pp. 199-212.
213 See Graham Wallas, The Art of Thought (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1926) and more recently Howard
Gardner, Creating Minds: an Anatomy of Creativity seen through the Lives of Freud, Picasso, Stravisnki,
Eliot, Graham, and Gandhi (New York: Basic Books, 1993).
214 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Creativity. Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention (New
York: HarperCollins, 1997), especially Part I ‘The Creative Process’, pp.21-127.
215 On this point the more recent editions of Opera aperta and Apocalittici e integrati provide introductory
sections with information about the reception of these works at the time of their publication as well as
later.
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literature, the term has been used by Mikhail Bakhtin within the context of
Dostoevsky’s novels. Bakhtin employed the term to render Dostoevsky’s capacity to
capture the multiplicity of points of view intervening within the same description.216 The
notion of polyphony, as discussed in this chapter, is partly related to these modes of
writing. The understanding of the term within this chapter, however, aims more
generally at underlining how Eco, along with his intellectual itinerary, diversifies his
authorial voice in a progressive manner.
If the notion of polyphony in its original musical sense might not be the most
relevant referent to shed light on Eco’s career as an intellectual, it is nonetheless useful
to remember how Eco himself showed a pronounced interest in avant-garde music and
in the way in which such music expressed the idea of the open work: an idea that not
only launched Eco’s intellectual career, but also proved to be important and fertile
throughout his career.217 Between 1954 and 1959, Eco worked for National TV RAI as a
producer of cultural programmes; during this period he also befriended Luciano Berio,
an Italian composer known for his experimental work, especially in the domain of early
electronic and polyphonic music. Through Berio, Eco met important composers such as
John Cage, Pierre Boulez, and Henry Pousseur. Moreover, Eco collaborated with Berio
in experimenting with words and sounds at the RAI’s Studio di Fonologia established in
1955.218Partly in connection with these formative experiences, Eco develops the concept
of open work. The concept, as pointed out in the first chapter, refers to a space of
negotiation of meaning between the internal structure of a work of art generating
semantic multiplicity, and the response that the interpreter produces from interacting
with such works of art.
Given the importance that the concept of open work acquires in the first stages
of Eco’s intellectual itinerary and beyond, it will be helpful to further discuss the way in
                                                 
216 Bakhtin’s observations on Dostoevsky’s novels in terms of polyphony can also be extended to novels,
such as Virginia Wolf’s or James Joyces’s, which are known to feature the writing techniques known
under the name of stream of consciousness.
217 See for instance David Seed, ‘The open work in theory and practice’ in Reading Eco, ed. by Rocco
Capozzi (Bloomington: Indiana University press, 1997), pp.73-82.
218 See Michael, Caesar, Umberto Eco. Philosophy, Semiotics and the Work of Fiction (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1999), p.16. For a thorough discussion of the years in which Eco collaborated with Berio see
Florian Mussgnug, ‘Writing like Music: Luciano Berio, Umberto Eco and the New Avant-Garde’, in
Comparative Critical Studies, Feb. 2008, vol.5, no.1, pp.81-97.
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which Eco defines it. In the introduction to the first edition of Opera aperta, Eco argues
that:
Il tema comune a queste ricerche è la reazione dell’arte e degli artisti (delle strutture
formali e dei programmi poetici che vi presiedono) di fronte alla provocazione del
Caso, dell’ Indeterminato, del Probabile, dell’ Ambiguo, del Plurivalente; la reazione
quindi della sensibilità contemporanea in risposta alle suggestioni della matematica,
della biologia, della fisica, della psicologia, della logica e del nuovo orizzonte
epistemologico che queste scienze hanno aperto.219
This passage is an overall statement about the general topic as well as the theoretical
aim of the book. Eco refers to a ‘nuovo orizzonte epistemologico’ (of which avant-garde
art is one among a variety of expressions) in order to posit the existence of a theoretical
sensitivity that manifests itself in different fields of knowledge such as mathematics,
physics, psychology, logic, etc. What is clear is that Eco’s theoretical concerns touch
upon a wide range of disciplinary territories the book proposes to deal with. If
knowledge can be seen as a map with a certain number of known territories, Eco’s
theoretical interest goes hand in hand with the idea of a comprehensiveness of a variety
of disciplinary territories within a flexible theoretical framework. As the passage quoted
suggests, Eco’s view of knowledge is organic and interdisciplinary from the outset.
Avant-garde art, as Eco maintains, participates actively in expressing and
defining the formal strategies whereby modern sensitivity elaborates its own self-
representing narrative. In this context, as Eco points out, Opera aperta:
Si propone un’indagine di vari momenti in cui l’arte contemporanea si trova a fare i
conti col Disordine (…) Non è il disordine cieco e insanabile, lo scacco di ogni
possibilità ordinatrice, ma il disordine fecondo di cui la cultura moderna ci ha
mostrato la positività; la rottura di un Ordine tradizionale, che l’uomo occidentale
credeva immutabile e definitivo e identificava con la struttura oggettiva del
mondo.(p.2)
                                                 
219 Umberto Eco, Opera aperta (1962) 7th edn (Milan: Bompiani, 2006), p.2. Page numbers in the text in
the next paragraphs refer to this edition.
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As this passage suggests, Eco identifies a major historical shift of sensitivity between
the belief in the existence of a fixed and a-historical order, typical of the medieval
world, and the lucid awareness of the fact that this order can no longer be identified
anymore with an ontological structure of the world. Further on he notes:
Il mondo  delle grandi summae medievali ha costituito un modello di Ordine che ha
permeato di sé la cultura occidentale: la crisi di quest’ordine e l’instaurazione di nuovi
ordini, la ricerca di moduli ‘aperti’ capaci di garantire e fondare il mutamento e
l’avventura, la visione infine dell’universo fondato sulla possibilità, quale
suggeriscono all’immaginazione la scienza e la filosofia contemporanee, trova la sua
rappreentazione – forse l’anticipazione- più provocante e più violenta nel Finnegans
Wake. (p.4)
When the idea of an ultimate order of things is declared questionable and is indeed
questioned, the indeterminacy of the real and the contingency of the notion of truth
emerge in all their problematic complexity. It is precisely in relation to this very
complexity and indeterminacy that, in Eco’s view, takes shape the poetics of the open
work and more generally lays the creative potential of avant-garde art. Literary works
such as Joyce’s Finnegan Wake, Eco maintains, express the fundamental indeterminacy
of the modern world.220
In the opening pages of Opera aperta, Eco draws some examples from
experimental music, particularly from those composers he became interested in through
his acquaintance with Luciano Berio, in order to further exemplify the definition of the
open work. What characterizes the open work in the case of experimental music is, as
he points out, the freedom that the composer enjoys from conventional rules and norms
that have defined and shaped the art of composition hitherto. This freedom is reflected
by the indeterminacy that particular compositions assume. The fact that the execution of
a work accommodates indeterminacy suggests the inescapable ambiguity of acts of
interpretation. The idea of interpretation, in fact, covers the entire range of the process
                                                 
220 Eco mentions Joyce’s Finnegans Wake as perhaps the best example of a work that clearly anticipates
the philosophical, aesthetic and artistic values that he ascribes to the open work. To Joyce he will dedicate
a long chapter of the first edition of Opera aperta (1962). This long chapter will later appear in a separate
volume as Umberto Eco. Le poetiche di Joyce (Milan: Bompiani, 1966).
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that goes form the initial composition to the execution and fruition of the piece of
music.221
Composition technique, execution, and fruition. These are the three moments
that define the unfolding of the poetics of the open work in the context of the sort of
experimental music Eco engages with. In front of the open work, be it in music,
literature or art, the interpreter engages with the unexpected and the undefined. What
was a codifiable order organised around clear patterns or values, becomes possibility,
instability, and transience. In this sense the open work stands in clear contrast with the
modern ideas of stability, order and reason. The open work reveals the crisis of a society
that, faced with the crumbling of the system of values on which modernity is erected,
dwells in a space of transition where the belief in an ordered universe has been replaced
by philosophical scepticism. As Eco puts it:
Ma accettare e cercare di dominare l’ambiguità in cui siamo e in cui risolviamo le
nostre definizioni del mondo, non significa imprigionare l’ambiguità in un ordine che
le sia estraneo e a cui è legata proprio quale opposizione dialettica (…). Così l’arte
contemporanea sta tentando di trovare  - in anticipo sulle scienze e sulle strutture
sociali- una soluzione alla nostra crisi, e la trova nell’unico modo che le sia possibile,
sotto specie immaginative, offrendoci delle immagini del mondo che valgono come
metafore epistemologiche. (p.3)
As Eco maintains, avant-garde translates the particular cultural atmosphere of a period
of lost certainties well in advance compared to other fields of knowledge. As Peter
Bondanella’s points out in Eco and the Open Text, the concept of open work can be
considered as representative of Eco’s approach not only to avant-garde art, but also to
literary criticism and later to novel writing.222 While working with the possibilities
offered by the idea of the open-endedness and indeterminacy of cultural processes, Eco
will soon manifest a concern for finding reasonable limits to the field of possible
meanings the open work can express. As it will be shown in the next chapters, Eco
                                                 
221 See in particular the introductory pages of the first chapter of Opera aperta.
222 Peter Bondanella, Umberto Eco and the Open Text (New York: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 1997).
The book is considered the first comprehensive intellectual biography of Eco in English.
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tackles the question of these limits by defining a space of interaction between culture
and its interpreters.223 However, in spite of his growing concern for defining the limits
of the interplay between the open work and its interpreters Eco remains, throughout his
career, faithful to the flexibility of approach that the notion of open work allows for.
As illustrated, Eco explores the notion of open work at several levels and applies
it to modern art, literature, and, precisely, to experimental music. The interdisciplinary
orientation of Opera aperta results from Eco’s already very eclectic personal and
professional background. While Eco was working in the cultural program section of the
RAI he also published Il problema estetico in San Tommaso (1956), an essay that was
based on his master thesis.224 Between the publication of Il problema estetico in San
Tommaso and Opera aperta Eco initiates an important intellectual exchange with those
intellectuals who would later form the Gruppo 63.225 As a result of these early
intellectual experiences and of the diversity of disciplines he engages with, Eco
internalizes cultural and disciplinarity diversity and transforms it into an eclectic
approach to art, culture and social communication.
3.3 Apocalittici e integrati: interplay of detachment and engagement
Opera aperta addresses a readership that, while being diversified, is also interested in a
wide range of artistic expressions. As Michael Caesar notes ‘(i)f Eco’s  book was
successful, it was also because there was already a public there who needed it, made use
of it, was in a sense prepared for it’.226The interest that Eco manifests for
interdisciplinarity in relation to artistic practices is also central in Apocalittici e integrati
(1964), a work that follows closely the publication of Opera aperta. Apocalittici e
integrati can be regarded as a contribution to the discussion on the role of the
intellectual vis-à-vis mass culture, a topic that was very much debated immediately after
                                                 
223 See my discussion of Umberto Eco, I limiti dell’interpretazione (1990) 4th edn(Milan: Bompiani,
2004) in chapter six.
224 I will discuss Il problema estetico in San Tommaso later on in chapter five, in order to illustrate Eco’s
critical engagement with structuralism. Eco, by suggesting a comparison between scholastic philosophy
and structuralism, recasts his first work in light of his subsequent critical engagement with structuralism.
225 Italian neo-avant-garde group Gruppo 63 was founded in 1963 and included artists and writers such as
Edoardo Sanguineti, Renato Barilli, and Nanni Balestrini.
226 Michael, Caesar, Umberto Eco. Philosophy, Semiotics and the Work of Fiction, p.27.
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the publication of Opera aperta.227 In Apocalittici e integrati, Eco identifies and
describes two typologies of intellectuals that reflect the interplay between engagement
and detachment that I have discussed in chapter one.228 Eco uses the terms integrated
intellectuals and apocalyptic intellectuals as representing two distinctive responses to
mass culture. While integrated intellectuals celebrate with joy the advent of “mass”
culture, the apocalyptic ones condemn every manifestation of it, considering the
commodification of culture as antagonist to “high” culture. In Eco’s view, both attitudes
bare serious limitations in that they lay judgement on cultural phenomena without really
gaining insight into the mechanisms and functions of popular culture within the larger
picture of society. The apocalyptic intellectual, Eco contends, offers a consolatory view
of culture, one that considers rejection of popular culture as a sign of spiritual
leadership. As Peter Bondanella puts it, ‘this consolatory attitude allows the reader to
assume an attitude that is extremely detrimental to retaining a free and critical
judgement’.229 On the other hand, Eco warns against the propensity of integrated
intellectuals to celebrate the culture industry regardless of the value of cultural
products.230
In order to avoid being confined to one of the two categories he describes, Eco’s
position on culture embraces a critical approach that is quite similar to that of an
anthropologist; the idea is, as Caesar suggests, ‘to find a method which would enable an
informed discussion of “culture industry” its products and its means of distribution
                                                 
227 On this point the more recent editions of Opera aperta and Apocalittici e integrati provide introductory
sections with some useful contextual information about these works at the time of their publication and
later.
228 As Eco shows in Apocalittici e integrati, the distinction between engagement and detachment is not
always clear-cut. While fervent critics of mass culture claim detachment from the products of the culture
industry, they also firmly promote a culture of critical engagement. Similarly, enthusiastic supporters of
consumerist culture are engaged in supporting consumerist culture against what they see as a more
pretentious elite culture. From this perspective, integrated intellectuals are rather alien to the nostalgic
stance taken by certain intellectuals (one can think for instance of Herbert Marcuse in One dimensional
Man) for whom art’s authenticity was being violated by the culture industry and by the commodification
of culture. In Apocalittici e integrati Eco argues that distinctions between cultura alta, cultura media and
cultura bassa do not often reflect how these levels coexist interdependently. See Umberto Eco, ‘Cultura
di massa e “livelli di cultura”‘, in Apocalittici e integrati, pp.29-54.
229 Peter, Bondanella, Umberto Eco and the Open Text, p.48
230 Commentators generally agree that Eco’s position on integrated intellectuals is far more difficult to
convey, the reason being that Eco himself seems, at times, to be favouring a certain enthusiasm for
popular culture typical of the integrated intellectuals he describes. See for instance Michael Caesar,
Umberto Eco. Philosophy, Semiotics and the Work of Fiction, p.38-39 and Peter, Bondanella, Umberto
Eco and the Open Text, p.48.
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(…)’. Such method would also prove able to transcend the opposition between blind
approval and cynical disapproval of mass culture.231 In ‘La struttura del cattivo gusto’,
one of the essays of Apocalittici e integrati, Eco examines different aspects of mass
culture by looking at the concept of kitsch. Eco defines kitsch, or ‘cattivo gusto’, as the
‘fabbricazione ed imposizione dell’effetto’.232 In this very sense kitsch represents the
antithesis of the open work. In contrast to the notion of open work, kitsch denies
semantic indeterminacy, structural contingency and the free play of meaning between
the work of art and its interpreters. Kitsch is what has been conceived with the clear
intention to achieve a particular effect on people, and it fulfils its purpose when this
intention is reached in a rather unmediated way. In this sense, what distinguishes kitsch
from the open work is that the latter establishes a complex relationship with social
reality whereby the work of art generates a number of mediations between society and
its interpreters. These mediations in turn characterize the ground upon which different
interpretations arise. On the contrary, the notion of kitsch implies that a message is
interpreted without any reflection on, questioning or re-casting of the message itself.
In order to elaborate on the notion of kitsch, in ‘La struttura del cattivo
gusto’ Eco discusses an extract of a literary pastiche that German literary theorist
Walther Killy produced by combining different sentences or fragments of sentences of
known German authors within a single paragraph. The paragraph in question, notes Eco,
is kitsch precisely because its sentences rely on linguistic procedures whose explicit
finality is to produce an overemotional response in the reader.233 In contrast to the
formal strategies, rhetorical artefacts, and expressive solutions which he identifies as
kitsch, Eco is interested in studying how avant-garde art functions in terms of poetics
and epistemology: he considers avant-garde art to be a field of enquiry, testing and
discovery just like those scientific disciplines traditionally associated with experimental
methods. Recasting the line of reasoning developed in Opera aperta, Eco argues that
avant-garde art features the potential to become a legitimate instrument for knowing the
world and its logic. In this sense avant-garde art creates a space of mediation within
which the complexity of reality can be articulated. With regards to this, Eco reinstates
                                                 
231 Michael Caesar, Umberto Eco. Philosophy, Semiotics and the Work of Fiction, p.39.
232 Umberto Eco, ‘La struttura del cattivo gusto’, in Apocalittici e integrati, pp.65-129, p.66.
233 The desired effect is reached by recurring to various semantically overloaded poetic images.
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the opposition between avant-garde and kitsch. Kitsch satisfies the consumer by
gratifying him with the feeling of ‘perfezionare un’esperienza estetica privilegiata’.234
On the contrary avant-garde art, according to Eco, focuses less on the immediate
response of the consumer than on the process through which the work of art takes shape
and meaning:
L’avanguardia nel far arte pone in evidenza i procedimenti che portano all’opera, ed
elegge questi ad oggetto del proprio discorso, il kitsch pone in evidenza la reazione
che l’opera deve provocare ed elegge a fine della propria operazione la reazione
emotiva del fruitore.235
By moving his argument along the opposition between avant-garde and kitsch, Eco is
analysing cultural practices by setting a distinction between avant-garde art and popular
culture. From this perspective he is, in a certain way, relying on a binary opposition
between avant-garde and kitsch. At the same time, as pointed out, he seeks to maintain a
balance between approval and disapproval for mass-culture. While he identifies relevant
distinctions and oppositions between the artistic field and cultural consumerism, he also
clearly suggests areas of interpenetration between the two:
Non solo l’avanguardia sorge come reazione alla diffusione del Kitsch, ma il Kitsch si
rinnova e prospera proprio ponendo continuamente a frutto le scoperte
dell’avanguardia. Così questa, da un lato, trovandosi a funzionare suo malgrado come
ufficio studi dell’industria culturale, reagisce a questa circonvenzione cercando di
elaborare continuamente nuove proposte eversive (…) mentre l’industria della cultura
di consumo, stimolata dalle propose dell’avanguardia, continuamente svolge opera di
mediazione, diffusione e adattamento, sempre e di nuovo prescrivendo in modi
commerciabili come provare il dovuto effetto di fronte a modi di formare che
originariamente volevano farci riflettere unicamente sulle cause. In tal senso allora la
situazione antropologica della cultura di massa si delinea come una continua dialettica
                                                 
234Umberto Eco, ‘La struttura del cattivo gusto’, p.71.
235Umberto Eco, ‘La struttura del cattivo gusto’,  p.73.
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tra proposte innovatrici e adattamenti omologatori, le prime continuamente tradite dai
secondi: con la maggioranza del pubblico che fruisce dei secondi credendo di adire
alla funzione dei primi.236
Precisely because it acknowledges both sides of the opposition, Eco’s critical
contribution does not run the risk of rigidly confining itself to neither the apocalyptic
nor the integrated vision. Eco, in fact, was well aware of the procedures through which
avant-garde art was making use of fragments of popular culture, and quite rightly he
saw the possibility of approaching the relationship between popular culture and avant-
garde art in a dialectical way. Mentioning the specific case of pop-art, he notes:
Oggi è la cultura di avanguardia che, reagendo alla situazione massiccia e avvolgente
della cultura di massa, prende i propri stilemi a prestito dal Kitsch: e altro non fa la
pop-art quando individua i più volgari e pretenziosi tra i simboli grafici dell’industria
pubblicitaria e li fa oggetto di una attenzione morbosa e ironica, ingrandendone
l’immagine e riportandola nel quadro di un’opera da galleria.237
Again, Eco illustrates the presence of artistic strategies whereby avant-garde art
integrates popular culture. As Bondanella points out, ‘Eco understood perfectly that in
order to develop a theory of the avant-garde in aesthetics, any such theory would of
necessity have to come to grips with popular culture’.238
3.4 Towards an intellectual synthesis of avant-garde art and popular culture
In the last two sections, I have discussed the background of the very early stages of
Eco’s intellectual itinerary. I have pointed out the importance of Eco’s intellectual
involvement with artists of neo avant-garde milieus in art, literature and music. Eco’s
involvement with national television RAI was also extremely formative. My
observations point towards highlighting a creative process towards which a wide range
of experiences converge into forming an intellectual style. The fact that Eco comes to
grips with both the complexity of avant-garde art and with the communicative strategies
                                                 
236 Umberto Eco, ‘La struttura del cattivo gusto’, p.76.
237 Umberto Eco, ‘La struttura del cattivo gusto’, p.128.
238Peter Bondanella, Umberto Eco and the Open Text, p.49.
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employed by mass-consumerism shows that Eco’s approach, besides being extremely
versatile, is also useful in tracking down different forms of cultural and social
communication. Creativity, in the case of Apocalittici e integrati, is also apparent in
Eco’s capacity to use the opposition between a critical condemnation of mass
consumerism and its opposite hedonistic approval. Precisely because he acknowledges
that cultural criticism is divided in opposite fractions, Eco manages to create a third
option which, dialectically speaking, is the synthesis of the options from which it
emerges. In this sense, Eco reinterprets existing intellectual debates in order to produce
a creative synthesis that seeks to transcend existing positions. 239
As pointed out in chapter one, oppositions are constitutive of intellectual debates
as much as of rhetorical strategies whereby intellectuals express and legitimate their
particular views of society. A historical perspective, notes Eco, should also support an
informed discussion of the distinctions and dichotomies that structure the intellectual
field. Eco, in fact, suggests that a particular reference to kitsch and popular culture
should be understood within a historical frame going beyond modernity. In stating this,
he highlights how the idea of using popular culture to create a desired effect among
members of a society goes back to the Middle-Ages. Accordingly, he contends that
debates confronting supporters and detractors of popular culture may be traced back as
far as a controversy taking place in the Middle-Ages between St. Bernard and the Abbot
Suger. The subject of the controversy was the use of artistic images inside cathedrals in
order to convey religious messages. While St. Bernard, favouring a more austere and
severe décor, represents the apocalyptic intellectual, The Abbot Suger, much in favour
of using images to deliver religious messages, represents the integrated intellectual.240
Eco’s use of history in order to shed light on contemporary intellectual debates is, as I
will illustrate in the final sections of this chapter, a defining feature of his very
engagement with knowledge and with cultural theory.
                                                 
239 On this point see especially Arthur Koestler, The Act of Creation, pp. 178-224. Koestler, as I pointed
out, defines creativity in terms of a combination of conventionalized cultural matrices whereby a new,
unconventional matrix is produced.
240 Umberto Eco, Apocalittici e integrati, pp.17-18.
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3.5 Eco, Barthes, the intellectual and popular culture
As pointed out, Eco places the concerns he develops in Apocalittici e integrati within a
larger polemic regarding the role of the intellectual vis-à-vis the realm of cultural
consumerism. In order to understand the particular moment in which Eco wrote the
essays of Apocalittici e integrati, it might be useful to discuss it alongside Roland
Barthes’ Mythologies (1957) a collection of essays published in 1957 in which Barthes
adopts a quite eclectic approach in discussing popular culture.241
In Mythologies Barthes discusses popular culture as an expression of a
mythological discourse. According to Barthes, the social function of the modern myth is
to evacuate the real (évacuer le réel) by representing social reality as if it were the
expression of a natural and immutable order and not as a social construct.242 Barthes, by
defining myth as word, aims at showing how human cultures operate within a system of
signs that he calls ‘système sémiologique’: the myth has a signification (p.194) and
therefore it can be subjected to a lecture and a déchiffrement (201). Two of the essays of
Mythologies also address the figure of the intellectual within popular culture.243 In
defining the place of the intellectual within the discourse of the modern myth, Barthes
draws attention to particular traits of the figure of the intellectual that are reminiscent of
Manheim’s conception of the free-floating intellectuals: ‘l’intellectuel se détache du
réel, mais reste en l’air, à tourner en rond: son ascension est pusillanime, également
éloignée du grand ciel religieux et de la terre solide du sense commun’ (p.170). The
figure of the intellectual, as reflected by the mythological discourse of popular culture,
is often associated with abstract thinking or spirituality, and it is assimilated more with
the air element rather than with the earthy one. The tendency of identifying the
intellectual to a ‘machine à penser’, whose products are by essence abstracts,
                                                 
241 Apocalittici e integrati, in spite of being structured around specific sections, adopts the free spirited
tone typical of Diario Minimo, a collection of short pieces, often with a satirical tone that Eco published
in 1963. See Umberto Eco, Diario Minimo (Milan: Mondadori, 1963). For an overview of the place of the
book within Eco’s further production see Margherita Ganeri, ‘Da Diario minimo (1963) a Il pendolo di
Foucault (1988)’ in Margherita Ganeri, Il caso Eco, pp.44-45.
242 Roland Barthes, ‘Le Mythe, aujourd’hui’, in Mythologies (Paris: Seuil, 1970) pp.179-233. In the
theoretical essay following the short and descriptive essays of Mythologies, Barthes notes that the
discourse of the myth serves the ideological purpose of demystifying the arbitrariness of its structure, by
presenting itself as ahistorical. Page numbers in the text in the next few paragraphs will refer to this
edition.
243 See in particular Roland Barthes, ‘Poujade et les intellectuels’, in Mythologies, p.170-179.
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predisposes the intellectual to be perceived negatively, to be condemned for the
‘lourdeur excessive’ that erudition confers to his appearance and to his way of talking
(p.172).
Barthes’s observations on the figure of the intellectual give a good idea of the
ways through which the intellectual is perceived against the background of the culture
of everyday life. Moreover, a discussion on the intellectual through the lens of popular
culture, gives a good measure of how the mythological discourse of contemporary
cultures can best be located at the crossroad of different discourses. There is no single
and unified perception of intellectuals. Rather, there exist different perceptions, some of
which tend to be self-congratulatory and some which are, rightly or not, more critical
and pungent.244 Eco’s Apocalitici e integrati and Barthes’ Mythologies discuss the figure
of the intellectual in two different yet complementary ways. On the one hand Eco is
concerned with how intellectuals view and engage with popular culture. Barthes, on the
other hand, is interested in how intellectuals are represented by and within the discourse
of popular culture. Both texts raise the question of social and cultural representations of
intellectuals in contemporary Western societies from an original angle, examining the
figure of the intellectual as emerging from a cultural background shaping the way
intellectuals view society as much as the way society views intellectuals. Barthes’
concern to include intellectuals within the contemporary mythological discourse can
also stimulate a further parallel with Eco’s Apocalittici e integrati, considering the
extent to which the two intellectual attitudes described by Eco (cynical detachment and
hedonistic involvement) participate in the way society popularizes the figure of the
intellectual.
By placing his viewpoint on intellectuals within the general framework of the
study of social communications and its processes, Eco (as well as Barthes) discusses
                                                 
244Barthes also points out how the contributions of intellectuals are often seen as more qualitative than
quantitative; according to Barthes, this perception enhances the negative representations of intellectuals:
‘(s)es produits sont qualitatifs non quantitatifs. On retrouve ici l’ordinaire discredit jeté sur le cerveau
(…) dont la disgrace fatale est évidemment l’excentricité meme de sa position, tout ne haut du corps, près
de la nue, loin des racines!’ (p.173). In another essay of Mythologies, ‘L’écrivain en vancances’, Barthes
ironically describes the way in which the media portray writers on holiday, noting that: ‘(c)e qui prouve la
merveilleuse singularité de l’écrivain, c’est que pendant ces fameuses vacances, qui’il partage
fraternellement avec les ouvriers et les calicots, il ne cesse, lui, sinon de travailler, du moins de produire.
Faux travailleur, c’est aussi un faux vacancier. L’un écrit ses souvernirs, un autre corrige des épreuves, le
troisième prépare son prochain livre. Et celui qui ne fait rien l’avoue comme une conduite vraiment
paradoxale, un exploit d’avant-garde, que seul un esprit fort peut se permettre d’afficher’. Roland
Barthes, ‘L’écrivain en vancances’ in Mythologies, pp.29-32, p.30.
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intellectuality beyond the frame of academic specialisation. Accordingly, Eco looks at
the figure of the intellectual as much as at the background against which intellectuals
develop their ideas and voice their concerns. By doing so he avoids either isolating
intellectuals from the social context, or looking at intellectuals as mere reflections of
social processes developing independently from them.245 This type of framework
intelligently avoids the shortcomings of either an excessively micro-sociological or an
excessively macro-sociological approach. Eco’s approach to mass communication, as he
elaborates it in Apocalittici e integrati, monitors the co-existence of standardisation and
inventiveness, without losing sight of the social and cultural trends that define the
collective dimensions of contemporary culture.246
3.5.1 Eco, media criticism, and the phenomenology of Mike Buongiorno
The analysis of popular culture is also one of the areas where it is possible to find a
common ground between Bourdieu and Eco. Both thinkers are very interested in
exploring popular and media culture. As I have illustrated in the first chapters of this
study, Bourdieu and Eco both emphatically subscribe to the idea that the intellectual
ought to engage with different cultural domains across society. For example, I have
underlined Bourdieu’s commitment to the idea of the sociologist as someone who can
dwell equally in the realm of philosophy’s abstract theories as among working class
people. In chapter two, I have also discussed how Bourdieu frames his criticism of
media culture in his popular book Sur la télévision.
The ability to engage with different cultural spheres is also distinctive of Eco’s
intellectual self-narrative. In particular, I have insisted on Eco’s early commitment to
avant-garde movements in Italy and France, as well as on the importance of his
discussion of the integrated and the apocalyptic intellectual, in order to show how Eco
provides a framework for discussing sophisticated cultural products along with the more
                                                 
245 A theoretical synthesis between structure and agency has been a concern that strongly marked Eco’s
position within the intellectual field since his early works. See for instance the introductions to the various
editions of Opera aperta. I will turn to this question in chapter five.
246 For a discussion of the macro-sociology and micro-sociology see, The Micro-Macro Link, ed. by
Jeffrey Alexander, Bernhard Giesen, Richard Münch, and Neil Smelser (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1987).
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prosaic products of mass culture.247 In the next section I will explore how Eco’s eclectic
conceptual vocabulary develops in a way that is very consistent with the definition of
the academic discipline of semiotics.
For now, I will consider Eco’s analysis of the media. Eco has developed media
criticism in many of his journalistic pieces and short essays collected in works such as
Diario Minimo (1963) and Secondo diario minimo (1992), Il costume di casa (1973), La
bustina di Minerva (1999) and in the more recent A passo di gambero (2006). Many of
these essays, as Eco himself suggests in Il costume di casa, are examples of a critical
engagement that stands somewhere in between the impressionistic form of a newspaper
article and the more systematic form of the theoretical treaty. As Eco notes in the
introduction to Il costume di casa:
Si tratta di esempi di una pratica critica, o meglio di una pratica della diffidenza
quotidiana, che sta a metà tra i miei studi di carattere teorico e i vari modi
dell’impegno pubblico concreto (…) Sono scritti che dai miei interessi teorici sui
problemi della comunicazione traggono alimento per una curiosità vagamente
missionaria, puntata sulla pratica della parola persuasiva, dai giornali agli altri mezzi
di comunicazione di massa; e dalla tensione politica quotidiana traggono l’impulso a
intervenire nei modi che tutto sommato mi sono più congeniali, stabilendo una specie
di diario della diffidenza, smontando congegni apparentemente innocui e funzionanti,
per insegnare a non crederci.248
In this passage Eco stresses the fact that the essays of Il costume di casa offer several
examples of the many ways in which intellectual activity intersects with everyday
culture. As Eco points out, the essays of Il costume di casa are the result of the happy
convergence between his interest for social communication and the fleeting nuances of
                                                 
247 To some readers the distinctions I am drawing between cultural products, or between cultural levels,
might appear artificial. However, when placing Bourdieu and Eco’s intellectual itinerary in their
respective context, it is important to stress how these distinctions were much relevant at that time.
248 Umberto Eco, Il costume di casa (1973) (Milan: Bompiani, 2012), p.5
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what he calls the “politica quotidiana”. The stream of cultural messages delivered by the
mass media is the starting point for Eco’s work, thus feeding his “impulso a intervenire
nei modi che tutto sommato mi sono più congeniali”; with these words Eco conveys the
importance of writing as his preferential strategy for examining mass media culture.
As a way of exploring the culture of the everyday, writing is for Eco a form of
critical analysis that records and interprets events that are often magnified by the mass
media, “stabilendo una specie di diario della diffidenza”. In this very sense, the role that
the intellectual assumes with regard to the stream of information delivered by the mass
media consists in the reframing and in the production of a critical awareness of
everyday culture. In this sense, media criticism is a meaningful arena for the
development of Eco’s intellectual style. Eco’s early media criticism is also a decisive
moment in the process of becoming a public intellectual. An interesting example of this
is the essay called “Fenomenologia di Mike Buongiorno” that Eco published in 1961. In
this essay Eco writes about TV presenter Mike Buongiorno in an informal style that
recalls Barthes’ essays of Mythologies. Combining humour and seriousness, Eco
analyses the figure of Mike Buongiorno as a massmedia phenomenon.249
Approaching the subject in a way that reveals an underlying satirical intention -
which Eco often displays in his journalistic writing-, Eco maintains that televised
culture has allowed untalented people like Mike Buongiorno to become contemporary
national celebrities. According to Eco, the success these media personalities enjoy can
be explained by the fact that mass media culture provides a sense of inclusiveness with
regard to celebrity culture. Hence, Eco contends that media personalities do not
exemplify exceptionality, contrary to many cinema stars. Rather, the stars of the mass
media embody the democratic ideal of the participation in the practices of cultural
consumerism as a means of realising a social identity. Reiterating his vis polemica, Eco
points out that media personalities become contemporary idols by virtue of the fact that
they exemplify mediocrity rather than exceptionality: “(…) La TV non offre, come
ideale in cui immedesimarsi, il superman ma l’everyman. La TV presenta come ideale
l’uomo assoultamente medio”.250
                                                 
249 Mike Buongiono is especially known to Italian audiences as presenter of televised talk-shows.
250 Umberto Eco, “Fenomenologia di Mike Buongiorno”, In Umberto Eco, Diario Minimo (1963), 15th
edn (Milan: Bompiani, 1992), pp. 29-35, p.30.
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As Eco notes, Mike Buongiorno is a character without aspirations, without
contradictions, someone who believes in the platitudes of the clichés, and who
subscribes to the blandest nuances of common sense. He is a one-dimensional man in a
truly marcusian sense. What is more, the potential irony of the character resides in the
fact that he is absolutely genuine, he is not even playing at being someone like Sartre’s
famous garçon de café, who is merely acting out the role of the waiter. As Eco points
out:
Idolatrato da milioni di persone, quest’uomo deve il suo successo al fatto che in ogni
atto e in ogni parola del personaggio cui dà vita davanti alle telecamere traspare una
mediocrità assoluta unita (questa è l’unica virtù che egli possiede in grado eccedente)
ad un fascino immediato e immediato spiegabile col fatto che in lui non si avverte
nessuna costruzione o finzione scenica.251
Eco’s essays on media culture are animated by a desire to question taken for granted
realities as well as to provide new perspectives that problematize stereotypical
discourses. In this very sense, Eco’s essay on Mike Buongiorno is very indicative of
Eco self-definition as an intellectual. The example of Mike Buongiorno illustrates, for
Eco, an anti-intellectual, someone who is unable to process contradictory information
and therefore merely exists at the superficial level of appearances. Mike Buongiorno is
also the antithesis of the creative mind, in that he simply reproduces knowledge without
possessing the ability to create something new. He is unable to imagine things
differently from what they are, and he therefore does not believe that experience can be
subject to multiple interpretations.
Mike Buongiorno è privo del senso dell’umorismo. Ride perché è contento della
realtà, non perché sia pace di deformare la realtà. Gli sfugge la natura del paradosso;
come gli viene proposto, lo ripete con aria divertita e scuote il capo, sottolinenando
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che linterlocutore sia simpaticamente anormale; rifuiuta di pensare che ditero il
paradosso si nasconda una verità, comunque non lo considera come veicolo
autorizzato di opinione.252
“La fenomelogia di Mike Buongiorno” is one of the most often mentioned examples of
Eco’s early journalists writings. As a recent study of Eco’s early work points out, Eco’s
use of the formula “la fenomenologia di” (the phenomenology of) followed by a
person’s name has been employed recurrently in Italian newspaper articles since Eco’s
essay.253
The popularity that the text enjoyed, mostly within the Italian audience, certainly
comes from the fact that Eco discusses an Italian media icon in a way that is
sophisticated, humorous, as well as accessible to a wide audience. On the other hand, as
I suggested, the essay is a particularly interesting example of Eco’s attempt to define his
intellectual self-concept by referring to a popular figure that he constructs as the
quintessential anti-intellectual. Like any oppositions, Eco’s depiction of the anti-
intellectual helps to elucidate his conception of the intellectual. Unlike the anti-
intellectual, the intellectual should disrupt the self-evidence of the given, should
distance us from the received ideas and platitutes that often shape public opinion and
should open up new ways of perceiving reality. In the previous chapter, I have pointed
out how Bourdieu defines his idea of the intellectual against the figure of Jean-Paul
Sartre. In the case of Eco, the example I have discussed above shows how intellectuals
define their own self-identities not only against those of other intellectuals, but also in
contrast to figures that they identify as anti-intellectuals.
3.6 Eco’s Trattato di semiotica, or the theoretical side of intellectuality
Since the work of public intellectuals like Eco addresses a wide readership, it is also
important to consider that not all readers are alike. Some readers might share with Eco
the same specialist perspective, the same expertise in an academic discipline, or the
                                                 
252 Umberto Eco, “Fenomenologia di Mike Buongiorno”, p.33.
253 Some of these newspaper articles openly recognize the paternity of Eco’s formula. See Michele Cogo,
Fenomenologia di Umberto Eco (Bologna: Baskerville) 2010, p.22-23.
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same interest for interdisciplinary theory. Other readers might be aware of, or concerned
only with a relatively small portion of Eco’s work. While some of Eco’s readers are
familiar with his theoretical writings, others might only be aware of Eco as a novel
writer, or as a columnist for the Espresso, while being only dimly or not at all aware of
his theoretical production. In spite of this, Eco’s role as public intellectual is solidly
rooted in the work he produces as a scholar. As previously pointed out, one of the
factors fostering the success of intellectuals like Eco is their field of specialisation and
the expertise attached to it. In order to gain a better understanding of how intellectuals
develop their ideas, concepts, and theories, it is important to aknowledge that part of
work that, without necessarily being their best known aspect, plays a decisive role in
shaping their thinking style. Eco’s Trattato di semiotica generale, published in 1975, is
perhaps his more densely theoretical and in many ways his more systematic work. Yet
its importance for Eco’s intellectual itinerary is undeniable. In Trattato di semiotica
generale, in fact, Eco sets out to define the discipline of semiotics. Thanks to semiotics
he elaborates a theoretical model in which a great deal of his previous work on culture
and artistic practices converge. Semiotics, as defined by Eco, is a way to explain the
notion of culture by providing some key concepts which account for both the relative
stability of cultural systems as well as for the possibility to question and partially
redefine these systems. One of the ways in which cultural systems can be affected by
partial redefinitions is, as I shall point out, artistic and creative practice.
Semiotics, simply put, is the study of signs, of the way in which signs are
constituted into systems, and of how these systems are informed by operational norms
whereby social communication and the making of meaning is possible. It is within the
interplay of these three elements (the sign, the system of signs, and the cultural codes)
that Eco defines the discipline of semiotics. More specifically, the goal of Trattato di
semiotica generale is to ‘esplorare le possibilità teoriche e le funzioni sociali di uno
studio unificato di ogni fenomeno di significazione e/o comunicazione’.254 Or, as Eco
puts it a few pages later:
 La semiotica ha a che fare con qualsiasi cosa possa essere ASSUNTA come segno. È
segno ogni cosa che possa essere assunto come un sostituto significante di qualcosa
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numbers in the text in the next paragraphs refer to this edition.
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d’altro. Questo qualcosa d’altro non deve necessariamente esistere, né deve sussistere
di fatto nel momento il cui il segno sta in luogo di esso (…) la semiotica, in principio,
è la disciplina che studia tutto ciò che può essere usato per mentire. (p.17, capital
letters in the text)
Meaning, for Eco, is a field of possibilities, where relations between cultural units are
contingent rather than necessary. Two things can be extrapolated from this assumption.
The first one is that a sign is something that stands for something else, and the second is
the fact that there is a dynamic relation between the sign and what the sign stands for.
Such a definition of sign, which Eco derives from Charles Peirce, is an invitation to
consider how the meaning to which a sign is connected will in turn be the starting point,
or rather the continuation, of a process whereby an additional sign is required in order to
explain the previous sign. In light of this, communicative processes that define culture
can be seen as unstable web of signs whereby culture is continuously created and re-
created by acts of interpretation that establish relationships between previously
disjoined cultural units.255
Another term that plays a key role in Trattato di semiotica generale is the
concept of code. While being complex and abstract, the term is all pervasive in Trattato.
This is how, for instance, Eco defines it at the beginning of Trattato: ‘(u)n codice è un
SISTEMA DI SIGNIFICAZIONE che accoppia entità presenti con entità assenti’ (p.19,
capital letters in the text) . This definition describes the code in its general but also most
important sense. As Eco points out, one can define as sign ‘tutto ciò che, sulla base di
una convenzione sociale previamente accettata, possa essere inteso come QUALCOSA
CHE STA PER QUALCOS’ALTRO’(p.27, capital letters in the text). The code stands
for a system of conventions whereby one can associate a sign with something other than
itself. In other words, the act of associating a sign with a given meaning or portion of
meaning on the map of the cultural world requires the presence of a code, without which
this operations would not be possible.256 Hence, codes play a key role in the way in
which acts of interpretation are carried out in a given culture. The term code, in this
                                                 
255 Eco’s understanding of the notion of sign will be discussed more thoroughly in chapter six.
256 As Eco notes in Trattato, the code correlates a given expression (a sign) with a given content or
meaning: ‘un codice stabilisce la correlazione di un piano dell’espressione (nel suo aspetto puramente
formale e sistematico) con un piano del contenuto’ (p.77).
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sense, has a similar function to Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, in that both can be
described as frameworks whereby cultural units can be assigned meaning to. In a broad
sense, the habitus operates as a code, in that the term code, precisely, designates a
relatively stable system of rules or norms in reference to which individuals
communicate with one another. Notwithstanding their relative stability, codes can
accommodate communicational flexibility. This is so because the units that compose the
code can be subject to creative combinations challenging more conventional
arrangements. From this perspective a code (as well as the habitus) can be prescriptive
on some level while being able to accommodate creative configurations of meaning on
another level.257
While the notion of code can account for the processes whereby the expression
of a sign generates meaning, it can also account for the manner in which the production
of meaning operates within a set of conventions. This set of conventions define, roughly
speaking, the limits of possible (or reasonable) meanings that can be inferred from a
sign or a set of signs. While it allows for a generative process in which meaning is not
fixed but rather dynamically expressed, codes regulate the production of meaning; they
define a space of possibility within which a culture conceives itself in relation to
existing signs. As Eco points out, a code ‘limita sia le possibilità di combinazione tra gli
elementi in gioco che il numero degli elementi che costituiscono il repertorio (…) certe
combinazioni sono possibili e altre meno’ (p.66). Later on in Trattato, in summarizing
the definition of the term, Eco argues that:
Qui non si sta dicendo soltanto che un solo codice può produrre molti messaggi in
successione, ciò che è abbastanza ovvio, né che i contenuti possono essere veicolati
dallo stesso significante, secondo il codice usato, perché anche questo è ovvio; si sta
invece dicendo che usualmente un solo messaggio veicola contenuti diversi e
interlacciati e che pertanto quello che si chiama messaggio è il più delle volte un
TESTO il cui contenuto è un DISCORSO a più livelli. (p.86, capital letters in the text)
While they constitute frameworks through which cultures organize their knowledge,
codes also foster the conditions for elaborating new knowledge:
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I codici, in quanto accettati da una società, costruiscono un mondo culturale che non è
né attuale né possible (almeno nei termini dell’ontologia tradizionale): la sua esistenza
è di ordine culturale, e costituisce il modo in cui una società pensa, parla e, mentre
parla, risolve il senso dei propri pensieri attraverso altri pensieri, e questi attraverso
altre parole. (p.92)
The term code, besides being intimately associated with the notion of culture, is
equally fundamental in the understanding of creativity. As pointed out, Eco’s
understanding of the notion of code allows formulating questions such as how, within a
given culture, creative solutions emerge from conventional frameworks. Koestler,
precisely, notes that creativity emerges within the context of a set of rules that, at a
given time, might be relatively fixed. As he points out, the fixity of the code does not in
any way exclude the flexibility of the strategy whereby this code is interpreted.258 Along
the same lines, Eco, in Trattato di semiotica generale, examines the semiotic processes
whereby analogies and metaphors are created, and shows how creativity emerges when
conventional cultural units are combined in unexpected and unprecedented ways.259 In
Trattato di semiotica generale Eco also suggests how the creativity expressed by artistic
disciplines ‘sfida l’organizzazione del contenuto esistente e quindi contribuisce a
cambiare il modo in cui una data cultura “vede” il mondo’. Hence, the presence of
creativity ‘stimola il sospetto che l’organizzazione del mondo a cui siamo abituati non
sia definitiva’.260 Creativity, in this context, operates at two complementary levels:
firstly, it shows the contingency of the social order, and secondly, it reveals culture’s
tendency to generate new configurations of meanings.
3.7 The intellectual polyphony of Il nome della rosa
 Il nome della rosa, Eco’s first and best known novel, contributes to creating a whole
new realm of intervention and a new literary “playground” in which Eco can apply his
ideas and theoretical concerns. It is certainly not by chance that Eco, while being a very
attentive interpreter and critic of mass-media communication, is also one of its most
                                                 
258 See Arthur Koestler, The Act of Creation, pp.38-42.
259 See in particular Umberto Eco, Trattato, pp.328-359, and Umberto Eco, Semiotica e filosofia del
linguaggio (1984) (Turin: Einaudi, 1997), pp.141-195.
260 Umberto Eco, Trattato, p.342.
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self-conscious practitioners. Within the context of Eco’s intellectual itinerary, Il nome
della rosa adds a further dimension to Eco’s already impressive range of fields of
intervention. The novel marks Eco’s début as a fiction writer, and further diversify his
readership.261 These two elements (a broader field of intellectual intervention and the
achievement of a wider audience) can be seen as resulting from the enormous success of
the novel. This interrelation shows that Eco proved capable of conceiving a perfectly
balanced synthesis between a sophisticated and highly complex message on the one
hand, and an accessible and entertaining product on the other. Giuseppe Zaccaria, in an
essay called ‘Avanguardia come consumo’, conveys precisely this idea. He notes that in
a post-industrial society, avant-garde and consumerism influence each other on many
different levels and often pursue a common goal.262
Writing a novel set in the Middle-Ages is for Eco a matter of relating a story
where the Middle-Ages is itself an open concept. Il nome della rosa, offering a story
which is open to multiple readings, represents an implicit reflection on the act of textual
interpretation. As Giuseppe Zecchini observes, Il nome della rosa dedicates many pages
to the ways and techniques whereby Guglielmo, the central character of the novel, tries
to make sense of what happens around him by appealing to the idea a cultural universe
constituted by and through signs. As a result, note Zecchini, ‘l’insieme della vicenda è
“letta” attraverso una gamma vastissima di segni, ma il suo senso vero sarà il risultato
della mediazione tra ciò che è il dato e ciò che in esso vi coglie l’intepretazione del
protagonista’.263 This is also the position that Eco holds in Lector in Fabula (1979), a
study in which he maintains that meaning and interpretation originate from a co-
production between the text and the reader.264 Inextricably linked to the theme of
interpretation, the question that polarizes the attention of many critics with regards to Il
Nome della rosa is that of the readership. Margherita Ganeri considers, for instance,
how the novel addresses different typologies of reader through what she calls a
                                                 
As Ganeri and other commentators have pointed out, there is a part of Eco’s readership that might have
purchased Eco’s novel as a consequence of its commercial success without necessarily reading it.
262 See Giuseppe Zaccaria, ‘Avanguardia come consumo’ in Saggi su ‘Il nome della rosa’, ed. by Renato
Giovannoli (Milan: Bompiani, 1999), pp.283-287.
263 Giuseppe Zecchini, ‘il medioevo di Umberto Eco’ in Saggi su ‘Il nome della rosa’, p.362.
264 This point will be thoroughly developed in the next chapter.
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‘ministrategia commerciale interna’.265 Critics usually agree that the success of the novel
is to be attributed, among other things, to its capacity to satisfy the palate of different
readers.266 There are, mainly, three typologies of reader that the novel addresses. The
first target group aimed by Eco’s ‘ministrategia commerciale’ are ‘the avid consumer(s)
of bestsellers concentrating on plot and story line’.267 These readers expect the novel to
gratify their expectations for a narrative tension typical of the genre of the detective
novel. The second target group ‘see any historical treatment of the past as a thinly veiled
allegory for events in the present’.268 Such readers are particularly prone to interpreting
the book in light of contemporary political events. The third target group is ‘the most
sophisticated category and would include the educated reader as well as the scholar
specialist or critic such as the author himself’.269 These readers, while being able to
enjoy the novel as a best seller as well as a statement on contemporary culture, are also
particularly keen in interpreting the novel as a re-casting of Eco’s semiotic theory into a
work of fiction.270
While Il nome della rosa addresses different typologies of readers, one could
argue that the success of the novel in Italy and outside partly contradicts Eco’s early
criticism -which he shared with members of Gruppo 63 - of some of the Italian writers
enjoying great popularity in the 60s, such as Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, Giorgio
Bassani and Carlo Cassola. However, his early reservations with regard to the logic of
the culture industry did not last long. As pointed out in the early sections of this chapter,
in Apocalittici e integrati Eco already withdraws such negative views of the culture
                                                 
265 Margherita Ganeri, Il caso Eco, p.70.
266 As Ganeri indicates, the presence of a diversified readership was widely anticipated and thoroughly
planned around specific marketing strategies.
267 Peter Bondanella, Umberto Eco and the Open Text, p.96.
268Peter Bondanella, Umberto Eco and the Open Text, p.96. What is implied here are references to
episodes of Italian political history, such as the murder of Aldo Moro. In discussing how the culture of the
Middle-Ages becomes a concern for contemporary societies, Eco has used the term of neo-medievalism
in the essay ‘Dreaming the Middle-Ages’ in Umberto Eco, Travels in Hyperreality (New York: Harcourt
Brace, 1986), pp.61-72.
269 Peter Bondanella, Umberto Eco and the Open Text, p.98.
270 The three typologies of reader targeted by Il nome della rosa are not mutually distinctive. However,
the more cultivated the reader is, the more he or she is potentially capable of accessing the novel from
different perspectives. The contrary cannot be said of the “naïve” reader who reads the book only as a
detective novel. In other words, while the novel explicitly encourages different modalities of reading,
only a reader capable of accessing these different levels of reading is also able to understand the full
complexity of the work.
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industry in favour of the idea that commercial success and artistic value are not
mutually exclusive.271 Il nome della Rosa confirms precisely the possibility, theorized
by Eco in Apocalittici e integrati, of a cultural product that, while conceived within the
logic of specific market strategies, retains a high degree of artistic value.
3.8 Eco, the Middle-Ages, and the post-modern intellectual
With Il nome della rosa, Eco reinstates his idea of intellectuality. Even when
conceptions of medieval intellectuals traditionally stress the centrality of detachment
from worldly events, Guglielmo, the central character of the novel, represents an
intellectual type that cannot be equated to neither detachment nor commitment.272
Guglielmo represents an intellectual type at the crossroad of spirituality, erudition,
science, and practical knowledge; because his modus operandi combines different ways
of knowing and experiencing the world, Guglielmo also represents an intellectual type
whose sphere of action cannot be reduced solely to one particular cultural domain.
Rather, he has an eclectic mind capable of combining apparently heterogeneous and
incompatible fields of knowledge. From this perspective, Eco translates his concern for
cultural diversity and interdisciplinarity into creative writing.
As Teresa Coletti notes, Eco’s re-reading of the Middle-Ages constitutes one of
the elements of a wider intellectual system. Coletti, in particular, examines the
extension of Eco’s expertise in medieval culture into the realm of the post-modern
discourse273. Being a medievalist herself, Coletti’s examination of Eco’s re-reading for
the Middle-Ages is very careful in ‘address(ing) the relationship between the novel’s
medievalism and its preoccupation with signs, focusing on the thorough grounding of its
                                                 
271 In Postille al nome della rosa, Eco is fairly clear in maintaining that commercial success and artistic
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ottiene il consenso di un pubblico’. See ‘Postille al nome della rosa’, in Il nome della rosa (1980), 52nd
edn (Milan: Bompiani, 2006), pp.525-526.
272 Julien Benda, for instance, when using the word clerc instead of the word intellectuel, implicitly refers
to the medieval model of the intellectual. The French clerc (Italian: chierico) refers primarily to the
religious sphere and secondly to a more general meaning of cultivated person. Both the French clerc and
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associated with practical concerns. See Julien Benda, La trahison des clercs (Paris: Bernard Grasset,
1927).
273 Teresa Coletti, Naming the Rose (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).
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semiotics concerns in its representation of medieval culture’.274 Coletti’s study does
justice to the jeu de mirroirs of Eco’s polyphonic discourse while keeping a solid
grounding in the study of medieval culture, thus pointing out how ‘Eco substantively
crafts a distinctly contemporary statement about language and meaning, responsible
intellectual activity, and the nature of critical discourse’.275 Coletti’s observation points
to one of the main characteristics of post-modern intellectuals as described by Zygmunt
Bauman:
The typical post-modern strategy of intellectual work is one best characterised by the
metaphor of the ‘interpreter’ role. It consists of translating statements, made within
one communally based tradition, so that they can be understood within the system of
knowledge based on another tradition.276
Intellectuals, notes Bauman, are the uncontrasted creators of the post-modern discourse,
and aesthetics - the domain of cultural tastes - is still relatively unchallenged by non-
intellectuals. Apart from aesthetics, the other major area covered by the post-modern
discourse comprises, as Bauman notes, ‘philosophical discourses which are concerned
with the issue of truth, certainty and relativism, and those which deal with the principle
of societal organisation’.277
Eco is well grounded in all areas mentioned by Bauman. If, as Bauman notes,
the task of post-modern intellectuals ‘consists of translating statements, made within
one communally based tradition, so that they can be understood within the system of
knowledge based on another tradition’, it should also be noted that particular statements
are also re-contextualised under the sign of eclecticism and irony.278 As Eco notes in
relation to Il nome della rosa, post-modern intellectual strategies involve substantial
‘ironic rethinking of the past’.279When translating his expertise in medieval culture
within the context of contemporary theoretical debates, Eco warns readers against
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276Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters. On Modernity, Post-modernity and Intellectuals
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), p.5.
277Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters, p.140.
278 Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters, p.5.
279 Umberto Eco, Reflections on the Name of the Rose (1985) (London: Minerva, 1994), p.68.
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indulging in a unilateral reading of Middle Age culture. Here is where Eco is truly
practising the post-modern discourse, by pointing to the fact that the culture of the
Middle-Ages is as much an open text as contemporary culture is. Yet, Eco’s
comprehensive definition of culture suggests that if historical discourse is a conceptual
web, creativity (the very element through which culture renews itself) is both beyond
and within the limits of this web. As Eco notes, ‘if a character of mine, comparing two
medieval ideas, produces a third, more modern, idea, he is doing exactly what culture
did’. 280
3.9 Conclusion: intellectual polyphony and creativity
Culture, as a creative process, is constantly in its making. As Koestler points out in The
act of creation, the combination of different cultural and cognitive matrices is at the
heart of the expression and of the recognition of creativity. Matrices can be disciplinary,
relative to a particular field of experience or, more broadly, encompassing cultural
spheres. Eco’s intellectual itinerary, I have argued, provides a good example of how
different cultural matrices, such as avant-garde art and cultural consumerism, interact
within the same intellectual project. Cross-fertilization (the combination of different
cultural and cognitive matrices) involves a process of combination of already existing
matrices resulting in a creative output:
‘Creative originality’ does not mean creating or originating a system of ideas out of
nothing but rather out of a combination of well-established patterns of thoughts - by a
process of cross-fertilization, as it were.281
It is precisely the novel combination of well-established patterns of thoughts that fosters
creative thinking and intellectual originality. The combination of different cultural
matrices plays a crucial role in Eco’s intellectual itinerary. His definition of the
discipline of semiotics in Trattato di semiotica generale suggests the inclusion of
cultural diversity within the same theoretical framework. What allows such
comprehensiveness is, as I have pointed out, the concept of code. The concept of code
implies the existence of a common framework articulating manifestations of culture that
                                                 
280Umberto Eco, Reflections on the Name of the Rose, p.76.
281 Arthur Koestler, The Act of Creation, p.131.
126
are often perceived as distinctive. Eco’s Trattato di semiotica generale gives an account
of cultural phenomena by looking at culture as an essentially dynamic object, whose
stability of meaning is never a fixed but rather a transient phenomenon. As chapter six
will point out, Eco’s definition of culture emphasizes how culture is something that is
always in the process of becoming something else. This is so since culture is
continuously created and re-created by acts of interpretation that modify its internal
structure and establish relationships between previously disjoined cultural units. In
elaborating this understanding of culture, Eco develops a theoretical view that can also
account for the basic mechanisms whereby creativity is produced. Creativity also marks
Eco’s intellectual itinerary on two complementary levels: that of the cultural theorist
and that of cultural practitioner. These two levels converge in Il nome della rosa. In this
novel Eco recasts his early theoretical considerations within the framework of a work of
fiction. Hence, fiction writing reinstates creativity as one of the major trait defining
Eco’s intellectual profile.
As this study has illustrated thus far, providing a common communicative
framework for otherwise different discourses offers, under particular circumstances, an
example of intellectual creativity. In fact, the combination of two aspects or elements
pertaining to two distinctive domains of knowledge presupposes the presence of an
analogy functioning as a sort of symbolic bridge between two previously distinct
domains of knowledge. As Koestler points out, an analogy is ‘ “created” by the
imagination; and once an analogy has been created, it is of course there for all to see –
just as a poetic metaphor, once created, soon fades into a cliché’.282As Eco has shown
since some of his early works, artistic imagination and stereotyped language might
coexist within the same cultural expression. Cultures often incorporate some of the
artistic strategies of the past to such an extent that these strategies, once perceived as
unique, original, and creative, become part of the symbolic establishment.
Once it becomes conventional, creativity needs to find new paths.
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Chapter 4: The Singular and the Plural: Theorizing
Intellectual Engagement
‘Certain difficulties are repeatedly encountered whenever one tries to arrive at a
convincing solution to the problem of the relationship between that which we call
individual and that which we call society. These difficulties are certainly closely
connected with the nature of these two concepts. In trying to free our minds from the
limitations imposed by the ideas these concepts foster, the first thing to notice is that
they are based on one simple fact. One concept refers to people in the singular, the
other to people in the plural’.283
4.1 Introduction: The self as a social construct. Individuals and social contexts
In Western cultures, the self is usually regarded as one of the most intimate things we
possess. It is something private, which belongs to us and only to us. We build our own
identity around it, and we view other people as the expression of other, equally
autonomous, selves. However, if examined attentively, the notion of self loses its clear-
cut boundaries, and the private and intimate space of enclosure covered by the term
gradually fades away. Similarly to what happens when we move our eyes close to a TV
screen, and we realize that the people we see on the screen are nothing but little dots,
the concept of self loses its immediate intelligibility once we bring it under close
examination. Sociology has a similar story to tell. It is the story of the constructed
nature of the individual. This story reveals the essentially relational ground without
which the individual would be unthinkable; without which the notion of individual
would not exist. The network, in its more general sense, is society, and the individual is
part of it. Society is within the individual as much as it is composed by individuals.
There is no dividing line where society stops, and where the individual starts. The
singular merges with the plural as much as the plural merges with the singular. The
individual accommodates society as much as society accommodates the individual: one
defines the other.
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In this chapter I shall argue that, in order to understand how intellectuals come to
be recognized as creative thinkers, it is essential to acknowledge some of the dynamics
that define intellectual engagement. Confrontations between intellectuals sometimes
take the form of well-orchestrated debates, taking place either at a conference or on the
pages of a scholarly article.284 Interactions among intellectual fractions, between
intellectuals and particular theories, and between thinkers of the present and thinkers of
the past, account for a number of possible intellectual engagements. Another form of
engagement, apparently more individual than the previous ones, takes place in the
hermeneutical space in which readers interact with texts. To some extent all these
interactions are, I shall argue, related to those between the individual and society and
between the singular and the plural.
As sociologist Randall Collins notes, creators of ideas are, most often, not lonely
and isolated creatures, but ‘it is possible to demonstrate that the individuals who bring
forward such ideas are located in typical social patterns: intellectual groups, networks,
and rivalries’.285 In spite of the fact that Western societies cherish such figures as the
genius, the neglected thinker, the artiste maudit or, more prosaically, the capitalist self-
made man, it is possible to demonstrate that such figures are in fact social constructs.
Historically, these figures often fully emerge and become social icons only after several
generations.286 Similarly, the notion of the individual, as we understand it today, can be
seen as the result of an historical process that has increasingly promoted the cult of
individual freedom over social constraints. We often forget how professionals of the
marketing industry make a considerable effort to suggest ways to re-fashion or re-define
our self-image. “New” and “exciting” practices associated with technological gadgets
such as smart phones, I-pods, and personal computers, are constantly associated with
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286 Nathalie Heinich in La Gloire de Van Gogh. Essai d’anthropologie de l’admiration (Paris: Minuit,
1991) shows the processes through which, generation after generation, the figure of Vincent Van Gogh
has assumed the characteristic elements of the cult of saints. Heinich shows how historians of art, by
making consistent use of notions like martyr or neglected artist, have created a religious aura around the
artist. The pseudo-sanctification of Van Gogh, as Heinich points out, is also apparent in the pilgrimages
recently created in his honour.
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the possibility to re-define one’s style.287 In a world where reality and fiction seem
irrevocably intertwined, the individual is presented, almost everywhere, as the source of
every freedom and independence, master of infinite joys and locus of endless
possibilities.
As I will argue in this chapter, intellectual voices emerge in the symbolic space
of engagement between a singularity (something that cannot be easily subsumed into a
descriptive framework) and a number of symbolic resources made available by existing
social contexts and institutional settings. From this perspective, singularity is not
something external to society but rather a particular expression of society. There are a
number of elements that might define, by and large, the symbolic space in which
intellectual engagements take place. As this study illustrates, one of the ways of
theorizing intellectual engagement consists in focusing on confrontations between
opposed positions in view of gaining symbolic prestige.288 As the recent history of the
humanities has shown, post-structuralists have criticized structuralism’s tendency to
view individual freedom as a simple reflection of a social structure or a system. From a
different angle, post-modern sociologists have criticized phenomenology on the ground
that it does not take enough stock of how social factors shape personal experiences.
Post-modern aesthetics has often argued in favour of the ephemeral, the transient, and
the constructed nature of reality, thus making it difficult to sustain the validity of
theoretical frameworks whose aim is, precisely, to go beyond such transience and
contingency. One could argue that postmodernism has moved, or so it seems, beyond a
certain number of theoretical positions. Yet, in spite of the way in which theoretical
positions succeed one another, there seems to be something whereby oppositional
stances resurface more or less recurrently within theoretical debates.289 As Collins
maintains for the case of sociology, even when a considerable effort has been made in
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Philosophies, p.1.
289 As Collins notes, post-modernism in its ‘rejection of any fixed standpoint from which an explanation
might be made (…) is itself an explanation’. In Randall Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies, p.11.
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order to transcend theoretical oppositions such as internal and external, micro-social and
macro-social, local and global, ‘any sociology which attempts to abolish such terms
soon finds itself smuggling these distinctions back in under other words’.290
4.1.1 The structure and the aim of the chapter
In theorizing intellectual engagement, this chapter will refer to existing debates in
literary theory, philosophy and social theory. The different strands of my argument,
while venturing in a number of theoretical debates, meet and fall in place around the
idea of the relational aspect of the individual and the social context. When discussing
the relationship between notions such as individual and society, singular and plural, or
reader and text, it is easy to be under the impression that the bipolar structure that these
notions designate corresponds to a natural order of things. But in fact such
dichotomisations of reality are first and foremost conceptual ones. Even when many
conceptual divisions seem to be supported by common-sense knowledge, there is no
reason why they should match a natural order of things. In fact, as I will argue in this
chapter, synthetic or relational thinking (the ability to see the relations between
concepts) has a certain advantage over thinking styles that privilege divisions over
relations. Namely, I will argue that relational thinking, as a conceptual strategy, fosters
a holistic approach to knowledge which entails both intellectual creativity as well as
interdisciplinarity. In presenting such a view, I will illustrate that it is possible to
conceive that that the relational aspect of notions such as individual and society, reader
and text, and singular and plural precedes rather than proceed from their separation.
In organising my interdisciplinary enquiry, I will start by introducing Norbert
Elias’ understanding of the relationship between the individual and society. From there I
will move on to discuss the debate about literature and singularity; I will then pursue my
reflection on the notion of singularity by referring to how Terry Eagleton and Zygmunt
Bauman understand the relation between intellectuals and society. While arguing that
intellectuals experience an increasing irrelevance in defining the direction of
contemporary societies, Eagleton and Bauman highlight some of the defining tensions
between modern intellectuals and Western cultures. The arguments put forward by
Eagleton and Bauman are also about the different social and cultural contexts in which
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post-modern intellectuals carry out their role of cultural mediators.291 When engaging
with theoretical narratives that define intellectual debates, intellectuals often turn into
bricoleurs of ideas, creatively combining elements from different areas in the
intellectual field. In the second part of this chapter, I will argue that Eco’s idea of
textual interpretation and Bourdieu’s concept of habitus foster an approach that
combines the individual and the social, the singular and the plural. Bourdieu and Eco
have proven to be very versatile in the art of linking elements drawn from different
theoretical traditions, as well as in interpreting intellectual debates under a new light. In
the third and final part of this chapter I will discuss the new sociology of ideas. The new
sociology of ideas examines the place of intellectuals with regards to the conception,
elaboration and diffusion of intellectual products.292 Under this label, sociologists
Charles Camic and Neil Gross express a concern for studying the processes of
production and distribution of ideas, and for the role that intellectuals play within such
constellations. As I will argue, one of the main concerns of Camic and Gross is to
examine the interactions between intellectuals and institutional (i.e. academic) contexts.
4.2. Society and the individual
As German sociologist Norbert Elias points out, even if it is not difficult to see that
society and individuals exist interdependently, the explanatory frameworks developed
by social scientists often obfuscate the dialogical relationship of these two notions. In an
essay called What is sociology? Elias develops a critique of the notions of individual
and society as developed by the dominant sociologists of the first half of the twentieth
century.293 The failed synthesis of these two concepts, notes Elias, ‘is found in the
theories of many sociologists, who strain themselves in vain to discover how such an
“individual” might be related to “society” which they conceive as a static entity’
                                                 
291 See in particular Terry Eagleton, After Theory (London: Penguin, 2004) and Zygmunt Bauman.
Legislators and Interpreters. On modernity, Post-modernity and Intellectuals (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1989).
292 See Charles Camic, and Neil Gross, ‘The New Sociology of Ideas’, in The Blackwell Companion to
Sociology, ed. by Judith Blau (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), pp.236-249. See also Neil Gross, Richard Rorty.
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293 Norbert Elias. What is Sociology? Trans. by Sthephen Mennel and Grace Morrissey (London:
Hutchinson, 1978). The book originally appeared in 1970 in German under the title of Was ist
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(p.116).294 In modern times, argues Elias, sociologists have sought to build their theories
on the principles of order and stability, often viewing social change in terms of
instability. Such a view of society cannot come to grips with the idea that society is a
process rather than a stable entity. As Elias points out, separating the understanding of
the notion of the individual from that of society often leads to misinterpretation of these
notions. As Elias observes, a somehow simplistic understanding of the notion of the
individual is not uncommon in sociology. So much so, that he wonders:
Then why do scholars so often use traditional concepts like the individual, which
makes each person seem like a completely self-reliant adult, forming no relationship
and standing quite alone, never having being a child, and therefore never having
become an adult? (p.118)
As pointed out in the introductory paragraphs, there exist a number of epistemological
obstacles to a dialectical understanding of the relationship between the individual and
society. Elias, on his part, notes that:
The traditional concept of the individual conveys a mental image. From infancy
we are brought up to become independent, perfectly self-reliant adults, cut off from
everyone else. We end up believing and feeling we actually are what we ought to be
and what we may even want to be. More precisely, we confuse fact with ideal, that
which is with that which ought to be. (p.118)
As Elias points out, the separation between the individual (and the personal
states characterising this individual) and society is rendered by the Latin notion of homo
clausus, a self-enclosed being. Languages reflect this cultural propensity to conceive of
the individual as an isolated being on a number of other levels. For instance, the
personal pronoun ‘I’ and the concept of ‘Ego’ suggest the idea of an entity existing
outside of any social context. However, as Elias rightly points out, the ‘I’ as well as
                                                 
294 For Elias, the problem of the conceptual couple individual-society lies as much in the polarity that
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description, a generalization applicable to historical and social realities. For an overview of Weber’s
sociology see Raymond Aron, Les étapes de la pensée sociologique (Paris: Gallimard, 1967), pp.497-600
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other personal pronouns define themselves within a system of positions, a structure, and
a communication network. Hence, such interdependences within a structured system
illustrate how individuals do not exist per se, but within a network of multiple
relationships giving them the possibility to say ‘I’, thus singling out a self in relation to
other individuals. It thus follows that each personal pronoun has a profoundly social
significance (pp.123-128).295
Behind the dichotomy individual-society, one finds that ‘one concept refers to
people in the singular, the other to people in the plural’ (p.121). The concept of
individual implies the idea of singularity, and the concept of society implies that of
plurality of individuals. However, as Elias points out:
Contemporary usage would lead us to believe that the two distinct concepts, ‘the
individual’ and ‘society’, denote two independently existing objects, whereas they
really refer to two different but inseparable levels of the human world. (p.129)
As this section has illustrated, Elias addresses the problem of how to articulate two
seemingly different and mutually distinctive concepts within a complex but essentially
unified reality. The next sections will explore some of the ways to account for such
conceptual interdependences.
4.3. Singularity in literature and philosophy
As pointed out in the previous section, the notion of individual is strongly connected
with the idea of singularity. On a very immediate level, singularity refers to that which
is individual as opposed to that which is plural or collective. Beyond this first level, the
term singular has several other meanings. As an adjective, it denotes something that is
‘individual, in contrast to what is common and general’, or ‘above the ordinary in
amount, extent, worth or value, unique’. Singular also means ‘different from or not
complying with that which is customary, usual, general; strange, odd, peculiar’.296
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Singularity appears as a relevant theme in a number of contemporary
philosophers and literary theorists. For Derrida, the philosophical quest for being is
always and necessarily synonym with a quest for an ontological difference, so that
ultimately the notion of being can never be reduced to an identity, in that being is
intrinsically different from itself. If being is constituted by and through a fundamental
difference, it is not possible to trace back its origin to a stable unity, a singularity. What
can be found, and what language can express, is but a mere trace of this original being.
For Derrida the task of language, and in particular of writing, is to access being through
the careful and manifold analysis of its ontological difference, which is also the only
means whereby we can access its authenticity and its singularity.297 Derrida conceives
singularity as opposed to repetition. If repetition is a property of a machine or a
machine-like organism, singularity is inscribed in the living and characterizes the idea
of a non-repeatable event. However, Derrida also contends that singularity and
machine-like repeatability are, by no means, clearly and completely distinct.298As
Jonathan Culler observes, ‘singularity is necessarily divided: it takes part in the
generality of meaning, without which it could not be read, and so is not closed in on
itself, ponctuelle, but iterable. The singularity of a work is what enables it to be repeated
over and over in events that are never exactly the same.’299 As Culler points out,
Derrida’s idea of iterability stresses the fact that a work of literature can be repeated,
and thus in a certain way reproduced, either synchronically or diachronically, by
subsequent or synchronised acts of reading.
As Culler argues, the singularity of literature can be preserved beyond its
iterability precisely because literature, as Derrida contends, poses a serious challenge to
                                                 
297See Jacques Derrida, De la grammatologie (Paris: Minuit, 1967). In classic phenomenology, the theme
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conventional or reified thinking. As Culler suggests ‘(t)hinking the literary text as a
singularity, a singularity that challenges the generality of truth that it nevertheless
makes possible, goes along with thinking of it as an event’.300 In this instance, the fact
that literature is experienced and performed as an event creates the conditions whereby
singularity and repetition coexist dialectically.
In The Poetics of Singularity: The Counter-Culturalist Turn in Heidegger,
Derrida, Blanchot and the later Gadamer, Timothy Clark refers to the ‘cultural politics
paradigm’ as a trend of literary criticism, which places the discourses of literary texts
within a larger cultural and political context.301 As Clark argues, this type of
contextualisation or political reading of literature is deeply criticized by the
‘deconstructive’ school of thought, inasmuch as literature is conceived as a ‘singularity’
defying conceptualization. As Clark puts it:
Singularity names the specific being of a text or work, inflected so as to underline its
resistance to being described in general categories or concepts. Its resistance may also
be understood as upsetting the distinction between the realm of the conceptualisable,
that which is masterable by thought, and that of passion, which is necessarily not so
mastered. (pp.2-3)
According to the deconstructive approach, Clark argues, meaning cannot be completely
mastered by reason and language. Accordingly, the value of literature resides in its
being ‘outside’ rational discourse, in its being irreducible, a-causal and anti-
deterministic. In being, precisely, a singularity. By consequence, a deconstructive
reading poses singularity as ‘the specific being of a text or work, inflected so to
underline its resistance to being described in general categories or concepts’ (p.2).
Hence, the literary text comes to be strongly linked, as in Culler’s discussion of Derrida,
to the idea of an ‘event’, thus exceeding, by its very singularity, the attempt to frame it
within the limits of a conceptual discourse:
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The literary may be singular as a mode of discourse whose inventiveness, while being
based on certain conventions or rubrics, may also exceed being understood in terms of
any pregiven linguistic or political or cultural norm. The literary may be an ‘event’,
that is something that cannot be fully understood theoretically, but must be engaged in
its specific performance…302
Further on, Clark singles out two different ways of approaching the notion of
singularity. The first one, which he condemns and which he attributes to a particular
way of loosely adopting a ‘deconstructive’ posture, consists in merely proclaiming
singularity against any attempt to frame the literary within a constellation of meaning:
To defend literature and the poetic as that which, by definition, escapes critical
appropriation is surely a strategy with a limited future. One cannot go banging on
indefinitely about the ever-elusive strangeness of the literary without giving the
impression that one has nothing more to say. The greatest difficulty here is that in
itself, 'singularity' is necessarily an empty and purely relational term. Everything is
'singular' in some sense, even the tiny blotches on a desk or the intestines of a
greenfly. To say of anything that is 'singular' is the least one can say of it, short of
saying nothing at all. (p.7)
The second line of argument, which Clark strongly advocates, is more positive
in that it strives to preserve singularity in relation to a given set of interpretative norms
and not merely for its own sake.303 For Clark, the fact that singularity can be expressed
through an artistic event which is unique, does not exclude a subsequent and
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retrospective analysis of its meaning. The two things, the uniqueness of the event and its
semantic contextualisation are, in Clark’s view, interdependent.
By positing the importance of an interpretative frame against which to examine
singularity, as Clark does, the singularity of the text accommodates the idea of plurality
of interpretations. Similarly, as Culler suggests with regards to Derrida’s notion of
iterativity, the repetition of an event, and the fact that the event manifests itself in a
slightly different way each time, keeps alive the possibility of a plurality of
interpretations. Iterativity, from this perspective, suggests a subtle dialectics between
sameness and difference, in that the “literary” comes to be viewed as a process rather
than a self-enclosed space. Instead of looking for a meaning that is impermanent and
immutable Derrida, as Culler notes, considers the specificity of literature, its singularity,
its eccentricities and curiosities, as a starting point for further contextualisation and
iterations. Singularity, in order to be recognised, is subject to a process of framing that
confers meaning, even when this meaning is identified with some form of social or
textual marginality. Singularity, both in the sense of ‘individual, in contrast to what is
common and general’, ‘above the ordinary’, and ‘different from or not complying with
that which is customary, usual, general, strange, odd, peculiar’, can be discussed as a
process, or a strategy. Different forms of singularity can be analysed in terms of
strategies developed against structured spaces such as texts, cultures, intellectual
communities, or societies.304
4.3.1 Singularity and the fragmentation of the notion of culture
As Bauman maintains in Legislators and interpreters, the project of modernity has been
developed around the idea of reason, and social order has often been construed around
the centrality of reason. Hence, modern intellectuals have enjoyed the role of privileged
spokesperson of universal values; invested by this legislating role, they have shaped the
very idea of social order, and have had a major role in defining the hierarchy of values
according to which one could draw a line between reason and passion, culture and
nature, the spiritual and the vulgar. Many important and meaningful distinctions such as
the one between “high” culture and “low” culture were among the products of
intellectuals’ minds. As Bauman contends, this social role of intellectuals was still
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clearly discernible for a good part of the twentieth century. However, with the
progressive fading away of the project of modernity, the identification between
intellectuals and culture is severely questioned. With the emergence of the society of
consumption as the dominant force fashioning cultural trends as much as thinking
styles, the very notion of culture, and the salience that it occupies on contemporary
maps of knowledge, undergo a transformation. 305
This transformation, as authors like Eagleton, Eco, and Bauman himself
underline, leads to a fragmentation of the notion of culture resulting in a plurality of
discourses. As Eco illustrates in Apocalittici e integrati (1964), with the advent of mass
consumerism, culture functions as a notion in the name of which to oppose consumerist
society.306 Yet in another sense culture also designates a new life-style colonized by
consumption, inflated by the centrality of the markets of cultural entertainment. This
form of institutionalized consumption assumes a central role in the life of individuals,
and in the dynamics whereby individuals construct their identity and their sense of
belonging to a society.307 As pointed out in the previous chapter, Eco demonstrates the
importance of avoiding an excessively moralistic and monolithic assessment of cultural
markets. In the period in which Eco writes Apocalittici e integrati, the distinction
between champions and critics of consumerist culture becomes increasingly porous, and
the divide between the critical value of culture, and its more sensuous experience, is
increasingly under attack. At the same time, the notion of culture is in the process of
acquiring new relevance in many disciplines in the humanities and the social sciences.
In this sense, disciplines such as cultural studies, semiology, or sociology of culture
reflect the right of inclusion of both popular and elite culture within their research
agendas.308
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4.4. Intellectuals, theory, and singularity
As a result of discursive fragmentation, the notion of culture, from being relatively
cohesive and unified, undergoes a diversification, which creates some potentially
contradictory uses of it. As I have noted above, one direction in which the notion is
redefined implies a levelling down of distinctions such as that between “high” and
“low” culture. Within this context, those intellectuals who, for one reason or another,
wish to withhold the role of critical thinkers often endorse a certain form of singularity.
Since intellectuals claim a particular strategic use of the notion of culture that retains
some of its critical and oppositional value, their singularity symptomatizes the marginal
position and the increasing difficulty in embracing the contradictory meanings that
culture assumes in contemporary Western societies. Moreover, as many commentators
point out, intellectuals are not always likely to identify themselves with narrow fields of
specialisation. While often solidly grounded in an academic discipline, their approach
tends to be transdisciplinary from the outset.309
With the relevance of culture being increasingly associated with practices of
cultural consumption highlighting the self-fashioning potential of individuals, another
concept, theory, appears in the critical vocabulary of intellectuals. The concept of
theory, as Eagleton notes, stands for a very flexible and almost all-encompassing label
constituting one of the vantage points from where modern intellectuals speak:
What academic label, for example, could be pinned on writers like Raymond
Williams, Susan Sontag, Jurgen Habermas, Julia Kristeva or Michel Foucault? There
is no obvious term to describe the kind of thinkers they are, which is one reason why
the rather vague word ‘theory’ floated into existence. And the fact that their work
cannot be easily categorized is a central part of its significance. 310
Perhaps theory is the very term that allows intellectuals to re-state the notion of
culture as an alternative to the increasingly global trends imposed by the market. Since
culture and theory are by essence transdisciplinary notions, modern intellectuals need to
                                                 
309 As Terry Eagleton notes, ‘a snap definition of intellectuals might be that they are the opposite of
academics’. In Terry Eagleton, After Theory, p. 81.
310 Terry Eagleton, After Theory, p.82.
140
beware of potential contradictions deriving from ‘falling back into the blithe
amateurism of the gentleman scholar on the one hand, or capitulating to the short-
sighted scholar on the other’.311 In fact, from the point of view of its detractors, the
notions of culture and theory represent a generalist point of view of society. As such,
these notions lose relevance in favour of the growing importance of intellectual
expertise.312On the other hand, when adequately manipulated, these notions can still
offer a vantage point from which to articulate a holistic viewpoint on society. As
Bauman maintains, the increasing irrelevance of the notion of culture is part of a
process that recasts the role of intellectuals from that of legislators to that of
interpreters.313
The discourse of culture, which served as one of the main legislating tools of
modern intellectuals, sees its field of application confined to the insularity of academic
disciplines and departments. Or, ceasing to be the domain of a particular elite, culture
becomes increasingly embedded in the mechanisms that shape and diversify individual
styles and social identities. As pointed out in the previous chapter, in discussing popular
culture Eco shows that formal strategies formerly associated to avant-garde art are
implemented at different cultural levels. In this sense, it is no longer intellectuals (or
artists) who spell out the discourse of culture; the markets themselves mostly take up
such a legislative role. Hence, with the gradual decline of the legislating role of
intellectuals, cultural markets become powerful agents offering self-shaping tools to re-
define life-styles; the ethos of consumerism is promoted to the role of lingua franca of
global societies. In consequence, as Bauman suggests in his analysis of consumerist
culture, individuals increasingly seek comfort in a form of hedonism, inspired by the
promises of happiness delivered by the market.
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Against the backdrop of the pervasiveness of cultural markets, singularity is
perhaps what allows intellectuals to stand out, to be recognised by refusing ready-made
categories delivered by consumerist culture. As studies of creativity have shown, there
is an element of unconventionality and social deviance in the way in which individuals
express creativity.314 As Robert J. Sternberg shows, non-conformist thinkers and
scientists have to struggle before their creativity is fully acknowledged. Their attempts
to have their creativity recognised can be explained as an effort to break free from
conventional patters set by their intellectual communities.315 Bourdieu’s critique of
television discussed in chapter two is a case in point in this sense. As an intellectual,
Bourdieu claims a marginal position when he casts a critical gaze on the deontology that
defines TV journalists. Bourdieu’s marginal position when denouncing the ready-made
clichés of the journalistic field represents a discursive strategy allowing him to position
himself “outside” of the discourse he criticizes. Bourdieu’s example illustrates how
intellectual creativity defines itself both in relation as well as in opposition with
symbolic strategies employed by the media. Hence, singularity can be viewed as a
communicative strategy challenging conventional thinking patters of social conformity.
 4.5. Relational thinking: individuals, social contexts, texts, and readers
Oppositions between individual and society or text and reader have been the centre of
multiple debates in a number of disciplines across the humanities. These debates have
often triggered discussions about the relation between individual freedom and social,
textual, or literary norms. In literary criticism, for instance, many important recent
debates have gravitated around the question of the relation between the freedom of the
reader and the constraints of the text. The debate between Umberto Eco, Richard Rorty,
Jonathan Culler and Christine Brooke-Rose at the occasion of the 1990 Tanner Lectures
is a good example of this. The debate illustrates a number of aspects with regard to the
vexata quaestio of textual interpretation. More specifically, the question discussed in the
1990 Tanner Lectures revolves around the difference between interpretation and over-
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interpretation of literary texts.316The debate engages with the definition of interpretation
as well as with the symbolic operations leading the reader to confer meaning to a text.
Eco, in this sense, develops a careful distinction between interpretation and
overinterpretation, illustrating what discriminates one from the other. The starting point
for Eco’s discussion of interpretation is the idea that language establishes a
conventional relationship between words and things. As Eco argues, language, under
certain conditions, offers the possibility of establishing simultaneous associations
between words and things which might lead one to construe different representations of
reality, none of which might be said to be neither entirely true nor entirely false. As Eco
points out, such a possibility is particularly well illustrated by Second-century hermetic
traditions: for tenants of these traditions, language can only suggest, but never define,
truth. As Eco points out, Second-century Hermetism:
Is looking for a truth it does not know, and all it possesses is books. Therefore, it
imagines or hopes that each book will contain a spark of truth and that they will serve
to confirm each other. In this syncretistic dimension, one of the principles of Greek
rationalist models, that of the excluded middle, enters a crisis. It is possible for many
things to be true at the same time, even if they contradict each other.  But if books tell
the truth, even when they contradict each other, then their each and every word must
be an allusion, an allegory. They are saying something other than what they appear to
be saying. Each one of them contains a message that none of them will be able to
reveal alone. In order to be able to understand the mysterious message contained in
books, it was necessary to look for a revelation beyond human utterances (…). 317
As Eco argues further on, the idea that language is the medium whereby cultures
organize knowledge is not incompatible with the notion that the relation between words
and things is open, at any time, to multiple interpretations. When a string of words is
turned into a text, it is also more prompt to be subject to multiple readings over a certain
period of time. As noted earlier, each repetition of a literary text is a recasting of
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meaning; as Culler suggests, Derrida’s approach to the dialectic of singularity and
repetition reveals how the “literary” negates the possibility of reified meaning.
Literature, in this sense, contains difference, plurality. As such, it is a symbolic space
that accommodates the multiplicity of subjective experiences. As Eco suggests, one
could say that a text is an open-ended reality ‘float(ing)’ between an author and a
reader:
Someone could say that a text, once it is separated from its utterer (as well as from the
utterer’s intention) and from the concrete circumstances of its utterance (and by
consequence from its intended referent) floats (so to speak) in the vacuum of a
potentially infinite range of possible interpretations.318
In Eco’s view, the text and the reader are interdependent poles; it is, precisely, in
the space where readers and texts “converge” that interpretation arises. For Eco
interpreting a text involves turning it into a virtual system whose signifying units are
associated in virtue of a range of possible meanings established by cultural conventions.
From such a perspective, overinterpreting a text for Eco implies the act of making a
series of textual inferences that logically contradict each other and therefore do not hold
together as a coherent system. In this sense Eco’s idea of interpretation requires that
interpretation is tested not only against the coherence of the text, but principally against
a system of cultural conventions the text refers to in virtue of a set of rules and norms.
These rules and norms define legitimate uses of language, as well as legitimate ways to
understand and to establish associations between signifying units. However, rules and
norms can often be interpreted quite creatively. In this sense, the more a language user
possesses an active competence of these rules and norms, the more she or he will able to
recast conventional meaning into original configurations:
When a text is produced not for a single addressee but for a community of readers (…)
the author knows that he or she will be interpreted not according to his or her
intentions but according to a complex strategy of interactions which also involve the
readers, along with their competence in language as a social treasury. I mean by social
treasury not only a given language as a set of grammatical rules, but also the whole
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encyclopaedia that the performances of that language have implemented, namely, the
cultural conventions that that language has produced and the very history of the
previous interpretations of many texts, comprehending the text that the reader is in the
course of reading. (…) Thus every act of reading is a difficult transaction between the
competence of the reader (the reader’s world knowledge) and the kind of competence
that a given text postulates in order to be read in an economic way.319
Contrary to what Eco maintains, Rorty contends that interpretation is no more than a
description of a given situation to which a reader applies a linguistic frame. In
illustrating such a stance, Rorty demarcates himself from Eco for whom not all
interpretative frames that readers apply are equally valid or epistemologically sound. In
fact, Rorty contends that it is not the text (or the idea of a privileged object) that orients
what a reader or community of readers say about it, but the specific interests that people
pursue. These interests are independent from the idea of the text-object. Rorty argues
that the idea of internal coherence leads to the assumption that the text has an essence,
thus triggering the illusion that there is something that the text really wants to say; that
the interpreter’s task consists in decoding this very meaning. For Rorty, one cannot
sustain the idea of a limit dividing valid interpretations from unreasonable ones, since
interpretation constitutes an operation that is part of a larger context in which people do
things with texts rather than interpret them. Rorty suggests that interpreting a text does
not entail the preservation of an internal coherence, as it does for Eco.320
Following the initial Eco-Rorty confrontation, Culler and Brooke-Rose propose
intermediate positions moderating Eco’s and Rorty’s views. As it often happens when
scholars debate fundamental questions such as that of interpretation, the positions
offered do not only illustrate the possibility of formulating oppositional stances, but also
that oppositions foster the expression of new theoretical stances.321 Like a cubist
                                                 
319 Umberto Eco, Interpretation and Overinterpretation, pp.67-68.
320 Richard Rorty, ‘The pragmatist’s progress’, in Umberto Eco, Interpretation and Overinterpretation,
pp.89-109. See also Richard Rorty. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1989).
321 According to Collins, ‘there is always a small number of rival positions at the forefront of intellectual
creativity; there is no single chamber, but there are rarely more than half a dozen’. Randall Collins, The
Sociology of Philosophies, p. 42.
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painting in which the representation of an object originates from different points of
views, a debate between scholars is likely to give rise to many and different
formulations which are the expression of different theoretical sensitivities.322 In Eco’s
understanding, as noted above, interpretation results form an encounter, a dialectical
relationship, between a text and a reader. This richly symbolic encounter, as pointed
out, involves much more than just a reader and a text. It also postulates a background of
acquired competence and of encyclopaedic knowledge that allow individuals to produce
new meaning by interacting with multi-layered systems of conventions. The meaning
that results from these interactions might reproduce ipso facto these conventions, as
cultural stereotypes or bland common-sense tend to do; or it might contribute in
extending, through creative manipulation of cultural conventions, the ‘treasury’ of
meaning which define cultures.
Symbolic interactions between texts and readers can be useful when examining
the notions of singularity and plurality. As pointed out in the section on singularity and
literature, a literary text can fully signify its singularity insofar as it participates in a
general meaning: insofar as it lends itself to different interpretations that confer it the
property of being singular in the different senses of the term. Interpretative practices
also figure prominently in the descriptions of the role and the social figure of the
intellectual, as most of the works on intellectuality show. This is so precisely because,
as authors such as Collins or Bourdieu clearly show, interpretative practices capture the
essential dynamism defining intellectual fields. In the more specific and localized
context of literary texts, Eco describes interpretation as a symbolic encounter between
texts and readers. As shown, such interactions engage a much wider competence of the
cultural, symbolic and historical codes that orient the production of meaning within a
given culture.
4.6. The sociology of the self and Bourdieu’s notion of habitus
The relation between intellectuals and society can be addressed in different ways, using
a number of conceptualizations and argumentative frames.323 While some approaches
                                                 
322 The fact that a given topic gives rise to multiple interpretations is a good example of how singularity
and plurality can coexist.
323 See for instance the previously referenced Neil Gross. Richard Rorty. The making of an American
Philosopher and Randall Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies. On the negative impact that societal
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might focus more on either individuals or their contexts, other approaches present a
clearer attempt to articulate the interactions between intellectuals and the social settings
in which they operate.324 Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, as shown in the previous
chapters, is construed in such a way as to account for the way in which the individuals
are embedded in social spaces. As pointed out, the habitus structures individual
experience, as well as individual strategies and actions in view of attaining symbolic
prestige. The habitus is, for Bourdieu, a point of view on the social space; like any point
of view it is by necessity partial, contingent to a particular experience of the social
world. Hence, social contingency expresses the singularity of the individual, and the
uniqueness of an individual itinerary. For this reason singularity, through which
individuals distinguish themselves from one another, is itself inscribed in the social
world.
The habitus unmistakably addresses the individual-society dichotomy. It also
highlights how emotional states are socially constituted. As Deborah Reed-Danahay
points out, Bourdieu’s concept of habitus ‘focuses on the cultural construction of
emotions and on discursive practices associated with emotions’.325 While individuals
learn to identify the value of particular experiences that are filtered through their
habitus, they also learn to recognize certain emotions when they engage in social
practices.326 As already highlighted, the concept of habitus posits that the position of
individuals within the social world is connected to a set of cognitive and behavioural
dispositions orienting cognition and action. Bourdieu’s habitus, as Jacques Bouveresse
suggests, relies on the idea of social regularity without necessarily implying a
deterministic logic. In an essay called ‘Rules, Dispositions, and the Habitus’,
                                                                                                                                    
changes have on the public image of intellectuals see for Frank Furedi, Where have all the intellectuals
gone?, 2nd edn (London: Continuum, 2006).
324 With regards to this, Bourdieusian sociology, Collins’ theory of intellectual change, and the new
sociology of ideas all share a concern for offering effective ways to account for the interactions between
intellectuals and the social settings in which they operate.
325 Reed-Donahay stresses how the debate between structures and agency has often overshadowed this
particular aspect of the concept of habitus. Deborah Reed-Danahay, Locating Bourdieu (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2005), p.99. It is also important to stress how the study of emotions has been an
early concern in Bourdieu’s career as a scholar, as testified by the title of his doctoral thesis ‘The
Temporal Structure of Emotional Life’ to which Reed-Danahay rightly alludes. Bourdieu never
completed such project. Valuable information about Bourdieu’s doctoral thesis can be found in the first
part of the biography of Bourdieu by Marie-Anne Lescourret. Bourdieu (Paris: Flammarion, 2008).
326 The link between feeling and thinking is particularly well explored in the chapter ‘Habitus and
Emotions’ in Deborah Reed-Danahay, Locating Bourdieu, pp.99-129.
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Bouveresse suggests that Bourdieu distances himself from the concept of (social) rule.
Instead, he proposes that regularities in behaviour and cognition occur without the
presence of explicit rules. Regularities are, simply put, part of the social world itself.
Hence the habitus, as Bouveresse points out, accounts for a ‘generative spontaneity’; 327
individuals are neither like robots nor totally self-determined. In fact, as Bourdieu
points out in the previously quoted passage of ‘Fieldwork in Philosophy’:
Les agents sociaux, dans les sociétés archaïques comme dans les nôtres, ne sont pas
(…) des automates réglés comme des horloges, selon des lois mécaniques qui leur
échappent. Dans les jeux les plus complexes, les échanges matrimoniaux par
exemples, ou les pratiques rituelles, ils engagent les principes incorporés d’un habitus
générateur. Ce système de dispositions on peut le penser par analogie avec la
grammaire générative de Chomsky – à la différence qu’il s’agit de dispositions
acquises par l’expérience, donc variables selon les lieux et les moments. Ce «!sens du
jeu!», comme nous disons en français, est ce qui permet d’engendrer une infinité de
«!coups!» adaptés à l’infinité de situations possibles qu’aucune règle, si complexe soit-
elle, ne peut prévoir.328
The flexibility of the concept of habitus allows one to apply it to the specific reality of
individuals, as well as to the collective spaces individuals belong to. A correct
understanding of the concept of habitus resides, as David Swartz puts it, in ‘the basic
insight of the classical sociological tradition that maintains that social reality exists both
inside and outside of individuals, both in our minds and in things’329. In such a context,
the habitus explains how social competence, as in language for instance, exists both
under the form of internalised knowledge (in the specific form of grammatical rules but
also with regards to how language ought to be used in different social milieus or
situations) and under the externalised or objective form of grammar books and texts.
Moreover, Swartz remarks that, ‘Bourdieu’s approach to understanding the relationship
                                                 
327 Jacques Bouveresse, ‘Rules, Dispositions, and the Habitus’, in Richard Shusterman. Bourdieu. A
Critical Reader (Malden: Blackwell, 1999), pp.45-64, p.62.
328 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Fieldwork in Philosophy’, in Choses dites (Paris: Minuit, 1987 ) pp. 13-47, p.19.
329 David L. Swartz, Culture and Power. The sociology of Pierre Bourdieu (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1997), p.96
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between actors and structures builds on one key idea: that objective structures have
subjective consequences is not incompatible with the view that the social world is
constructed by individual actors’330. The concept of habitus, when applied to the study
of linguistic practices, leads to conclusions which are very similar to the ones Eco draws
from his idea of textual interpretation. In particular, Bourdieu argue that linguistic
ability does not only entail a theoretical mastering of rules and norms that define
preferential uses of language. Linguistic ability it is also the product of social
performance, in that performance actualizes individual competence within socially
informed situations:
En effet, l’habitus n’est pas moins lié au marché par ses conditions d’acquisitions que
par ses conditions d’utilisation. Nous n’avons pas appris à parler seulement en
entendant parler un certain parler mais aussi en parlant, donc en offrant un parler
déterminé sur un marché déterminé, c’est-à-dire dans les échanges au sein d’une
famille occupant une position particulière dans l’espace social et proposant de ce fait à
la mimesis pratique du nouvel entrant des modèle et des sanctions plus ou moins
éloignés de l’usage légitime.331
Sociologist Jean-Claude Kaufmann also stresses the relevance of Bourdieu’s concept of
habitus when it comes to explain the ways in which individuals internalise a set of
acquired competences which they then externalise in concrete social situations.
By articulating individuality and social structures within a single theoretical
frame Bourdieu interprets, in an original and pertinent way, the question of habits
informing everyday life.332According to Kaufmann, the interest that sociology invested
in the study of social habits has been strongly encouraged by the return, on the scene of
sociological discourse, of the everyday as a legitimate object of study.333 Against this
                                                 
330 David L. Swartz, Culture and Power. The sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, p.97
331 Pierre Bourdieu, Ce que parler veut dire. L’économie des échanges linguistiques (1982) (Paris:
Fayard, 2005), p.83
332Jean-Claude Kaufmann, Ego. Pour une sociologie de l’individu (Paris: Nathan, 2001), especially
pp.127-129. Page numbers within the text in the next paragraphs refer to this edition.
333 For the importance of the notion of the “everyday” in philosophy during that period see in particular
the importance of the works of French philosopher Henri Lefebvre. See Henri Lefebvre, Critique de la vie
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backdrop, Kaufmann discusses some of the limits of the concept of habitus. In doing so,
he joins other critics; Philippe Corcuff and Bernhard Lahire, for instance, have shown
how the concept of habitus, by the frequent generalisations it leads to, ‘apparaît très mal
adapté pour rendre compte de la dynamique individuelle, notamment de son caractère
mouvant, ouvert et pluriel’334. The concept of habitus is nonetheless, as Kaufmann
points out, a manifold concept rich of insightful implications both at a theoretical and at
an empirical level (p.135). Kaufmann claims that the concept of habitus can be
associated with two distinctive theories. In the first instance, habitus operates as a
‘système de schèmes capable d’orienter les pratiques’ (p.137). As Kaufman suggests,
the ‘système de schèmes’ the concept of habitus refers to often comes across as having
an immanent presence, as Michel de Certeau notes in L’invention du quotidien.335 In the
second instance, the concept of habitus, observes Kaufman, encourages another
theoretical approach that, along with the first use of the concept (the habitus as a
framework generating individual practices), explains individual practices by recurring to
empirical data. These data are usually gathered so as to illustrate observable regularities
disseminated within the social space. According to Kaufman, the first theory locates the
habitus within the individual, while the second extends it in a multitude of empirical
data. In light of this, the habitus can ideally operate as a mediator between individual
schemes of perception and action and the norms that define the collective ethos of a
social group. However, Kaufmann argues that by denoting both objective structures as
well as individual schemes of cognition and action, the concept inevitably ends up
privileging one dimension over the other, for example when it indicates the ethos of a
social group.336As Kaufmann points out, the concept of habitus oscillates between
                                                                                                                                    
quotidienne (Paris: L’Arche, 1947) and Critique de la vie quotidenne II. Fondements d’une sociologie de
la quotidienneté (Paris: L’Arche, 1961).
334 See for instance Philippe Corcuff, ‘Le collectif au défi du singulier; en partant de l’habitus’ in
Bernhard Lahire, Le travail sociologique de Pierre Bourdieu. Dettes et critique (Paris: La decouverte,
1999), and Bernard Lahire, L’homme pluriel. Les ressorts de l’action (Paris: Nathan, 1998), referenced in
Jean- Claude Kaufmann, Ego. Pour une sociologie de l’individu,  p.133.
335 Michel de Certeau, L’invention du quotidien. Tome 1, Arts de faire (Paris: Gallimard, 2002)
336As Kaufman points out, ‘(l)’habitus accède plus souvent au pluriel (l’infinité des habitus catégoriels), et
en perdant le singulier, perd aussi sa place centrale qui tenait dans la “formule génératrice” ‘ (p.140).
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denoting individual experience and the logic through which a given society gives itself a
signifying order by means of social structures (pp.144-145).
In spite of the criticism it can be subject, the habitus remains a very powerful
concept that underlines how individual action and cognition is informed by social
configurations whose logic is partly beyond individual understanding. Against this
background, singularity emerges in the negotiation between individual experience and a
system of categories organising and orienting actions. The outcome of the encounter of
the singularity of individual experience and the plurality of the possibilities whereby the
habitus generates actions is not predetermined. The habitus implies, as Bouveresse
points out, regularities rather than rules. Like Eco’s account of the interactions between
texts and readers, the habitus preserves the idea that creative action emerges within the
space of the encounter between individual experience and the organised space of social
norms and conventions.
4.7. The contribution of the new sociology of ideas
A very relevant contribution to the individual-society debate comes from what
American sociologists Charles Camic and Neil Gross have called ‘the new sociology of
ideas’. The two American sociologists define an important method that has emerged
over the last few decades.
The new sociology of ideas, as discussed by Camic and Gross, brings together
insights, theoretical orientations and arguments coming from scholarly areas such as
sociology of science, sociology of culture, and general sociological theory, with the aim
of elaborating relevant ‘tools of sociological analysis to explain why thinkers make the
intellectual choices they do’.337 The new sociology of ideas ‘focuses primarily on those
(men and women) who are relatively specialized in the production of scientific,
interpretive, moral, political or aesthetic ideas’ (p.237). Attention is given to the actual
processes through which knowledge is produced and distributed, as much as to the
individuals involved in these processes. What is at stake is, in other words, the
possibility to elaborate a general line of argument to account for the production of ideas
within a more or less large network of people and institutions such as universities, the
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press, the media, etc., so that emphasis is laid on the intellectual actors as much as on
the particular institutional setting in which ideas are generated.
Camic and Gross argue that earlier generations of sociologists of ideas assumed
‘an unproblematic distinction between the content of ideas, their “internal” substance,
and the social and therefore “external” factors that condition this content’ (p.238). This
tendency to view the distinction between internal and external as unproblematic often
resulted in the inability to see connections between the content of ideas and their context
of production.338As the two sociologists suggest, much of the descriptions offered by
Karl Manheim, Lewis Coser or Alvin Gouldner, rested on the assumption that
intellectuals were part of a homogenous social category and that ‘in most societies, and
certainly in modern societies, groups of persons can be found exhibiting the defining
properties of intellectuals’ (pp.241-42). Without disqualifying the idea that intellectuals
might, in fact, be grouped according to certain homogeneous criteria, Camic and Gross
point out some of the inherent limitations that such a generalisation is inclined to
generate. For instance, they argue that ‘the old sociology of ideas tended to efface
important forms of variation among specialized knowledge producers’. This
generalisation resulted in the fact that the ‘old sociology of ideas tended to occlude the
extent to which the attributes identified in different definitions of intellectuals may
systematically vary across groups of knowledge producers’ (p.242).
As pointed out, Camic and Gross identify sociology of science, the study of
ideology, sociology of culture, intellectual history and general sociological theory as the
key areas of research fostering the emergence new methods for addressing the study of
ideas (p.242). Camic and Gross contend that new sociologists of ideas challenge the
assumption that scientific ideas are developed autonomously and away from social
constraints. This aspect is particularly relevant in the work of authors like David Bloor,
a key thinker in the field of the sociology of scientific knowledge. According to Bloor,
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the processes whereby ideas are produced and circulate within scientific communities
are sustained by ‘rhetorical tactics and vocabularies that acquire their efficacy and
meaning within historically specific frameworks of scientific convention and
understanding’.339 David Bloor has argued that “scientific” standards might not be
enough to settle controversies over scientific truths, but that there is, indeed, an
important social component that intervenes in selecting particular arguments and in
granting value to them over other competing arguments.
David Bloor is also a strong advocate of an approach to knowledge that carefully
considers the relationship between the individual and the social. He maintains that there
are a number of different ways in which social constraints infiltrate those practices
which are very much associated with the production of knowledge:
Does not individual experience, as a matter of fact, take place within the framework of
assumptions, standards, purposes and meanings which are shared? Society furnishes
the mind of the individual with these things and also provides the conditions whereby
they can be sustained and reinforced. If the individual’s grasp of them wavers, there
are agencies ready to remind him; if his view of the world begins to deviate there are
mechanisms which encourage realignment. The necessities of communication help to
sustain collective patterns of thought in the individual psyche. As well as the
individual’s sensory experience of the natural world, there is, then, something that
points beyond that experience, that provides a framework for it and gives it a wider
significance. It fills out the individual’s sense of what the overall Reality is, that his
experience is experience of.340
In light of such awareness, the old distinctions between internal and external
explanation are replaced by an interdependence of social factors and rational
explanations. New sociologists of ideas pay specific attention to those values and norms
which regulate the exchange of ideas among and within scientific communities, as well
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340David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, p. 15. An outline of the strong program in the sociology
of science is given in the first chapter of the book.
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as to other social factors that might play a role in the presentation and communication of
scientific ideas.341Hence, the new sociology of ideas is closely concerned with how
ideas are produced within particular contexts, and with the ways in which texts (or
similar supports on which ideas are inscribed) are part of a larger network formed by
other texts or supports for ideas.342 The meaning of a text, an idea, a theory etc., does not
come to be viewed as transparent, or self-sufficient, but is considered in the light of the
interaction with contextual elements.343 For Camic and Gross a careful reconstruction of
the context in which ideas take shape ‘must have a strong local focus’, laying emphasis
on an almost ethnographic approach of the study of how ideas come to be what they are,
in particular by positing that ideas should be understood within the specific
communities (academic, mediatic, etc.) in which they acquire meaning.344 In contrast to
traditional sociological approaches, new sociologists of ideas are concerned with those
processes whereby intellectuals come to hold a position of authority within and without
their scientific communities:
Whereas contributors to the old sociology of ideas tended to view intellectuals as
‘special custodian of abstract ideas’, new sociologists of ideas see the women and the
men who produce ideas as engaged in historically specific struggles with one another,
and with various audiences, to establish their legitimacy and respectability as
intellectuals of particular types (scientists, humanists, etc.) – struggles that can have a
significant effect on the ideas that these actors produce and on the fate of the ideas that
they generate.345
                                                 
341 Charles Camic, and Neil Gross, ‘The New Sociology of Ideas’, p.244. Along with Bloor, sociologists
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public space.
342 See in particular Bruno Latour, Reassembling the social. An introduction to Actor-Network-Theory
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Latour’s Actor-Network-Theory (ANT) proposes to treat social
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See my discussion of field in chapter two.
344 Charles Camic, and Neil Gross, ‘The New Sociology of Ideas’, p.246
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This also implies considering what kind of demands an institutional setting (i.e. the
academic world) imposes on intellectuals and also how intellectuals manage to make a
name for themselves by responding to the different codes, moral obligations and
scientific norms through which these demands are imposed. Moreover, the weight that
‘various audiences’ have in consecrating the legitimacy and popularity of intellectuals’
voices within the public sphere is also taken into account.346The new sociology of ideas
addresses confrontations between intellectuals not as purely abstract disputes between
disinterested men and women, but rather as symbolic strategies contributing to the
establishment of prominent positions within the intellectual field.
4.8. Conclusion
When discussing intellectual engagement within symbolic as well as concrete loci in
which ideas and people come together and exert a reciprocal influence, it becomes
possible to see the production of ideas as being part of a larger picture in which
intellectual activities function in relation with one another. This chapter sought to
integrate Bourdieu and Eco within a common theoretical framework constructed around
a set of interconnected questions. These questions, as I hope to have shown,
complemented the arguments developed in the first three chapters. Conceptual couples
such as individual and society, singular and plural, and reader and text are often
construed by academic practioners in terms of binary oppositions. I have suggested that
it is possible to reframe these oppositions around the relational aspect that characterizes
them. In so doing I have illustrated how relational thinking provides the possibility to
establish a dialogue between oppositions. This chapter has explored various forms of
intellectual engagement such as that between intellectuals and society or that between
readers and texts. Another type of intellectual engagement, which will be addressed in
the next chapter, is that between intellectuals and bodies of knowledge constituted as
theories.
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The topic of the next chapter is Bourdieu’s and Eco’s critical engagement with
structuralism.
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Chapter 5: The order and the Structure: Pierre Bourdieu,
Umberto Eco, and Structuralism
‘L’identité sociale se définit et s’affirme dans la différence.’347!
5.1 Introduction
It is generally assumed that fashions are transient, ephemeral. Nevertheless, they often
become representative of historical periods and characterize the way people think, and
do things. Moreover, fashions never fade away completely. Often combined with new
ideas, they resurface within new stylistic, intellectual, or artistic paradigms.
Structuralism was often seen, in its heyday, as an example of methodological rigour,
offering scholars the impression that disciplines in Arts and Humanities could claim a
truly “scientific” knowledge. While some of the most prominent intellectual voices to
emerge out of this period would soon turn against it to construct new theoretical claims,
the intellectual appeal of structuralism is still very strong today. The promise to bring
methodological rigour into fields such as literary studies - where the hermeneutical
approach is traditionally dominant - has never completely faded. Even if for many
academics structuralism is a thing of the past, some of its main ideas are still very much
alive today, disguised under new names or conceptual labels.348
This chapter investigates how intellectuals elaborate their conceptual
contributions by manipulating theories in a creative way.349 It proposes to chart the
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349 Bourdieu’s and Eco’s intellectual engagement with structuralism is one possible interpretation of
structuralism among many others. The aim of the chapter is not to assess structuralism as a theory or as a
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importance of structuralism in Bourdieu’s and Eco’s intellectual itinerary by showing
how structuralism has been relevant in the formation of their thought.  As I shall argue,
Bourdieu’s and Eco’s critical engagement with structuralism is a decisive factor in
fashioning the direction of their theoretical and conceptual contributions. Furthermore,
the chapter shows that in spite of their criticism of structuralism, Bourdieu and Eco
never completely abandoned some of its salient ideas. This ambivalence offers a
privileged angle from which to investigate what might be implied when two thinkers
claim to be moving beyond a theory. In particular, I shall argue that Bourdieu’s and
Eco’s intellectual engagement with structuralism might have implied not only a
criticism, but also a recasting of structuralism within a new conceptual agenda. As
pointed out, structuralism has been a renewing force in the Humanities during the
1960s. It influenced in a variety of ways the new theories that were soon to emerge out
the critique of its limits and shortcomings. Thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, Michel
Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Paul Ricoeur have all engaged, at some point, with the
structuralist paradigm.350
The genesis of structuralism can be traced back to the first half of the 20th
century, when Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure introduced the idea of structure in
the Cours de linguistique générale (1916). Saussure viewed language as a system
composed of many units functioning interdependently, and defining themselves in
relation to a whole.351 Before becoming a trademark in a number of disciplines ranging
from anthropology to literary analysis and semiotics, the idea of structure was
                                                                                                                                    
method, but it is to show how theories and methods are interpreted in such a way so as to contribute to the
establishment of new theoretical models. In this sense, scholars often tend to simplify certain aspects of
the theories they criticize in order to make a better case for the theories and conceptual models they
promote. Some of the points of Bourdieu’s and Eco’s engagement with structuralism I discuss in this
chapter should be seen in this light.
350 See for instance Michel Foucault’s Les mots et les choses (1966), Jacques Derrida’s L’écriture et la
différence (1967), Gilles Delueze’s Différence et répétition (1968) and Paul Ricoeur’s Le conflit des
interpretations (1969). For a general introduction to the thought of these four and other French thinkers of
the period see Richard Harland, Superstructuralism: the Philosophy of Strucutralism and Post-
Structuralism (New York: Methuen, 1987); Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory (Malden (MA): Blackwell,
1983); Vincent Descombes, Le même et l’autre: Quarante-cinq ans de philosophie française (1933-1978)
(Paris: Minuit, 1979); Johnathan Culler, Structuralist Poetics (1975) (New York: Routledge, 2002).
351 While the idea of a wholeness composed of interdependent elements was to become one of the central
motifs of structuralism, it is significant to note that Saussure employed the term system to convey this
idea much more often than the term structure. See Jonathan Culler, Saussure (Glasgow: Fontana/Collins,
1976).Generally speaking, the word system and the word structure are used as complementary terms, the
word system designating the presence of more than one structure.
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symptomatic of a theoretical reorientation investing several disciplines. As Jonathan
Culler points out:  ‘Saussure’s theory of language is an exceptionally clear expression of
formal strategies by which a whole series of disciplines, from physics to painting,
transformed themselves in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century and became
modern’352. The notion of structure slowly became the centre-piece around which to
organize a unifying scientific language for a number of disciplines concerned with the
study of culture, language and literature, such as anthropology, semiotics and literary
analysis. French anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss was the first to import the model of
structural phonology in a field other than linguistics. He was rapidly followed by
scholars working in other disciplines, such as Michel Foucault (history and history of
knowledge), Louis Althusser (Marxist philosophy), and Jacques Lacan
(psychoanalysis).353 The diffusion of the model of structural phonology was certainly
helped by the importance of the social phenomenon of language (language is
everywhere), its foundational character (a society could not possibly exist without some
language) and by the increasing association between language and the notion of culture.
As Levi-Strauss points out, language is ‘un phénomène de groupe, il est constitutif du
groupe, il n’existe que par le groupe, car le langage ne se modifie, ne se bouleverse pas
à volonté’.354
In line with the idea of a collective dimension of language and culture,
structuralist anthropology develops a method oriented towards the study of cultural
phenomena which are often presented as objective, as opposed to more subjective ways
of perceiving and experiencing the world. As Mondher Kilani argues, ‘le structuralisme
est d’abord une activité intellectuelle qui sépare le sujet de la science. Il évacue toute
finalité subjective ou méta-sociale comme Dieu, l’histoire, la morale, l’homme, pour
tenter d’accéder aux seules formes’.355 As Kilani points out, structuralism’s intellectual
program contemplates form over content, recurrence over historical development.
Accordingly, structuralism is heavily based on the assumption that social, cultural and
symbolic practices function within a specific logic that can be inferred from a number of
                                                 
352 Jonathan Culler, Saussure, p.115.
353 Mondher Kilani, Introduction à l’anthropologie (Lausanne: Payot, 1992), p.280.
354 Georges Charbonnier, Entretiens avec Claude Levi-Strauss (Paris!: Julliard, 1992), pp.72-73.
355 Mondher Kilani, Introduction à l’anthropologie, p.281.
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objective variables. Structures are often presented, be in anthropology, semiology or
literature, as located under the effervescence of immediate social activity, and below the
surface of individual awareness. On this very ground, the understanding of the notion of
structure is not incompatible with the notion of the unconscious, inasmuch as both
notions refer to something that, dwelling below the surface of human activity,
nonetheless informs its very meaning . As Levi-Strauss points out:
L’activité inconsciente de l’esprit consiste à imposer des formes à un contenu, et si ces
formes sont fondamentalement les mêmes pour tous les esprits, anciens et modernes,
primitifs et civilisés (…) il faut et il suffit d’atteindre la structure inconsciente, sous-
jacente à chaque institution ou à chaque coutume, pour obtenir un principe
d’interprétation valide pour d’autres institutions et d’autres coutumes.356
As this passage suggests, both notions of structure and of the unconscious refer to a
level of reality that resists historical development and persists beyond cultural and
individual difference.357
5.2 Eco and structuralism: the background
In the introductory section of this chapter, I have pointed out how structuralism
provides an explanatory framework accounting for how cultural practices function
within the larger whole of societies. Within this explanatory framework, the notion of
structure is the keyword around which to organise and describe the real. In what
follows, I shall investigate the importance of structuralism within the early
developments of Eco’s intellectual itinerary. As Eco himself acknowledges, the critical
engagement with structuralism constitutes one of the main intellectual events of his
career. In several works, such as La struttura assente (1968) and Il problema estetico in
Tommaso d’Aquino (1970) Eco explicitly engages with structuralism. Eco’s critical
engagement with structuralism is also related to the development of the discipline of
semiotics. As one of the major contributors in the development of semiotics, Eco
                                                 
356 Claude Levi-Strauss. Anthropologie structurale (Paris: Plon, 1958), p. 28. Quoted in Mondher Kilani,
Introduction à l’anthropologie, p.285.
357 See for instance Sigmund Freud. The Unconscious (London: Penguins, 2005).
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engaged with structuralism as a necessary step in the process of laying the institutional
bases of the discipline.358
By 1962, year of the publication of Opera aperta, Eco had already established
contacts with some of some of the key exponents of the French journal Tel Quel, who
offered to translate and publish a two-part essay on Joyce, originally included in Opera
aperta and that Eco would subsequently publish a separate volume as Le poetiche di
Joyce (1966).359 Eco’s essay on Joyce addresses the way in which artistic expression, by
thematizing the dialectic between order and disorder, operates on the symbolic
borderline between chaos and system. 360 The essay illustrates how the relationship
between order and disorder, while being a recurrent concern for Joyce, is also at the
origin of a creative tension that the Irish writer brings to a new and more expressive
level with each major work. Through the dialectic between order and disorder, and
between unity and multiplicity, Eco explores literary and philosophical ways of
engaging with the idea of order, while showing an intense fascination with possible
ways of accounting for the dissolution, and the internal destruction, of this order. The
essay on Joyce indicates how Eco was, on the one hand, organising his intellectual
agenda around the limits of the notion of order. On the other hand, he was also drawn
towards ideas, theories, and creative approaches that explicitly stated the implausibility
of this notion. In fact, as Eco argues in the introduction to the first edition of Opera
aperta.
                                                 
358 As Culler points out, ‘(t)he establishment of a new discipline within the system of academic research is
not a frequent event. Generally new arrivals explicitly identify themselves as subdivisions of old
disciplines and simply undertake to organise more rationally and to pursue more vigorously an existing
line of research. The emergence of a discipline like semiotics, however, cannot be guaranteed to leave
other disciplines unaffected’. In Jonathan Culler, The Pursuit of Signs (London: Routledge, 2002), p.22.
359 Umberto Eco, Le poetiche di Joyce (Milan: Bompiani, 1966) Notwithstanding Eco’s early involvement
with French intellectual milieus, Opera aperta was principally engaging with the specific situation of
Italian culture of the period. As De Lauretis point outs: ‘Eco ci tiene a far notare la sua diversa
formazione pre-semiotica, ed ha ragione, perché solo tenendola presente si può da un lato apprezzare la
portata del suo progetto critico e del suo lavoro – l’avere “aperto” la cultura italiana ad altri sistemi di
pensiero e, cosa più importante, l’averne dato una lettura critica in base ad essi-; e dall’altro vedere le
inevitabili limitazioni, i punti ciechi, del suo stesso sistema in prospettiva storica, e quindi utlizzarlo
effettivamente come mezzo di conoscenza’. In Teresa de Lauretis, Umberto Eco (Florence: La Nuova
Italia, 1981), p.25.
360 Lubomir Dolezel identifies in the tension between open work and closed work one of the main themes
of Eco’s early works. See Lubomir Dolezel, ‘The Themata of Eco’s Semiotics of Literature’ in Reading
Eco. An Anthology, ed. by Rocco Capozzi (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997) pp.111-12.
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(Opera aperta) propone una indagine di vari momenti in cui l’arte contemporanea si
trova a fare i conti col Disordine. Che non è il disordine cieco e insanabile, lo scacco
di ogni possibilità ordinatrice, ma il disordine fecondo di cui la cultura moderna ci ha
mostrato la positività; la rottura di un Ordine tradizionale, che l’uomo occidentale
credeva immutabile e definitivo e identificava con la struttura oggettiva del mondo.361
As this passage illustrates, Eco makes an important distinction between a disorder that
precludes any forms of harmony, and a positive and productive disorder. The latter is,
precisely, the kind of disorder Eco is determined to describe with the notion of the open
work. It follows that, from a methodological perspective ‘si tratta di elaborare modelli
di rapporti in cui l’ambiguità trovi una giustificazione e acquisti un valore positivo’362.
As Sanjin Park notes, often critics have emphasized the fact that ‘from the beginning,
Eco has generally shown a nostalgia for the ordered world of the Middle-Ages’,
particularly in the long essay on Joyce.363 Eco will return to the Middle-Ages with Il
Nome della Rosa as well as in some of the essays devoted to popular culture published
in Faith in Fakes (1986).364 According to Park, in spite of advocating the philosophy of
the open work, Eco maintains an on-going commitment with the notions of order and
stability. So much so that, when discussing how critics examine Eco’s ‘nostalgia for the
ordered world of the Middle-Ages’, Park argues that ‘(w)hat matters here, however, is
the nature of Eco’s interest in an ultimate order or structuralist inclination’.365
In spite of Eco’s early involvement with French intellectual milieus, it was not
until a relatively late stage in the composition of Opera aperta that Eco got introduced
to structuralism by to François Wahl, who at the time was preparing the French
translation of Opera aperta well in advance of its publication in Italy.366 Wahl suggested
                                                 
361 Umberto Eco, Opera aperta  (1962), 7th edn (Milan: Bompiani, 2006),  p.2.
362 Umberto Eco, Opera aperta, p. 3.
363 Sangjin Park, ‘Reconsidering the Implications of the “Pre-Semiotic” Writings in Umberto Eco’, in
Illuminating Eco. On the Boundaries of Interpretation, ed. by Charlotte Ross, Rochelle Sibley (Aldershot:
Ashgate, 2004), pp.123-137.
364  See for instance the two consecutive essay ‘Dreaming the Middle-Ages’ and ‘Living in the New
Middle-Ages’ in Umberto Eco Faith in Fakes (London: Secker and Warburg, 1986), pp. 61-87.
365Sangjin Park, ‘Reconsidering the Implications of the “Pre-Semiotic” Writings in Umberto Eco’, p.131.
366 ‘(Wahl) mi chiese di tradurre il libro prima ancora che fosse apparso in Italia. Così la traduzione iniziò
subito, ma prese tre anni e fu rifatta tre volte, con Wahl che la seguiva riga per riga, anzi per ogni riga mi
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that Eco should read some of the structuralist literature that was available in France.
This suggestion turned out to be vital. In fact, as As Eco points out: ‘sollecitato da Wahl
mi misi a studiare questi “strutturalisti” (…) ed ebbi tre shock, tutti più o meno intorno
al 1963. La Pensée sauvage di Levi-Strauss, i saggi di Jakobson pubblicati da Minuit e i
formalisti russi…’(p.viii).367 Five years after this ‘shocking’ encounter, Eco dedicates a
long section of La struttura assente (1968) to the development of a criticism of
structuralism.368. Eco’s discussion of structuralism in La struttura assente proceeds from
a distinction between methodological and ontological structuralism. As Eco argues, the
notion of structure can be conceptualised in two ways. In the first case, a structure
operates as an intellectual instrument employed to approach a given reality by means of
an analytical framework. However, as Eco points out, Levi-Strauss develops a second
understanding of structuralism, which informs the term structure with an ontological
meaning. While in the first instance the notion of structure designates an interpretative
grid that one applies on reality, in the second case structures become constitutive of
reality itself. As Eco points out, the second case represents an example of ontological
structuralism. According to Eco, ontological structuralism posits the existence of
structures that, because inscribed in reality, are also by necessity antecedent to its
contingent manifestations.
                                                                                                                                    
mandava una lettera di tre pagine folta di questioni, oppure io andavo a Parigi a discutere, e andò avanti
così sino al 1965. Fu un’esperienza preziosa in vari sensi’. Umberto Eco, Opera aperta (1962), 7th edn
(Milan: Bompiani, 2006), p.vii. François Wahl played a decisive role in the promotion of structuralism in
France. Elisabeth Roudinesco, in her biography of Lacan points out how ‘Wahl, who edited several
different series, really ran the human sciences section at Seuil until 1989 and so contributed to the rise of
French structuralism in the sixties’. Elisabeth Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan. An Outline of a Life and a
History of a System of Thought (Cambridge: Polity press, 1999), p. 323.
367 Umberto Eco, Opera aperta, p.viii. Eco also writes, in 1963, two articles entitled  ‘Per una indagine
sulla situazione culturale’ and ‘Modelli descrittivi e interpretazione storica’ , in which he urges Italian left
intellectuals criticizes, among other things, the cultural politics of the Italian left to take stock of the
importance of structuralist methodologies. These two articles unleash a series of polemic responses, one
of which, interestingly, is an article in two-parts signed by Louis Althusser cautioning against the danger
of combining Marxism with structuralism. In Umberto Eco, Opera aperta, p. xviii.
368 At that moment, Eco also discovers the first signs of post-structuralist thought in the works of Derrida
and Michel Foucault: ‘le opere che stavano uscendo di Derrida e Foucault (Deleuze non aveva ancora
pubblicato Différence et répétition) mi spingevano ad identificare la nascita di un post-strutturalismo che
conduceva a una anti-ontologia proprio sulla base delle contraddizioni dell’ontologia strutturalista (…)
Scrivevo sull’onda di letture fresche e di discussioni in atto: non elaboravo uno studio critico; intervenivo
nel vivo di un dibattito’. In Umberto Eco, La struttura assente. La ricerca semiotica e il metodo
strutturale, 6th edition (1968) (Milan: Bompiani, 2004), p.v.
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Given that structural models can be transposed to different domains of
experience there must be a meta-code, Eco suggests, allowing the occurrence of such
permutations:
Per consentire queste trasformazioni, la trasposizione di modelli da sistema a sistema,
occorre una garanzia dell’operazione, data dalla elaborazione di un sistema di sistemi.
In altri termini, se esiste un sistema di regole che permettono l’articolarsi di una lingua
(codice linguistico) e un sistema di regole che permettono l’articolarsi degli scambi di
parentela come modi della comunicazione (codice della parentela), deve esistere un
sistema di regole che prescrive l’equivalenza tra il segno linguistico e il segno
parentale, stabilendone l’equivalenza formale, il medesimo valore posizionale dei
segni, termine a termine; e questo sistema sarà quello che, usando un termine non
impiegato dal nostro autore, chiameremo metacodice, nel senso che è un codice che
permette di definire e nominare altri codici sottoposti.369
In contrast to ontological structuralism, in methodological structuralism, as pointed out,
structures come to be seen as intellectual instruments rather than as constitutive of
reality. In La struttura assente Eco illustrates this understanding of methodological
structuralism within the context of avant-garde art. As pointed out in the previous
chapters, Eco considers that avant-garde art participates, along with other disciplines, in
addressing the indeterminacy and open-endedness of meaning that informs modern
societies. In this context, stability is a possibility but not a de facto reality. As I
illustrated in chapter three, Eco’s understanding of avant-garde art (and, more generally,
of culture) relies on the dialectic between indeterminacy and stability. While Eco
thermatizes this dialectic in Opera aperta (1962), in La struttura assente he further
elaborates it through a thoroughly informed discussion of Levi-Strauss’ structuralism.
Against such backdrop, Eco introduces a further important distinction between
structuralism and seriality. As Eco envisages it, the concept of seriality revolves around
the presence of artistic or compositional techniques offering the freedom to rearrange
existing elements outside the prescription of norms. This approach to artistic creation is
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illustrated by, among others, composer Pierre Boulez. As Eco points out, Boulez’s serial
music relies precisely on a musical system that can be rearranged and interpreted by the
musician’s own sensitivity. 370
Since openness and indeterminacy manifest themselves by taking particular
forms, such forms might also be apprehended as structures; but this can only be the case
if, as Eco maintains, structures are in turn defined as open and indeterminate. This is
how Eco views the fundamental dialectic between the indeterminacy of seriality and the
determinacy of structures.
Pensiero seriale come produzione di una struttura aperta e polivalente: nella musica
come nella pittura, nel romanzo come nella poesia e nel teatro. Ma la stessa nozione di
opera aperta, nel momento in cui viene tradotta (ragionevolmente, anche se
rischiosamente, come ‘struttura aperta’) porta con sé un problema: gli strumenti che lo
strutturalismo ci offre per analizzare una struttura aperta, possono coesistere con la
nozione di polivalenza e di serialità? Cioè, è possible pensare strutturalmente la serie?
Vi è omogeneità tra pensiero strutturale e pensiero seriale?371
The tension between the finitude of structures, and the indeterminacy of creative
solutions stemming from serial compositions, is part of a strategic argument Eco
employs in order to define the shortcomings of ontological structuralism. In fact for Eco
ontological structuralism blurs the dialectic between the singularity of the creative
project, and the structures whereby artistic activity participates to a general societal
meaning. Taken to it extreme consequences, ontological structuralism implies a
dissolution of the dialectic between subject and object (i.e. between the subject that
perceives the world and the world perceived as object). Subliminal mental structures
and universal structures are made to coincide. As de Lauretis points out:
Nel momento in cui Levi-Strauss si pone il problema epistemologico e si pone il
prolema fra soggetto e oggetto, ricercatore e fenomeno, egli postula una identità di
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struttura fra pensiero e mondo che sarà poi solo spiegabile con la nozione di una Ur-
struttura primaria costituita dai meccanismi universali della mente umana.372
On the other hand, methodological structuralism, as Eco suggests, can be very useful
when examining contemporary artistic solutions, precisely because it provides a
framework for conceptualising difference, unexpectedness and open-endedness. As
Michael Caesar points out ‘the values of flexibility, openness and experimentation (…)
must be balanced against the urgent need to construct a system that is as complete and
has as much explanatory power as possible’.373
5.3 Eco’s comparison between scholasticism and structuralism
In a moment of his intellectual itinerary (the end of the 60s and beginning of the 70s) in
which he gradually gives a more systematic elaboration to his ideas, Eco republishes Il
problema estetico in San Tommaso (1956), his master thesis and his first relevant
published work. In the new edition, Eco proposes a seemingly capricious comparison
between scholasticism and structuralism. In spite of its more modest proportions
(compared to the lengthy discussion of structuralism developed in La struttura assente),
this comparison is symptomatic of the efforts whereby Eco reinvents one of his earliest
intellectual engagement within a new critical paradigm. In spite of the fact that, as said,
the comparison between scholasticism and structuralism is much less elaborate than the
discussion of structuralism in La struttura assente, it nonetheless illustrates particularly
well how intellectual creativity proceeds from the unexpected combination of different
frameworks.374
In Il problema estetico in San Tommaso (1956) Eco proposes to chart Thomas
Aquinas’ conception of beauty. Contrary to certain narrow views maintaining that
beauty became a relevant topic only in the Renaissance and not before, Eco
demonstrates that defining beauty was a central concern for the medieval
philosopher.375As Eco shows, the scholastic philosopher conceives of the experience of
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beauty as a concrete realization of a metaphysical order; according to this view, reality
proceeds from this metaphysical order to the realm of direct experience and manifests
itself through a number of meaningful categories that are hierarchically ordered as a
system. When Eco republishes the book in 1970 as Il problema estetico in Tommaso
d’Aquino, he adds a concluding section presenting a comparison between scholasticism
and structuralism. In the wake of his exhaustive analysis of the place that beauty holds
among the concerns of the medieval philosopher, Eco argues that:
Sarebbe interessante rileggere tutta la speculazione scolastica alla luce della sensibilità
strutturale: l’operazione non sarebbe inutile, dato che il pensiero scolastico
consentirebbe assai bene di ridurre i vari aspetti della realtà, che pretende di definire, a
modelli esplicativi. In realtà il pensiero scolastico ad altro non ha mai preteso se non a
risolvere la realtà in modelli esplicativi, salvo la persuasione che questi modelli non
fossero costruzione dell’intelligenza ma aspetti della realtà. (p.259)
The idea of ‘ridurre i vari aspetti della realtà (…) a modelli esplicativi’ is what allows
Eco to envisage a comparative frame within which to discuss scholasticism and
structuralism. Eco points out how both positions are inclined to reduce the multiplicity
of the real to the intelligibility of general models. Hence, Eco posits the presence of
formal strategies, common to scholasticism and structuralism, whereby experience and
subjectivity are explained as manifesting an underlying system of interdependent
categories. Moreover, Eco points out how both systems of thought develop a method of
enquiry that strongly relies on a synchronic, rather than a diachronic, logic:376
Lo strutturalismo trova non poche ascendenze nella forma mentis scolastica: è
scolastica la pretesa strutturalista al discorso interdisciplinare, a una logica universale,
                                                                                                                                    
angusta. Questo almeno per rispondere alle diffidenze della critica idealistica’ in Umberto Eco, Il
problema estetico in Tommaso d’Aquino (1970)(Milan: Bompiani, 1998), p.22. Here Eco is also making a
case against Benedetto Croce, for whom’i problemi estetici non formavano un vero e proprio ogetto di
interessamento, né per il medioevo in generale, né in particolar per San Tommaso (…)’, in Umberto Eco,
Il problema estetico in Tommaso d’Aquino, p.15. Page numbers in the text in the next paragraphs refer to
this edition.
376 See for instance Teresa de Lauretis, Umberto Eco, p.13 : ‘Si vedrà più avanti come la critica di Eco
allo strutturalismo si fondi su questa stessa obiezione a “un’estetica del sincronico”; anche il modello
strutturalista è incapace di fare “i conti” con il momento diacronico, e quindi con la comunicazione in
genere e quella artistica in special modo’.
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alla riduzione di tutte le scienze umane a una scienza leader (che per lo strutturalismo
è la linguistica), di cui le altre siano ‘ancillae’.  (p.258)
In further elaborating his argument, Eco suggests that there are three areas where
scholasticism and structuralism converge. Firstly, both scholasticism and structuralism
employ a single conceptual vocabulary to apprehend different objects of knowledge,
thus favouring the idea that diversity and contingency can be articulated within a single
representational model. Eco argues that scholasticism relies on explanations that can
easily subsume heterogeneous phenomena within a single explanatory frame. Similarly,
structuralism addresses different domains of knowledge (from the study of language to
the study of culture and social practices) by transposing the same methodological
principles into these different domains. Secondly, both philosophical positions aim at
universalizing knowledge by trying to identify invariables in the reality they investigate.
Thirdly, both theories claim the existence of one area of knowledge (in the case of
scholasticism theology, and in the case of structuralism linguistics) whose conceptual
language should serve as a model for all other disciplines.
As pointed out earlier, Eco suggests that scholasticism and structuralism focus
on the synchronic as opposed to the diachronic. Consequently, both systems tend to
overshadow the historical development of those realities they scrutinize. As Eco
suggests ‘il pensiero medievale sviluppa sino alla sottigliezza le possibilità di un’analisi
sincronica di una struttura generalissima delle cose, ultimo comun denominatore di ogni
altro fenomeno’ (p.259). For Eco this ‘struttura generalissima delle cose’ that defines
the intellectual project of scholasticism does not necessarily make structuralism its
equivalent. However, Eco argues that ‘non è del tutto chiaro sino a qual punto oggi lo
strutturalismo rifiuti di qualificare ontologicamente i modelli conoscitivi che
maneggia’(260). In other words, Eco suggest that structuralism might in fact presuppose
the presence of an underlying structure of reality upon which all knowledge would
depend. While scholasticism subscribes unambiguously to the idea of a universalistic
logic, the same cannot be said for structuralism. As Eco points out, when structuralism
refers to such things as the ‘universali del linguaggio’, it is not clear whether what is
meant is some kind of physical and cerebral structures existing beyond the historical
development of languages and cultures (p.260).
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While, according to Eco, a “medieval” reading of structuralism can highlight ‘le
tendenza più pericolose’ of the structuralist paradigm, re-reading scholasticism from a
structuralist point of view reveals that scholasticism, by defining reality as the
combination of invariable elements (substantia), adopts representational models which
are similar to those of modern sciences such as chemistry, biology, or physics (p.260).
In fact, these scientific disciplines conceive of reality as the aggregation of elements
whose combination gives rise to particular substances that can be catalogued (p.262). In
light of the cross-examination of scholasticism and strucutrualism, Eco suggests how
the synchronic methodologies employed by scholasticism and structuralism might lead
one to ignore possible contradictions undermining the possibility of conceptualising
order and stability. When approaching culture diachronically, notes Eco, the presence of
contradictions is inevitable; Eco thinks that ‘la riduzione sincronica, indispensabile per
parlare del campo di eventi, ha impoverito gli eventi stessi e gli ha opportunamente
“falsificati”’ (p.263). In order to return to the complexity and manifold texture of social,
cultural and esthetical phenomena, Eco believes in the importance of considering
history as a decisive factor informing the identity as well as the meaning of all
phenomena.
Eco’s criticism of structuralism gravitates around the idea that structuralism not
only reduces the multiplicity of the real to uniform explanatory models but that, as said,
its ontological version might take these models to be constitutive of the reality they
describe. By pointing out how scholasticism identifies an underlying order of things
below the surface of experience, Eco warns against possible impasses that would result
if structuralism were to adopt ipso facto such views. As Eco puts it:
Oggi le scienze umane lavorano su strutture formali e usano, criticamente e non
acriticamente come il pensatore medievale, una metodologia del sincronico. Allora,
rileggere Tommaso potrà significare a un tempo individuare degli strumenti
adoperabili e individuare delle aporie già patite per evitare di patirle di nuovo. (p.258)
As this passage shows, Eco approaches scholasticism and structuralism less from the
point of view of their object than from that of the underlying assumptions that guide
their representations of reality. However, in spite of the similarities outlined in these
paragraphs, it should also be noted that Eco identifies important distinctions between
the two systems of thought. In particular, he argues that structuralism is relatively open
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to the idea that the different units constituting structures might be interchangeable.377
Scholasticism is much more essentialist on this point, and therefore much less inclined
to accept this idea of interchangeability. As Eco observes:
Nella visione strutturalista odierna la struttura come sistema mette in tensione valenze
vuote, la cui individualità si definisce solo in opposizione con le altre valenze (e
proprio per questo diventa modello astratto applicabile interdisciplinarmente a vari
fenomeni); mentre la struttura ‘culturale’ di Tommaso mette in tensione elementi
pieni, forme sostanziali. Quindi Tommaso non era un precursore dello strutturalismo.
Ma l’analogia non è solo brillante, perché mostra come di fronte a un problema
particolare (la definizione del prodotto di cultura) il filosofo lavorasse inventando
(inventando, non applicando) un modello esplicativo che, svuotato del suo contenuto,
è il modello strutturale, è cioè la possibilità di pensare un composto come sistema di
valenze. (p.261)
As illustrated by the first part of this chapter, between the first edition of Il problema
estetico in San Tommaso of 1956 and the second edition of 1970 (Il problema estetico
in Tommaso d’ Aquino), Eco develops his criticism of structuralism in various ways. As
pointed out in this section, the comparison between scholasticism and structuralism
allows Eco to creatively recast his early interest for medieval philosophy in a
subsequent phase of his intellectual itinerary. Eco’s comparison between scholasticism
and structuralism is certainly less substantial than the criticism of structuralism he
develops in La struttura essente. However, my intention was to illustrate that
intellectuals often employ creative strategies in order to address prominent theories
within the intellectual field. In the case of Eco’s comparison of scholasticism and
structuralism, I have underlined the way in which Eco also succeeds in updating his
very early interest for Thomas Aquinas within the frame of a contemporary debate on
the importance of structuralism.
In order to fully develop his theoretical view of interpretation, Eco had to define
the shortcomings of structuralism. Eco’s view of ontological structuralism as described
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in the previous sections would also lead him to insist on structuralism’s tendency to
overshadow the creative potentials of readers. As he notes in the introduction to Lector
in fabula (1979):
Ma se la scoperta dei metodi strutturali mi apriva una strada, me ne chiudeva un’altra.
Infatti era dogma corrente, in quella fase della vicenda strutturalista, che un testo
andasse studiato nella sua struttura oggettiva, quale appariva nella propria superficie
significante. L’intervento interpretativo del destinatario era messo in ombra, quando
non era decisamente espunto come impurità metodologica.378
Some years after he elaborates a thorough criticism of structuralism in the 1960s, Eco
reminds his readers of the importance that such engagement took for in his intellectual
itinerary. This stands as a further proof of the centrality of structuralism in the
development of his intellectual self-concept.379
5.4 Bourdieu and structuralism: an ambivalent relationship
On a general level, Eco’s engagement with structuralism attests to the importance that
interactions between intellectuals and particular theories have in the expression of
intellectual creativity. However different the circumstances might be, the intellectual
engagement with structuralism also plays a very important part in Bourdieu’s
intellectual itinerary. As David Swartz note, ‘Bourdieu forges his concepts as a
corrective to opposing viewpoints. His work can be read as an ongoing polemic against
positivism, empiricism, structuralism, existentialism, and grand theory.’380 Bourdieu, as
I will illustrate, forges his own conceptual approach around the idea of defining the
limits of objectivism (structuralism being a particular instance of objectivism) and
subjectivism. After explaining what Bourdieu means by objectivist and subjectivist
modes of knowledge, I will show how Bourdieu strategically employs these categories
in order to overcome these positions by means of a conceptual synthesis. As pointed out
                                                 
378 Umberto Eco, Lector in Fabula. La cooperazione interpretativa nei testi narrativi (1979), 7th edition
(Milan: Bompiani, 2000), pp.5-6.
379 The notion of intellectual self-concept is developed by Neil Gross in Richard Rorty. The Making of an
American Philosopher (Chicago: The Univeristy of Chicago Press, 2008). See especially the chapter ‘The
Theory of Intellectual Self-Concept’, pp. 234-277.
380 David Swartz, Culture and Power. The sociology of Pierre Bourdieu (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1997), p.5.
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in the previous chapters, Bourdieu proposes an approach of the social world focusing on
the dialectical interaction between individuals and social structures.
However, even if Bourdieu’s approach highlights structuralism’s tendency to
obliterate individuals’ creativity, Bourdieu still maintains, throughout his career, an
underlying commitment with structuralism. As I will point out, Bourdieu frequently
combines a substantial critique of structuralism with the employment of structuralist
topoi. In works such as La distinction (1979), Bourdieu represents society as an all-
encompassing system of signs which define themselves interdependently; this idea, as I
pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, defines the core of structuralist theory. I
will illustrate this point by analysing a chapter of La distinction in which Bourdieu
discusses the social phenomenon of life-styles and the way in which life-styles reflect
not only a social condition but also a way to think and conceive the world. If Bourdieu’s
criticism of structuralism allows him to present his theoretical position as particularly
attractive, such a strategy does not hinder him to employ a structuralist approach in a in
a number of his writings, in particular at the very beginning of his career. The next
section will further develop this point by considering ‘La maison ou le monde renversé’
(1969), one of Bourdieu’s early essays. The essay, in which Bourdieu applies
structuralist methodology, was produced before the first substantial presentation of
Bourdieu’s theoretical approach in Esquisse pour une théorie de la pratique (1972). 381
5.5 Bourdieu’s structuralist house
‘La maison ou le monde renversé’ will allow me to clearly locate a structuralist
Bourdieu in a relatively early stage of his intellectual itinerary. I will then be able to put
this early text in relation to other texts by Bourdieu, in particular those in which he
crafts his own criticism of structuralism. ‘La maison ou le monde renversé’ first
appeared in Echanges et communications. Mélanges offerts à Claude Levi-Strauss
(Mouton: 1969); it was republished, along with two other texts, as Trois etudes
d’éthnologie kabyle in Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique in 1972.382 In ‘La maison
                                                 
381 In ‘La maison ou le monde renversé’ Bourdieu takes Levi-Strauss’ structuralism as a model. Claude
Levi-Strauss is the most prominent representative of structuralist anthropology.
382 Bourdieu elaborates relatively early in his career a full-fledged conceptual system. Raymond Aron, one
of the first to fully recognize Bourdieu’s potential as a scholar, warned him against possible problems
arising from having such a “premature” conceptual system: ‘Vous êtes comme Sartre, vous avez un
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ou le monde renversé’ Bourdieu analyses the way in which the organisation of the space
within a typical Kabylian house reflects the presence of social order. As Bourdieu
suggests, the Kabylian house can be conceived as a micro-society. Beyond the purely
functional organisation, the domestic pace reproduces symbolic divisions and
organisational principles defining traditional Algerian society. The interior of the
Kabylian house, as Bourdieu illustrates, is arranged in such a way as to render
meaningful a set of  binary oppositions such as masculine and feminine, clarity and
darkness, day and night, outside and inside. According to Bourdieu, the most
fundamental of these divisions is that between masculine and feminine:
Est sans doute une des plus simples et des plus puissantes que puisse utiliser  un
système mythico-rituel puisqu’elle ne peut opposer sans unir simultanément, tout en
étant capable d’intégrer dans un ordre unique un nombre infini de données, par la
simple application indéfiniment réitérée du même principe de division. 383
Further on, Bourdieu points out how the same attribute, such as /light/, can signify
either /masculine/ or /feminine/ but that, in all cases, /masculine/ and /feminine/ remain
strictly separate. In fact, while external light signifies /masculinity/, internal light, via
the association with domesticity, signifies /femininity/. Moreover, Bourdieu’s analysis
shows how the domestic space of the Kabylian house participates in a larger symbolic
system whereby the domestic sphere, associated with femininity and privacy, opposes
the outdoor environment, traditionally associated with masculinity and with social
activity:
Microcosme organisé selon les mêmes oppositions et les mêmes homologies qui
ordonnent tout l’univers, la maison entretient une relations d’homologie avec le reste
de l’univers; mais, d’un autre point de vue, le monde de la maison pris dans son
ensemble est avec le reste du monde  dans une relation d’opposition dont les principes
                                                                                                                                    
système de concepts trop tôt’ In Pierre Bourdieu, Esquisse pour une auto-analyse (Paris!: Raison d’agir,
2004) p. 48.
383 Pierre Bourdieu, Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique précédé de Trois études d’ethnologie kabyle
(1972), 2nd edn (Paris: Seuil, 2000), p71. Page numbers in the next paragraphs in the text refer to this
edition.
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ne sont autres que ceux qui  organisent tant l’espace intérieur de la maison que le reste
du monde et, plus généralement, tous les domaines de l’existence. (p.71)
The way in which Bourdieu describes the kabylian house In ‘La maison ou le monde
renversé’ indicates that Bourdieu uses the structuralist method and approach almost à la
lettre. Against this backdrop, henceforth I will consider examples which express a less
literal application of the structuralist method. In some works, for instance, Bourdieu
recurrently employs the notion of structure without explicitly subscribing to the
structuralist method. Or, in other cases, some of Bourdieu’s texts might be informed by
a kind of structuralist method without any direct acknowledgement of it.
5.6 Bourdieu’s critique of structuralism
During the 60s Bourdieu had gained attention for his ethnographic work in Algeria. At
the time, structuralism was well established as one of most innovative theoretical
paradigms in the French intellectual world, especially thanks to Claude Levi-Strauss. As
Louis Pinto points out, Bourdieu’s early ethnographic experience has been particularly
important in defining his early intellectual itinerary:
In turning to ethnology at the end of the 1950s, the young philosopher Bourdieu
could have easily kept up the illusion of scholarly universalism, while accumulating the
external trappings of academic excellence. His work on Kabylian society would have
allowed him to expect scientific recognition, above all from the ruling authorities in the
world of anthropology. Here his study of the idea of the ‘home’(examining the
homologies between different regions of space, domestic space and the body) might be
considered exemplary as it both made use of recent structuralist theory, and drew up a
coherent program for further investigation.384
However, Bourdieu was soon to invest his own ethnographic experience into a
questioning of structuralism and of other intellectual postures enjoying relevance in the
social sciences and in philosophy. Bourdieu’s intellectual project, as Pinto argues, aims
much further than the ‘respectful subversions performed by some individuals of the
same generation’385. As Pinto indicates, Bourdieu’s theoretical propositions at the time
                                                 
384 Louis Pinto, ‘Theory in Practice’, in Richard Shusterman, Bourdieu. A Critical Reader (Malden MA:
Blackwell), 94-113, p.97.
385 Louis Pinto, ‘Theory in Practice’, p.95.
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of Esquisse pour une théorie de la pratique reveal an ambition to change not only the
way philosophical problems are formulated, but also the way in which the label
“theoretical problem” should be understood by sociologists, anthropologists and
philosophers. Certainly, the strength of Bourdieu’s position was due to his capacity to
be at the forefront of theoretical debates: as such, he was able to capitalize his fieldwork
experience as an ethnologist in Algeria, which gave a him a potential advantage over
those intellectuals of his generation that had a more orthodox intellectual formation and
a more traditional approach to philosophical problems. As Pinto notes:
Pierre Bourdieu’s enterprise seemed to strike right at the heart of philosophy itself. It
not only implied a confrontation with a concrete ‘terrain’ at a time when writers at the
forefront of philosophy were either proposing other sort of texts for examination, or
were simply looking at canonical texts in a different manner, but it also adjourned sine
die the philosophical discourse of transcendence by means of which any product
which was labelled a theoretical text would normally have been received.386
In spite of his early commitment to the structuralist method, Bourdieu’s criticism of
structuralism is a sort of theoretical topos allowing him to present his own approach as a
direct response to the limitations and the impasses inherent in the structuralism method.
As I will illustrate in the following sections, Bourdieu inaugurates a thorough criticism
of structuralism in 1972, the date of publication of Esquisse pour une théorie de la
pratique .387From Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique onwards, Bourdieu is very much
concerned with thematizing the difference between his sociological approach and what
he refers to as the objectivist approach, a category under which he subsumes theoretical
schools such as Marxism and structuralism. While Bourdieu strongly opposes the
objectivist approach of Levi- Strauss or Althusser, he is also a fervent critic of
subjectivist approaches giving exaggerated credit to the idea of the rational individual.
The argumentative strategies Bourdieu employs to conceptualize his approach
rely on the idea of that the intellectual field is divided by a very important fracture
between objectivist approaches on the one hand, and subjectivist ones on the other.
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387 For this reason, the publication of Esquisse pour une théorie de la pratique can be regarded as an
important event in Bourdieu’s intellectual itinerary.
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Bourdieu’s approach is best exemplified by what he calls the theory of practice.
Bourdieu theory of practice, as he presents it in Esquisse pour une théorie de la
pratique, offers the first thorough and systematic discussion of the concept of habitus
and of the way in which the habitus, as a conceptual tool, provides an alternative to both
objectivism and subjectivism.388As a corollary of his criticism of structuralism,
Bourdieu also questions the way in which scholarly literature represent the figure of the
ethnologist as an external agent to the culture he/she studies. Bourdieu questions the
tendency to represent the ethnologist as a spectator who stands outside of the experience
he or she describes. Bourdieu’s critical target is, as he puts it, the ‘spectateur impartial’
(p.229).
The critique of objectivism, as conducted by Bourdieu, is a critique of the
supposedly externality of the researcher vis-à-vis his or her research object. It is also,
more generally, a critique of the possibility to acquire a view of reality from which to
claim impartiality. According Bourdieu, anyone wishing to acquire any kind of
scientific knowledge should start by questioning common-sense knowledge. Following
French epistemologists like Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem, Bourdieu
thinks that there is something about ordinary common-sense that hampers the way to
scientific knowledge.389 Hence, he suggests two ways to break from the common-sense
knowledge of the social world. One way consists in adopting an intellectual posture
allowing for the establishment of a conceptual distance; however, as Bourdieu
maintains, while the deontology of critical distance prevents, in principle, from
indulging into naïvely subjective judgments, it also creates a discrepancy between the
logic that informs the world as experienced by individuals, and the representation of the
world resulting from the disciplinary frame scholars apply on social reality.390In order to
                                                 
388 On this point see for instance Deborah Reed-Danahay. Locating Bourdieu (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2005), p. 10.
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390 See the following passage: ‘ je crois que j’étais guidé par une sorte de sens théorique, mais aussi et
peut-être avant tout par le refus, assez viscéral, de la posture éthique qu’impliquait l’anthropologie
structuraliste, du rapport hautain et lointain qui s’instaurait entre le savant et son objet, c’est-à-dire les
simples profanes, à la faveur de la théorie de la pratique, explicite chez les althusseriens, qui faisaient de
l’agent un simple support (Träger) de la structure (la notion d’inconscient remplissant la mêmes fonction
chez Levi-Strauss).’. In Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Filedwork in Philosophy’, in Pierre Bourdieu, Choses dites
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avoid such a representational dilemma, Bourdieu proposes a double epistemological
break that he describes as follow:
C’est dire que l’anthropologie ne doit pas seulement rompre avec l’expérience
indigène, et la représentation indigène de cette expérience; par une seconde rupture, il
lui faut mettre en question les présupposés inhérents à la position d’observateur
étranger qui, préoccupé d’interpréter des pratiques, incline à importer dans l’objet les
principes de sa relation à l’objet, comme en témoigne le privilège qu’il accorde aux
fonctions de communication et de connaissance (…). (p.228)
In the next section I will discuss the way in which Bourdieu pursues his criticism of
structuralism within the context of a critique of the objectivist and of the subjectivist
modes of knowledge.
5.7 Three modes of knowledge of the social world
In the section of Esquisse pour une théorie de la pratique called ‘Les trois modes de
connaissance théorique’ Bourdieu maintains that there are three distinct modes of
scholarly understanding of the social world. The first mode of knowledge is the
phenomenological approach; this approach is characterized by ‘la relation de familiarité
avec l’environnement familier, appréhension du monde social comme monde naturel et
allant de soi, qui, par définition, ne se réfléchit pas et qui exclut la question de ses
propres conditions de possibilité’ (p.234). Bourdieu objects to this type of knowledge
that it does not contemplate the existence of a societal logic operating beyond subjective
understanding. The phenomenological knowledge of the social world, as Bourdieu
points out, does not allow for a possible questioning of the ‘conditions de possibilité’
that inform individual experience. In other words, the phenomenological approach does
not take into account of external factors that might not fall under direct awareness but
that might nonetheless inform our perception and our understanding of the social world.
While describing things as they “appear”, the phenomenological approach, as described
by Bourdieu, does not question how things came to be the way they are, nor wonders
whether things could be different from what they appear to be.
The second mode of knowledge described by Bourdieu is ‘la connaissance qu’on
peut appeler objectiviste’, of which structuralism is, as pointed out, a particular
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instance. This second mode of knowledge focuses on identifying objective relations
between variables (be it linguistic, cultural, social, economic, etc.) ‘qui structurent les
pratiques et les représentation des pratiques, c’est-à-dire, en particulier, la connaissance
première, pratique et tacite, du monde familier, au prix d’une rupture avec cette
connaissance première, donc avec les présupposés tacitement assumés qui confèrent au
monde social son caractère d’évidence et de naturel’ (p.234). Bourdieu points out that
objectivist knowledge, while it reveals objective relations between phenomena, it also
provides knowledge of the representational character of social practices, thus showing
the interconnectedness of social practices and symbolic representations.
By combining insights from his fieldwork experience as an ethnologist, the
intellectual resources deriving from his philosophical formation, and his knowledge of
the major debates structuring the intellectual field, Bourdieu elaborates a third mode of
knowledge which he differentiates from the objectivist and the subjectivist modes of
knowledge.391 In fact, Bourdieu interprets in an original way the foundational
intellectual debate between engagement and objectivity. In anthropology (the discipline
to which Bourdieu’s theory of practice is usually associated) this debate - particularly
acute in the first part of the 20th century - takes the shape of an opposition between the
idea of the armchair anthropologist and the idea of fieldwork. These two conceptions
are not mutually exclusive and Claude Levi-Strauss, in more than one way, offers a
synthesis of the two. However, in updating the debate Bourdieu claims that conceptual
vocabularies and research techniques that support scholarly definitions of objectivity,
instead of enhancing the understanding of the symbolic interactions between social
structures and individuals, strengthen the epistemological divide between them.392
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scientifique’. Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Fieldwork in Philosophy’, p. 18.
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Hence, Bourdieu introduces praxeological knowledge as his preferential mode of
knowledge of the social world:
La connaissance que l’on peut appeler praxéologique (et qui) a pour objet non
seulement le système de relations objectives que construit le mode de connaissance
objectiviste, mais les relations dialectiques entre ces structures objectives et les
dispositions structurées dans lesquelles elles s’actualisent et qui tendent à les
reproduire, c’est-à-dire le double processus d’intériorisation de l’extériorité et
d’extériorisation de l’intériorité. (p.235)
As Bourdieu maintains, the praxeological mode of knowledge offers an ideal synthesis
of the subjectivist and the objectivist modes of knowledge, hence avoiding the
shortcomings that characterize them. While it integrates the exploration of the limits of
both the subjectivist and the objectivist approach, praxeological knowledge explores the
view that all forms of knowledge are social constructs; moreover, this form of
knowledge explicitly addresses the question of the social, theoretical, and
methodological assumptions that inform processes of knowledge production. 393 As
noted earlier, Bourdieu’s conceptual strategies are construed in view of challenging
well-known and generally quite important theoretical positions in the intellectual
field.394 However, as I will argue in the next section, while Bourdieu intends to elaborate
his conceptual approach beyond the shortcomings which he sees as inevitable in
theoretical positions like structuralism, his intellectual vocabulary remains, arguably,
open to the influences of the very positions he criticizes. While Bourdieu claims that
this theory of the social world is more accurate than that of rival positions, his
theoretical arguments, as Swartz points out, ‘draw from a wide variety of intellectual
influences including Marxism, structuralism, phenomenology, the philosophy of science
and the classical sociological tradition’395.
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5.8 The order and the structure: society as a system
As I will point out in this section, in spite of the criticism to which it is subjected,
structuralism will continue to impregnate Bourdieu’s critical language in more than one
way. My argument will proceed by making a number of circumscribed observations on
one chapter of La distinction in which Bourdieu explores the link between lifestyles and
social positions. In La distinction Bourdieu argues that social groups such the
bourgeoisie and the classes populaires distinguish themselves from one another by
adopting different life-styles as well as by adopting different attitudes with regard to
life. Lifestyles and attitudes are part of the way in which they define their group ethos,
their social identities. As Bourdieu writes in the introductory pages of La distinction ‘on
ne sort pas du jeu la culture’; there is no way out of the game of culture. 396 As I shall
illustrate, in La distinction Bourdieu conceptualises social identity (the experience of
living in a society) within a culturally defined system of signs configured in such a way
as to produce meaningful differences and oppositions between groups that compose
society.
In particular, I am interested in exploring the following question; in what ways
has Bourdieu not gone beyond structuralism? A similar question could also be asked
about Eco’s case. When investigating Eco’s pre-semiotic work, Sangjin Park discusses
the relationship between the concrete examples Eco selects from avant-garde art, and
the terminology Eco employs to elaborate the concept of open work. 397 In particular,
Park is interested in how Eco conceptually explains a world that is traversed by
contradictions, indeterminacy, and ambiguity. How does Eco “resolve” the problem of
describing a world that resists description and conceptualisation? As pointed out, Eco’s
observations underline the constitutive openness and indeterminacy characterizing
artistic expression. However, Park wonders how far the conceptualisation of openness
and indeterminacy can be pushed, and whether subsuming the indeterminacy of artistic
expression into an explanatory frame does not imply the danger of construing a
theoretical model where, precisely, such a model ought to be avoided:
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generale.
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If ‘the open work’ tries to resolve the world, it means raising a conscious debate about
the world, whereas if semiotics tries to resolve it, it might mean nothing more than
modelling it. This is the stage at which we can criticize Eco’ semiotic devices, such as
the encyclopaedia, and the inferential walk, for their objectivist properties.398
In the case of Bourdieu, the question could be expressed as follows; can Bourdieu’s
conceptualisations be questioned on the ground that they reintroduce an objectivist
mode of knowledge that has been, supposedly, overcome? There are, it seems, various
ways to depart from structuralism, some of which might not fully implement the
criticism of structuralism shortcomings.399 While Bourdieu and Eco question, at several
levels, structuralism’s tendency to rely on representational models that are quite
systematic, don’t they also rely, at some point in their career, on conceptual models
which also happen to be quite systematic?400As Park notes: ‘if one is absorbed in
constructing a system, one may well lapse into the play of that system’.401 Is it not
precisely the fact of being a system, or model, one of the problematic characters that
Bourdieu and Eco attribute to structuralism? In introducing Bourdieu’s idea of culture,
Derek Robbins argues that:
It is one of the defining characteristic of the human condition for people to be situated
in culture. Culture is enacted by everyone. It is a game in which there are no non-
participating spectators. It is a huis clos from which no one is excluded and from
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which there is no escape. It is a self-contained phenomenological enclosure which has
no point of reference beyond or outside itself.402
In La distinction as well as elsewhere, Bourdieu defines culture as a complex and multi-
layered system that exists both under the objective form of norms and institutions and
under the subjective form of internalised knowledge. Bourdieu’s concept of habitus
precisely focuses on the presence of homologies between individual experience and
social structures. Similarly, Bourdieu maintains that there exist a number of
interconnected homologies between individuals’ positions within society, life-styles,
level of education and artistic preferences. As Bourdieu argues in ‘ L’habitus et l’espace
des styles de vie’, Chapter 3 of La distinction:
La relation qui s’établit en fait entre les caractéristiques pertinentes de la condition
économique et sociale (le volume et la structure du capital appréhendés
synchroniquement et diachroniquement) et les traits distinctifs à la position
correspondante dans l’espace des styles de vie ne devient une relation intelligible que
par la construction de l’habitus comme formule génératrice permettant de rendre
raison  à la fois des pratiques et des produits classables et des jugements, eux-mêmes
classés, qui constituent ces pratiques et ces œuvres en système de signes distinctifs
(…).403
This passage conveys the impression of an on-going circularity whereby a series of
homologies are interlinked with one another. As Bourdieu points out, social practices
are performed in accord with the habitus. The habitus, in turn, expresses the social
position that individuals occupy within society. When describing the meaning and the
relevance that life-styles acquire within society, Bourdieu recurs to formulations
revealing a “structuralist” inclination of his conceptual views. Bourdieu represents
society as an all-encompassing system in which units acquire meaning not in
themselves, but through the differences and oppositions whereby they distinguish
themselves from one another:
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Chaque condition est définie, inséparablement, par ses propriétés intrinsèques et par
les propriétés relationnelles qu’elle doit à sa position dans le système des conditions
qui est aussi un système de différences, de positions différentielles, c’est-à-dire par
tout ce qui la distingue de tout ce à quoi elle s’oppose: l’identité sociale se définit et
s’affirme dans la différence. (p.191)
As this passage shows, in spite his criticism of structuralism, Bourdieu frequently
returns to a structuralist conceptual imagery. But what is, one could ask, the role of this
conceptual imagery in Bourdieu’s view of society? Perhaps, one could argue, the
structuralist approach favours stability and order as rhetorical strategies over strategies
that emphasize instability, change, and indeterminacy.404In any case, Bourdieu’s
prolonged, and never quite broken, relationship with structuralism is apparent in his
insistent use of a structuralist conceptual imagery, such as the idea that society operates
as a system of signs. In chapter 3 of La distinction, for instance, Bourdieu approaches
the study of life-styles in the same way in which a structuralist scholar would view
linguistic systems:405
Les styles de vie sont ainsi les produits systématiques des habitus qui, perçus dans
leurs relations mutuelles selon les schèmes de l’habitus, deviennent des systèmes de
signes socialement qualifiés (comme ‘distingués’, ‘vulgaires’, etc.). (p.192)
As this passage suggests, ‘produits systématiques’, ‘relations mutuelles’, ‘systèmes de
signes socialement qualifiés’ are formulations which, orchestrated within the same
sentence, convey an underlying structuralism in a supposedly post-structuralist
Bourdieu. Moreover, the system of life-styles that Bourdieu elaborates in La distinction
seems almost perfectly self-sustained:
Toutes les pratiques et les œuvres d’un même agent sont objectivement harmonisés
entre elles, en dehors de toute recherche intentionnelle de la cohérence, et
                                                 
404 Perhaps there is something reassuring in the possibility of “controlling” the real by means of an
interpretative grid. Other approaches, such as functionalism in sociology and anthropology, also draw on
the ideas of order and stability in construing their representational models. On this point see for instance
Jean- Michel Berthelot, ‘Schèmes d’intelligibilité’ in Jean- Michel Berthelot, Sociologie. Epistémologie
d’une discipline: Textes fondamentaux (Bruxelles: De Boeck, 2000), pp. 311-317.
405 See for istance Roland Barthes, Système de la mode (1967).
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objectivement orchestrées, en dehors de toute concertation consciente, avec celles de
tous les membres de la même classe (…) (p.192)
Hence, each individual practice reveals an underlying objective logic. A systemic logic
whereby the detail of the practice, the micro-strategy behind the decision, the minimal
movement or action, fall in place within a self-orchestrated social universe. As Bourdieu
maintains by invoking the figure of an old artisan:
Chaque dimension du style de vie ‘symbolise avec’ les autres, comme disait Leibnitz,
et les symbolise: la vision du monde d’un vieil artisan ébéniste, sa manière de gérer
son budget, son temps ou son corps, son usage du langage et ses choix vestimentaires,
sont tout entier présents dans son éthique du travail scrupuleux et impeccable, du
soigné, du fignolé, du fini et son esthétique du travail pour le travail qui lui fait
mesurer la beauté de ses  produits au soin et à la patience qu’ils ont demandés. (pp.
193-194)
Each detail of the social universe is but a small element, a note in the symphony of the
social universe.
5.9 Conclusion
My discussion has shown how Bourdieu and Eco highlight structuralism’s shortcomings
in a number of different ways. Their criticism of structuralism touches upon a number
of areas such the relationship between individual agency and social structures, artistic
practice, and social communication, while engaging with questions about the value and
the limits of representational models conceptualizing reality in relation to ideas of
stability, order, and objectivity. My analysis suggests that, in spite of their criticism of
structuralism, Bourdieu and Eco never completely abandon the attractiveness that ideas
of stability, order, and objectivity offer when employed as conceptual strategies. While
informing the intellectual project of structuralism, these ideas also participate, as I will
illustrate in the next chapter, in Bourdieu’s view of the social world as well as in Eco’s
concerns for art, literature, and social communication.
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Chapter 6: Order and the Deontology of Knowledge:
Umberto Eco and Pierre Bourdieu on Interpretative Practices
and Cultural Conventions
Order: noun. 1. The arrangement or disposition of people or things according to a
particular sequence or method. A state in which everything is in its correct place. A
state in which the laws and rules regulating public behaviour are observed (…) 2.
An authoritative command or direction. A verbal or written request for something to
be made, supplied, or served. 3. a social class. A particular social, political, or
economic system. A rank in the Christian ministry, especially that of bishop, priest
or deacon. (…)Theology any of the nine grades of angelic beings in the celestial
hierarchy 4. Biology a principal taxonomic category that ranks below class and
above family 5. a society of monks, nuns or friars living under the same rule. (….)
(OED)406
«!Comme si, s’affranchissant pour une part de ses grilles linguistiques, perceptives,
pratiques, la culture appliquait sur celles-ci une grille seconde qui les neutralise, qui,
en les doublant, les font apparaître et les excluent en même temps, et se trouvait du
même coup devant l’être brut de l’ordre. C’est au nom de cet ordre que les codes du
langage, de la perception, de la pratique sont critiqués et rendus partiellement
invalides. C’est sur fond de cet ordre, tenu pour sol positif, que se bâtiront les
théories générales de l’ordonnance des choses et les interprétations qu’elle appelle.
Ainsi entre le regard déjà codé et la connaissance réflexive, il y a une région
médiane qui délivre l’ordre en son être même.!»407
6.1 Order and discourse
Order can be something one wishes for, strives towards, aims to achieve or tries to
preserve, but also something one would want to challenge and question. Social or
political order, for instance, appears as something that intellectuals like Bourdieu and
Eco show an interest in challenging, while wishing for an order based on alternative sets
of values. Figures like philosophers, critical intellectuals, or religious leaders often
embody this double standard. On the one hand, they point out the inadequacy of the
social, political or cultural order, while, on the other, they propose an alternative order.
As Michel Foucault suggests in Les mots et les choses (1966), whether on the written
                                                 
406 The list of meaning is somehow longer. However, the main meanings of the word ‘order’ addressed in
this chapter are conveyed by the list above.
407 Michel Foucault, Les mots et les choses (1966) (Paris!: Gallimard, 2005), p. 12
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page or through the spoken word, order is organized through language, which is also the
main symbolic vehicle through which intellectuals, spiritual figures, and artists make
their voice public. Before pointing to the world by means of the referential function of
language, order is shaped by coherence of argument, organization, and by the particular
way in which ideas are presented.408
As Rudolf Arnheim argues in Entropy in art. An essay on Order and Disorder
(1971), order is a state of things that renders phenomena intelligible, allowing them to
be described, discussed, and analysed:
Order is a necessary condition for anything the human mind is to understand.
Arrangements such as the layout of a city or buildings, a set of tools, a display of
merchandise, the verbal exposition of facts and ideas, or a painting or a piece of music
are called orderly when an observer or listener can grasp their overall structure in
some detail.409
As Arnheim’s passage suggests, order lies as much in the patterns whereby different
elements are arranged, as in the capacity of an observer, listener, or reader to perceive
an ‘overall structure’, while being able to identify, within this structure, meaningful
details. Similarly, when intellectuals express themselves, there needs to be a symbolic
intersection where intellectual voices converge towards a public giving resonance to
these voices. As pointed out in chapter four, intellectual engagements take place within
particular social, communicational and institutional settings. Both the academic and the
intellectual field, as sociologists like Bourdieu and Randall Collins point out, are highly
structured spaces in which schools of thought challenge each other. As such, these fields
imply norms that regulate intellectual exchange.410
                                                 
408 The discipline of rhetoric (the art of using language to communicate effectively) focuses very much on
the idea of order, organisation, control and balance in discourse. Explanatory, argumentative practices,
alongside with abstract and empirical reasoning, presenting data, challenging commonly accepted views
on a certain topic, theory or school of thought, are among the concerns of rhetoric.
409 Rudolf Arnheim, Entropy in art. An essay on Order and Disorder (1971) (London: University of
California press, 1974), p.1.
410 See Pierre Bourdieu, Les règles de l’art (Paris, Seuil, 1992) and Randall Collins, The Sociology of
Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change (Belknap: Harvard University Press, 1998)
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In this chapter I will explore the idea that it is in the lines of tension dividing
order from disorder that original intellectual discourses appear.411 Order can be viewed,
on the one hand, as a process, something that needs be attained, established. In the case
of academic, artistic and scientific discourses, order is often the result of an act of
interpretation whereby meaning is put into motion. This chapter will address the
relationship between order and interpretation from the point of view of Eco’s idea of
interpretation. It will show how interpretation is an intellectual activity necessary for
apprehending the real as well as for redefining and reshaping the boundaries of
knowledge. Once established, order can be maintained by different means. While
operating as a framework through which intellectuals organize and produce knowledge,
social order can also be reproduced through discourse and ideology. This chapter will
also examine this second, complementary, understanding of the notion of order in
relation to some of the works of Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu’s critical sociology
discusses how order infiltrates every interstice of society, from institutions and social
structures to individual practices, experiences, strategies, and expectations.
This chapter illustrates that intellectual engagement operates in accordance with
deontological norms and codes by means of which knowledge is addressed, analysed
and understood. Academics are often involved in discussions about which criteria one
should use to assess the quality of academic work and the scientific soundness of it.412
One way to address the question the reliability of knowledge is to try to understand
those intellectual processes whereby knowledge is produced and assessed. Most of these
processes revolve, by and large, around interpretative practices. As illustrated in chapter
four, Eco argues in favour of a distinction between interpretation and
overintepretation.413The first part of this chapter will further discuss Eco’s
understanding of interpretation inasmuch as it points towards the possibility to examine
practices of interpretations within academia.414 However, as Mieke Bal points out in a
                                                 
411 As Rudolf Arnheim points out ‘(a) revolution must aim at the destruction of a given order and will
succeed only by asserting an order of its own’. Rudolf Arnheim, Entropy in Art, p. 3.
412 Michèle Lamont, How Professors think. Inside the Curious World of Academic Judgment (Cambridge,
Ma: Harvard University Press, 2009).
413 See Umberto Eco, I limiti dell’interpretazione (1990), 4th edn (Milan: Bompiani, 2004).
414 In order to get an overview of the some of the main epistemological issues that have characterised the
history of sociology and philosophy of science see Jean-Michel Berthelot, Sociologie. Epistemologie
d’une discipline. Textes fondamentaux (Brussels: de Boek, 1990).
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review of I limiti dell’intepretazione, Eco’s semiotics, while focusing on interpretation
per se, often falls short in discussing how social factors might contribute in defining
interpretative models within specific cultural communities.415 Bourdieu’s works on
cultural taste and on the education system tackle precisely the question of how
intellectual engagements are embedded in social contexts.416 Bourdieu’s reflexive
sociology addresses the problem of the social conditions forming the background
against which intellectual engagement is played out.417 By reflecting on professional
practices of knowledge-making, Bourdieu marks a decisive contribution not only in the
field of sociology but also in that of philosophy, alongside thinkers such as J.L. Austin
and Ludwig Wittgenstein.418 In the second part of this chapter I will focus on some of
the works by Bourdieu that specifically address the link between social order, the
education system, and the production of knowledge. In discussing these works, I will
highlight the presence of cognitive, intellectual and deontological frameworks by means
of which knowledge is expressed and assessed. In Bourdieu’s sociology, these
frameworks have an essentially internalised dimension, which I will emphasize against
the background of Eco’s discussion of hermeneutical practices.
6.2 Reading practices and the academic field
In a few images describing an eye moving along the page, creating its own trajectory on
the surface of the text, this is how Michel de Certeau defines the act of reading:
From analyses that follow the activity of reading in its detours, drifts across the page,
metamorphoses and anamorphoses of the text produced by the travelling eye,
imaginary or meditative fights taking off from a few words, overlapping of spaces on
the militarily organised surfaces of the text, and ephemeral dances, it is at least clear,
                                                 
415 Mieke Bal, ‘The Predicament of Semiotics’, Poetics Today, vol.13, No. 3 (Atumn, 1992), pp.543-552.
416 See Pierre Bourdieu, and Jean-Claude Passeron, Les héritiers. Les étudiants et la culture (1964), 3rd
edn (Paris: Minuit, 1985); Pierre, Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, La reproduction. Eléments pour
une théorie du système d’enseignement (Paris: Minuit, 1970); Pierre, Bourdieu, Homo Academicus (Paris:
Minuit, 1984)!; Pierre Bourdieu, Méditations pascaliennes (Paris!: Seuil, 1997). These are the works that I
will discuss in this chapter.
417 See Richard Shusterman, Bourdieu. A critical Reader (Malden MA (USA). Blackwell, 1999), and
David Swartz, Culture and Power. The sociology of Pierre Bourdieu (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1997).
418For a discussion of Bourdieu’s specific contribution to the field of philosophy see the previously
referenced Richard Shusterman, Bourdieu. A Critical Reader.
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as a first result, that one cannot maintain the division separating the readable text (a
book, image etc.) from the act of reading. Whether it is a question of newspapers or
Proust, the text has a meaning only through its readers; it changes along with them; it
is ordered in accord with codes of perception that it does not control. 419
The manifold reading operations and reading tricks that Michel de Certeau enumerates
along the passage quoted might suggest, in quite an intuitive yet very precise manner,
some of the intellectual operations whereby academics come to be recognised as official
knowledge producers. Reading paradigms and techniques are fundamentally and
intrinsically bound with intellectual engagement. Academia is the very place in which
reading techniques, approaches and paradigms are discussed, analysed, and
institutionalised. In academia, reading represents a very sophisticated intellectual game,
a way through which a host of disciplinary communities claim to make knowledge
progress and strive to make contributions towards better and clearer understandings of
ourselves and of the world we live in.
‘Appropriating or reappropriating’ a text means, as de Certeau’s words suggest,
working on the flexibility of its texture by testing out possibilities for the recasting of
meaning. In academia, where reading is bound to analysing, discussing, examining, and
truth seeking, reading practices unfold as acts of reading reality.420 De Certeau’s
emphasis on reading and reading tricks draws attention to the fact that ‘one cannot
maintain the division separating the readable text (a book, image etc.) from the act of
reading’.421 Furthermore, one could argue that intellectual engagement has to be
                                                 
419 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984),
p.170.
420 The idea that a text is a metaphor of the world and that the world can be read as a text is explicitly
taken up by Eco’s semiotic projects. See for instance Umberto Eco, I limiti dell’intepretazione, p.235 and
p. 241.
421According to Michel de Certeau’s discussion of the act of reading developed in The Practice of
Everyday Life, cultural consumption has often been understood in terms of a passive public. The notion of
public, as de Certeau points out, has been neglected until the development of reader-response theory and
criticism. Accordingly, the reception of cultural messages has often been viewed as a cognitive operation
assuming that ‘“assimilating” necessarily means “becoming similar to” what one absorbs, and not
“making something similar” to what one is, making it one’s own, appropriating or reappropriating it’
Traditional theories of communication, notes de Certeau, generally assume a strict distinction between
producers and consumers, by ‘distinguish(ing) and privileg(ing) authors, educators, revolutionaries, in a
word “producers”, in contrast with those who do not produce’. In Michel de Certeau, The Practice of
Everyday Life, p.166. For these reasons, consumption was often identified as the passive end of the
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orchestrated, organised around norms of communication; converging and dissenting
voices have to be in accord with particular discursive practices. As De Certeau notes, a
text ‘is ordered in accord with codes of perception that it does not control’. (p.170) De
Certeau’s assertion poses a certain number of questions regarding the presence of codes
of perception orienting the experience of reading. It is not implausible to posit that these
‘codes of perception that (the text) does not control’ might in fact operate according to
cultural codes that, while allowing the emergence of a fully articulated experience of
reading, might also revolve around a certain idea of order. As Arnheim notes:
Order makes it possible to focus on what is alike and what is different, what belongs
together and what is segregated. When nothing superfluous is included and nothing
indispensable left out, one can understand the interrelation of the whole and its part, as
well as the hierarchic scale of importance and power by which some structural
features are dominant, other subordinate.422
As Eco argues in I limiti dell’intepretazione (1990), the reader is relatively free to
wonder on the written page in search for multiple layers of interpretations, for different
ways to arrange the semantic units within the text. However, this does not make every
interpretation as valuable as any other. As Eco points out, ‘se un testo è potenzialemente
senza fine non significa che ogni atto di intepretazione possa evere un lieto fine’.423 As
pointed out in chapter four, Eco envisages interpretation as a symbolic interaction
between texts configured in a certain way, and readers possessing a degree of
competence not only about these texts, but also about the world. While being essential
to the production of knowledge, interpretative techniques employed by academic
communities may become, at times, object of debate and controversy. Eco’s discussion
of ‘la deriva ermetica’ in I limiti dell’intepretazione suggests precisely this possibility.
In particular, Eco’s distinction between hermetic semiosis and Pierce’s notion of
unlimited semiosis offers a possible framework within which to address interpretative
                                                                                                                                    
spectrum of social communication. Reading, in de Certeau, becomes an active process in the
communication process, and the reader becomes a cultural operator who creates his or her own text.
422 Rudolf Arnheim. Entropy in art, p.1.
423 Umberto Eco, I limiti dell’intepretazione, p.14.
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techniques commonly used in academia.424By referring to the interdependent
reactiveness of signs, both hermetic semiosis and unlimited semiosis indicate a process
whereby meaning is put in motion by the interplay of different signs. As Eco suggests,
while Peirce’s unlimited semiosis is, ultimately, an oriented process, hermetic semiosis
is subject to rather ‘random’ associations between signs:
Sembra così che la semiosi ermetica identifichi ogni testo, così come nel Grande Testo
del Mondo, la Pienezza del Significato, non la sua assenza. Nonostante ciò, questo
mondo invaso dalle segnature, e governato dal principio della significanza universale,
dava luogo a effetti di continuo slittamento e differimento di ogni possibile significato.
Infatti, posto che il significato di una parola o di una data cosa non erano che un’altra
parola o un’altra cosa, qualsiasi cosa fosse detta non era che un’allusione ambigua a
qualcos’altro. Il significato di un testo veniva così sempre posposto, e il significato
finale non poteva che essere un segreto inattingibile.425
According to Eco, interpretation rests on a process whereby knowledge is expanded.
Unlimited semiosis, as Eco understand it, operates through a selection of potential
meanings which are defined against the background of a world constituted by and large
through cultural conventions. Similarly, intellectual engagement occurs within the frame
of intellectual practices requiring norms regulating the exchange of ideas. Such norms
can be used to identify differences between similar ideas, or in order to advocate a
higher degree of pertinence of an argument over another.
As I shall illustrate in this section and in the next, Peirce’s theory of signs is
crucial in understanding Eco’s semiotic project, in that it allows Eco to capitalize on the
tension between order and unpredictability. As Louis Menand points out in The
Metaphisical Club, Peirce theory of signs implies the representational character of
signs:
Peirce thought that our representations can be classified, filled out, and elaborated in
all sorts of ways, that they can even become ‘better’, in the sense of ‘more useful’, as
                                                 
424 In line with his historical approach, Eco discusses a variety of interpretative traditions and paradigms,
thus making his approach to reading, reading strategies and interpretative tactics all the more pertinent.
425 Umberto Eco, I limiti dell’interpretazione, p.326.
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we peel off their metaphysical husks. But we can never (as individuals) say that they
are identical to their objects.426
As Menand points out, for Peirce there is no reality outside the web of signs through
which we experience the world, since reality itself is made up of signs: ‘the distinctive
feature of Peirce’s theory of signs (…) (is that) there are no prerepresentational objects
out there. Things are themselves signs: their being sign is a condition of their being
things at all’.427 In the continuously generated chains of signs, everything is filled with,
or expected to be filled with meaning. For Peirce it is not possible to clearly distinguish
between the possibility of knowing something “out there” and the semiotic processes
whereby we interpret reality, in that reality is itself an act of interpretation. As Menand
points out, ‘for Peirce, knowing was inseparable from what he called semiosis, the
making of signs, and of the making of signs there is no end’.428 Furthermore, Peirce’s
theory of signs encapsulates a whole epistemic view of the universe that openly
challenges deterministic views based on straightforward relations of causality. As
Menand notes, in Peirce’s theory of signs ‘(t)he problem boils down to this question:
What does it mean to say that a statement is “true” is a world always susceptible to “a
certain swerving”?’429 Truth is, for Peirce, something that emerges within an interplay of
signs that is not predetermined, but open to unpredictability. However, as I will point
out, unpredictability can be examined in relation to a field informed by social and
cultural conventions.
6.3 Peirce’s theory of signs and Eco’s encyclopaedia
Interpretation, as Eco maintains, operates on a map of knowledge that is not only
defined by the agenda of the reader. It is also matter of a system of culturally defined
conventions. As pointed out in the previous section, in I limiti dell’intepretazione Eco
establishes an important distinction between what he calls hermetic semiosis, a notion
which he often uses in relation to the idea of overinterpreting texts, and unlimited
                                                 
426 Louis Menand, The metaphysical Club (London: Flamingo, 2002), p.364.
427Louis Menand, The metaphysical Club, p.364.
428 Louis Menand, The metaphysical Club, p.364.
429 Louis Menand, The metaphysical Club, p. 223.
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semiosis, a notion that Eco derives from Charles Peirce.430 Peirce conceives of the
relation between signs in such a way that one sign is represented by another sign, which
in turn gives rise to another representing sign. Moreover, Pierce’s theory of signs
revolves around three interdependent elements: the object, the representantem and the
interpretant. As the SEP indicates:
In Peirce’s theory the sign relation is a triadic relation that is a special species of the
genus: the representing relation. Whenever the representing relation has an instance,
we find one thing (the ‘object’) being represented by (or: in) another thing (the
‘representantem’) to (or:in) a third thing (the ‘interpretant’); moreover, the object is
represented by the representantem in such a way that the intepretant is thereby
‘determined’ to be also a representantem of the object yet to another interpretant. That
is to say, the interpretant stands in the representing relation to the same object
represented by the original representantem, and thus represents it to yet another
interpretant.431
While Peirce’s chain of signs might be virtually endless, one might start wondering
whether there is a logic that governs the shifting of signs.
In order to address this question I shall turn again to Peirce’s and Eco’s
understanding of the notion of sign. As pointed out above, a sign is something that
stands for something else. This is true for Peirce as well as for Charles Morris whose
definition of sign is often taken to be a foundational definition for practitioners of
semiotics. As Eco maintains, such an understanding implies the presence of an
interpreter who makes the transaction from the sign to its interpretation possible.432 A
sign can be defined as such insofar as it means something to/for someone. Peirce’s
unlimited semiosis reflects the continuous interrelation between signs and their
interpreters. As Menand notes, the meaning of Peirce’s signs is by their very nature
                                                 
430 See my discussion of Umberto Eco, Interpretation and Overinterpretation. With Richard Rorty,
Jonathan Culler, Christine Brooke-Rose, ed. by Stefan Collini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992) in chapter four.
431 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce/, p. 17. Consulted on 13/01/2010.
432 Umberto Eco, Trattato de semiotica generale (1975) 19th edn (Milan: Bompiani, 2008), pp. 26-28.
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changing and unstable, as a sign is already oriented towards other signs. As Eco puts it
in Semiotica e filosofia del linguaggio (1984):
Non c’è modo, nel processo di semiosi illimitata che Peirce descrive e fonda, di
stabilire il significato di una espressione, e cioè di interpretare quella espressione, se
non traducendola in altri segni (appartengano essi o no allo stesso sistema semiotico)
e in modo che l’interpretante non solo renda ragione dell’interpretato sotto qualche
aspetto, ma dell’intepretato faccia conoscere qualcosa in più.433
In drawing from Peirce’s theory of signs, Eco discusses the notion of unlimited semiosis
within the context of his own personal semiotic investigations. From Trattato di
semiotica generale (1975) onwards, Eco often refers to the distinction between
dictionary and encyclopaedic definitions of signs. In Semiotica e filosofia del
linguaggio, he defines the notion of encyclopaedia as:
L’insieme registrato di tutte le interpretazioni, concepibile oggettivamente come la
libreria delle librerie, dove una libreria è anche l’archivio di tutta l’informazione non
verbale in qualche modo registrata, dalle pitture rupestri alle cineteche.434
The notion of encyclopaedia is a powerful model for knowledge that refers to what we
know about the world at any given time. Historically speaking, one of the most relevant
and perhaps the most illustrious example of encyclopaedia that springs to mind is the
Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des Sciences, des Arts, et des Métiers (1751-65)
edited by Diderot and D’Alambert. Diderot’s and D’Alambert’s endeavour produced a
powerful vehicle for communicating the most advanced practical, philosophical and
scientific knowledge, thus creating a new readership which brought about ‘the ideal of
transposable knowledge across national boundaries, with individuals of whatever social
status able to participate in a universal conversation’.435
In his semiotic investigations, Eco links the vast territories of knowledge
suggested by the encyclopaedia to localised acts of interpretations practiced on
                                                 
433 U. Eco, Semiotica e filosofia del linguaggio (1984) (Turin: Einaudi, 1997), pp.107-108.
434 U. Eco, Semiotica e filosofia del linguaggio, p.109.
435 Mike Feartherstone and Couze Venn, ‘Problematizing Global Knowledge and the New Encyclopaedia
project’, in Theory, Culture and Society (Sage Publications: London), 2006, vol. 23(2-3), pp.1-20, p.6.
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particular texts, words, visual objects, etc. In so doing, he refers to the idea that texts
and other cultural supports are portions of an encyclopaedia; a given text or cultural
support is part of a network of many texts and cultural supports that confer meaning to
each other.436 Differently from the encyclopaedia, the dictionary, as a model for
knowledge, is much more restrictive and contains a limited amount of information.437 As
Mike Feartherstone and Couze Venn observe, ‘(a)n encyclopaedia is a flexible type of
ordering somewhere between a system and a list. Many of the entries refer to each other
in a coherent way and could be extracted to reconstruct a systematic disciplinary order,
such as, for example, the discipline of physics’438. Featherstone and Venn emphasize, as
Eco does, the essential flexibility allowed by the ordering operated by the
encyclopaedia. Similarly, the encyclopaedia allows for the definition of particular areas
of knowledge, as in the case of academic disciplines. However, according to Eco, a
particular portion of encyclopaedia remains only virtually mapped out as long as it is
not actualized by the concrete intervention of a reading act performed by an individual.
From Eco’s perspective, the idea of encyclopaedia acquires relevance mainly
against the background interpretative intentions that link particular portions of a text to
other texts and thus to a larger constellation of meaning. Or, to put it in other words, the
macro-territory covered by the encyclopaedia cannot be dissociated from the micro-
territory highlighted by a concrete interpretative act. In light of this, Eco’s
understanding of the notion of encyclopaedia can be discussed as:
Un’ipotesi regolativa in base alla quale, in occasione di un’interpretazione di un testo
(sia esso una conversazione all’angolo della strada o la Bibbia), il destinarario decide
                                                 
436 According to this understanding, the encyclopaedia virtually contains the totality of the information
about texts, including the way in which these texts are related to one another.
437 For the word ‘structuralism’, for instance, the dictionary would register the meaning of the term by
mentioning that the word designates a theoretical school particularly relevant in the field of humanities in
the sixties. The encyclopaedia would include a lot more information about the history of structuralism; it
would contemplate the different contexts in which the word structure or structuralism has been referred
to, and would hint at the different meanings that the word structuralism assumes in these different
contexts. In other words, an encyclopaedic account of structuralism would encompass the repertoire of
contexts in which the word appears as well the uses of the term in these different contexts.
438 Mike Feartherstone and Couze Venn, ‘Problematizing Global Knowledge and the New Encyclopaedia
project’, p.5.
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di costruire una porzione di enciclopedia concreta che gli consenta di assegnare al
testo o all’emittente una serie di competenze semantiche.439
In this instance, Eco employs the notion of encyclopaedia to describe the process
whereby a text gets contextualized, through an act of interpretation, within the
intertextual matrix comprising other texts to which the first text indirectly or directly
refers. In this respect, Eco’s use of the notion of encyclopaedia as ‘ipotesi regolativa’
draws attention to the movements and shifts occurring on the surface of the map of
knowledge in virtue of which links are drawn, resemblances constituted, and
correspondences between texts established; Eco leaves these movements and shifts to
the competences of the readers and to the interpretative actions they perform on the
written page. In this sense, Eco’s understanding of the encyclopaedia, by underlining
the importance of localised acts of interpretations and by emphasising, to use de
Certeau’s words, the importance of ‘detours, drifts across the page, metamorphoses and
anamorphoses of the text produced by the traveling eye’440, recasts the traditional idea of
encyclopaedia. From a taxonomic device creating order through an alphabetical grid, as
the traditional models of Diderot and D’Alambert’s suggest, Eco turns the idea of
encyclopaedia into a more dynamic and less predictable notion that ‘contempla anche
interpretazioni contradditorie’.441 Eco’s implicit model of encyclopaedia resembles less
a carefully and linearly ordered tree than a rhizomatic structure of the type suggested by
Gilles Deleuze.442 As Featherstone and Venn point out:
According to Eco, the encyclopaedia, contrary to Enlightenment thinkers, does not
reflect an ordered universe in a univocal and rational way, but supplies rules which are
generally myopic and only agree with some provisional criterion of order. In effect,
encyclopaedias attempt to give meaning to a disordered world whose criteria of order
escape us. This contrasts with the type of order produced by the dictionary, which
works to register the properties of words in a succinct manner. Encyclopedic
                                                 
439 Umberto Eco, Semiotica e filosofia del linguaggio, p.111.
440 Michel de Certeau, The Practise of Everyday Life, p.170.
441Umberto Eco, Semiotica e filosofia del linguaggio, p. 109.
442 Umberto Eco, Semiotica e filosofia del linguaggio, p.112.
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competence, on the contrary, excludes the possibility of hierarchizing the semantic
marks, the linguistic properties and the seme in a single, uncontroversial way in its
endeavour to map the life of a culture as a system of inter-semiotic systems.443
Eco’s understanding of the encyclopaedia as a model for global knowledge underscores,
as Peirce’s unlimited semiosis does, the unpredictability of meaning and interpretation.
In the last two sections, I started by pointing out how Eco’s understanding of
interpretative practices underscores a distinction between interpretation and
overintepretation. From the perspective of this distinction, Eco’s discussion of
interpretation can be examined against the background of an epistemological tradition
of philosophers and sociologists of science who raised the question of how scientists
determine the validity of knowledge. In fact, Eco applies to the domain of textual
interpretation Karl Popper’s idea that a theory can be considered truly scientific only
inasmuch as one can prove that it is falsifiable. From Popper’s perspective not every
theory applies to such criteria as falsifiability, but only those who are enunciated
through formal strategies that can undergo experimental validation.444 Similarly, as
suggested in chapter four, Eco tests different interpretations and different readings
against the principle of textual validation as well as against the wider reservoir of
knowledge of cultural encyclopaedias. In so doing, he draws a line between
interpretations that are confirmed by textual coherence and those which, by relying
solely on the free play of hermetic semiosis, do not appear to be good candidates for
textual validation. However, as I pointed out in the discussion of Peirce’s theory of
signs and in the case of Eco’s understanding of the encyclopaedia as a model for
knowledge, interpretation can also be understood as a much more fluid, unpredictable,
and unstable process. While Eco’s distinction between interpretation and
overinterpretation suggests a useful framework for the validation of knowledge, Eco’s
discussion of Pierce offers a complementary and more dynamic view of interpretative
practices which suggest that coherence of meaning is an open process rather than a
state.
                                                 
443 Mike Feartherstone and Couze Venn, ‘Problematizing Global Knowledge and the New Encyclopaedia
project’, p.9.
444 See Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1934) (New York: Basic Books, 1959).
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6.4 Interpretation, academic judgment, and social background
The idea that interpretations should be, ideally, corroborated by specific hermeneutical
criteria, is not only a central concern for Eco, but it is also paramount to academic
communities. As Michèle Lamont points out in How Professors Think, when academics
are asked to justify their own assessment, it becomes possible to discern criteria which
inform academic judgment.445 However, while criteria of academic judgement are often
employed as part of an argument to support or justify assessments, they are much less
often employed in order to raise questions about the very conditions that make academic
assessments possible. Against this backdrop, Lamont’s work addresses the relationship
between disciplinary cultures and academic judgment. By showing that the way in
which academic judgment works is not monolithic, Lamont points out that there is a
degree of variation in the self-conceptions, images and understandings of the figure of
the researcher and of research practices across disciplines. Lamont’s work addresses the
multiple ways in which researchers approach knowledge and perform the role of
gatekeepers of disciplinary communities.
Criteria of academic judgement constitute a framework for elaborating different
and often diverse judgments. They also allow for a considerable saving of resources in a
context, that of academia, where the striving for balance between quality, quantity and
time often produces highly stressful situations and a considerable pressure in order to
meet both internal and external demands.446Lamont’s work shows that criteria that
inform academic judgement often operate at a rather implicit level. Nevertheless, while
they orient the way in which academics weight their assessments, these criteria also
ensure that academic judgements are regarded as coherent, credible and reasonable.
Since they operate on a long-term basis, criteria of academic judgment are often quite
routinized. For this reason, it is plausible to think that they have been sufficiently
                                                 
445 Michèle Lamont, How Professors Think. Inside the Curious World of Academic Judgment. Lamont’s
work focuses on the peer-reviews done on research proposals; such reviews are generally kept strictly
confidential. Beyond the particular example of the research proposals, Lamont’s analysis focuses on some
general aspects defining academic disciplines.
446 Whether the conditions fostered in the last few decades by the model of the global university have
produced a more stimulating intellectual environment is all but obvious. Quite on the contrary, critical
thinkers like Frank Furedi lament a deterioration of the traditional values that ensured that academia
remained a highly stimulating intellectual environment without directly depending upon market demands.
See Frank Furedi, Where have all the intellectuals gone?, 2nd edn (London: Continuum, 2006).
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internalized by individuals so that they readily operate as interpretative grids allowing
one to read a situation in ways which disciplinary communities view as appropriate.
Until now, I have observed how interpretative practises, as Eco understands
them, are generative rather than static or predetermined. From this perspective, the
establishment of knowledge is the result of formal strategies by means of which
meaningful symbols are arranged in relation to cultural codes. In the rest of my
discussion, I will raise the question of how such codes operate once they have been
internalised. More specifically, I will tackle the problem of how perception of reality
might in fact result from the existence of cultural conventions through which
individuals organize reality as coherent narratives.
6.5 Education, culture, and cognitive frameworks
As I have pointed out in different parts of this study, from early on in his career
Bourdieu is interested in finding a conceptual language to account for how individual
experience relates to the collective dimension of society. In particular, Bourdieu is
interested in how the concept of habitus can account for this relation. Bourdieu argues
that individual experience relates to the acquisition of socially acquired perceptive
categories through which individuals make sense of their place in the social universe.
As illustrated, the acquisition of these perceptive categories comes as a result of a long
process of socialisation by means of which individuals come to be exposed, more or less
recurrently, to situations or social milieus that are likely to have a long-lasting influence
on their social identity. Following the formative experience of his ethnological
fieldwork in Algeria, Bourdieu elaborates a full-fledged theory of practice that
underlines how the social background also informs, in many ways, scholarly approaches
to knowledge. 447
Even before elaborating his theory of practice, Bourdieu had produced, along
with some fellow sociologists, Un art Moyen (1965), a work in which he clearly
articulates an account of how individuals express aesthetic taste through the practice of
photography. Bourdieu elaborates a study of the social uses of photography at a moment
in which photography has not yet emerged as a fully recognised artistic practice.
                                                 
447 See my discussion of Pierre Bourdieu, Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique précédé de Trois études
d’ethnologie kabyle (1972), 2nd edn (Paris: Seuil, 2000) in chapter four.
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However, photography is of particular interest for Bourdieu, in that it shows how
appreciations and definitions of the category of the aesthetic vary across social groups.
Supported by empirical cases, Bourdieu illustrates an important distinction between a
relatively small group of individuals practicing photography as a way to express an
artistic interest, and large group who, without associating the practice of photography to
artistic intentions, practice photography as a means to document salient moments of
their life. Bourdieu argues that social background, and the position individuals occupy
in social space, are likely to influence their receptivity to potentially artistic uses of
photography. Interestingly, Bourdieu observes how a great number of individuals
engage in reproducing the dominant social perceptions of photography whereby certain
situations (like a marriage) make a much better photographic subject than other settings
falling outside highly ritualized social situations.448
The empirical research carried out in Un art Moyen is indicative of how
Bourdieu became familiar, throughout his fieldwork experience in Algeria, with
research techniques that he readily applied in his first important works on cultural and
artistic practices like photography but also, more importantly, in several studies on the
French education system. In La reproduction. Eléments pour une théorie du système
d’enseignement (1970) Bourdieu and fellow sociologist Jean-Claude Passeron expand
on some of the considerations developed in some of their previous studies by integrating
them within a theory of education.449The academic system, as the two sociologists
already argued in Les héritiers. Les étudiants et la culture (1964) favours a particular
approach to culture by encouraging certain ways of manipulating  symbols (as in
abstract thinking or in argumentative strategies for instance), while disqualifying
approaches regarded as less legitimate by the gatekeepers of official culture (professors
and those employed by the education system). 450
Supported by empirical data, Bourdieu and Passeron observe important
correlations between the cultural capital possessed by students, and their chances of
                                                 
448 Pierre Bourdieu, ed., Un art moyen. Essai sur les usages sociaux de la photographie (1965), 2nd edn
(Paris: Minuit, 1993).
449Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, La reproduction. Eléments pour une théorie du système
d’enseignement (Paris: Minuit, 1970).
450 See especially Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, Les héritiers. Les étudiants et la culture
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achieving excellence in their academic programs. As the two sociologists argue,
linguistic capital (a particular form of cultural capital), is highly correlated to academic
distinction, particularly in fields such as humanities. Linguistic capital indicates not
only linguistic capabilities but, more broadly, the presence of intellectual and cognitive
ones. As Bourdieu and Passeron point out:
Le style reste toujours pris en compte, implicitement ou explicitement, à tous les
niveaux du cursus et, bien qu’à des degrés divers, dans toutes les carrières
universitaires, même scientifiques. Plus, la langue n’est pas seulement un instrument
de communication, mais elle fournit, outre un vocabulaire plus ou moins riche, un
système de catégories plus ou moins complexe, en sorte que l’aptitude au
déchiffrement et à la manipulation de structures complexes, qu’elles soient logiques
ou esthétiques, dépend pour une part de la complexité de la langue transmise par la
famille.451
Linguistic capital, as described in this passage, is related to the mastering of ‘un
système de catégories plus ou moins complexes’ providing the conditions to enjoy
specific aesthetic experiences and also, seemingly, particular techniques of reasoning
which come to be viewed as privileged forms of logical thinking by the education
system.452
In Homo academicus (1984) Bourdieu further develops his criticism of the
education system by providing a description of the university system by means of the
concept of field. Homo academicus is a study about the French university system
around 1968, largely conceived to illustrate, support and analyse data gathered from
sociological research and already presented in their previous publications. The book
seeks to analyse how the dramatic increase in the number of students in ’68 France
created the possibility to remap the field of knowledge by introducing, among other
                                                 
451 Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, La reproduction, p.92.
452 According to the empirical studies conducted by Bourdieu and Passeron, the knowledge of Latin and
Greek, and the historical heritage associated with such languages, come to be seen as a sign of social
distinction conferring an aura of intellectual charisma. Students who demonstrate proficiency in Latin and
Greek and following certain academic careers, such as literary studies, also appear to satisfy more readily
the expectations of their professors. See Pierre Bourdieu and Jean Claude Passeron, La reproduction,
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things, new disciplines in the university. However, as Bourdieu maintains, in spite of
the increase in the number of students, some of the hierarchical structures of the
university have remained intact. With arguments similar to those used in his previous
studies about education and culture, Bourdieu illustrates how the social background of
students, and their degree of mastering of particular cultural codes, enhance either the
motivational stirring or the frustration they experience with regards to the education
system. The academic system, the argument goes, privileges a specific type of symbolic
capital, which is also the type of capital that students from socially and economically
privileged families are likely to possess.453
6.6 Academic field and deontology of knowledge
In Homo academicus, Bourdieu places the academic field between the economic field
and the artistic field. The economic field, consisting mainly of the industry and the
commerce, is where traditionally money and material resources are concentrated,
whereas the artistic field is much more based on cultural capital. The academic field
occupies an intermediate position between them; while it is often “dominated” by the
economic power, it also enjoys some privileges with regards to the artistic field:
En tant que ‘capacités’, dont la position dans l’espace social repose principalement sur
la possession de capital culturel, espèce dominée de capital, les professeurs
d’université se situent plutôt du côté du pôle dominé du champ du pouvoir et
s’opposent nettement sous ce rapport aux patrons de l’industrie et du commerce. Mais,
en tant que détenteurs d’une forme institutionnalisée de capital culturel, qui leur assure
une carrière bureaucratique et des revenus réguliers, ils s’opposent aux écrivains et
aux artistes.454
As Bourdieu argues, different social fields tend to attract different types of symbolic
capital. University professors, for instance, like artists and writers, possess a lot of
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454 Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus (Paris: Minuit, 1984), p. 55.Page numbers in the text in the next
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cultural capital recognised institutionally. But unlike many writers and artists, they often
enjoy a fixed salary and their professional role is carried out within specific institutional
settings such as universities or research centres. If its position within the social space is
characterized by a number of relations to other fields (such as the artistic or the
economic field), the academic field also enjoys a relative autonomy from neighbouring
fields. However, despite this relative autonomy, Bourdieu points out that some faculties
recognize a more immediate application of their knowledge into the world of business,
while others rely on a more research oriented paradigm:
Les mots communs, recherche, enseignement, direction de laboratoire, etc., recouvrent
des réalités profondément différentes, et sont sans doutes d’autant plus trompeurs
aujourd’hui que la diffusion du modèle scientifique, sous les effets combinés de la
mode et des contraintes homogénéisantes de l’administration de la recherche, ont
conduit l’ensemble des membres de l’enseignement supérieur à rendre cet hommage
obligé à la science qu’est l’emploi d’un langage emprunté aux sciences de la nature
pour designer des réalités souvent très éloignés des choses de la science (je pense par
exemple à la notion de laboratoire).(p.77)
As Bourdieu notes, writing and argumentative styles also express different ideas of
knowledge. In some disciplines one might find a preference for one writing style over
another:
En fait, les prises de positions dans l’espace des styles correspondent étroitement aux
positions dans le champ universitaire. (…) Si les géographes et les sociologues ont en
commun de montrer plus d’indifférence envers les qualités littéraires, les premiers
manifestent l’humilité des dispositions qui conviennent à leur position en prenant le
parti du style neutre qui est l’équivalent dans l’ordre de l’expression de l’abdication
empiriste à laquelle ils se résignent la plupart du temps. Quant aux sociologues, ils
trahissent souvent leur prétention à l’hégémonie (inscrite dès l’origine dans la
classification comptiste des sciences) en empruntant alternativement ou simultanément
aux rhétoriques les plus puissantes dans les deux champs par rapport auxquels ils sont
obligés de se situer, celle de la mathématique, souvent utilisée comme signe extérieur
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de scientificité, ou celle de la philosophie, souvent réduite à des effets de lexique. (pp.
45-46)
Some disciplines are more inclined to value literary and artistic experiences, while
others have a more immediate, pragmatic, and interested relationship to knowledge and
knowledge practices.
From the development of his theory of practice in the early 70s, Bourdieu relies
more systematically on concepts such as field, habitus, and logic of practice to examine
intellectual and artistic practices. As I have pointed out in the previous chapter,
Bourdieu’s commitment to developing his theory of practice also leads him to formulate
a criticism of the deontology of critical distance adopted by academic disciplines such
as anthropology or philosophy. In fact Bourdieu will often critically address the very
notion of reason that informs scholarly practices of knowledge. As Richard Shusterman
notes, Bourdieu, by linking the notion of practical reason to the concept of habitus,
suggests the internalised dimension of practical reason:
Practical reason requires the idea of regulative norms and conscious rules that the non-
reflective, anti-intellectualistic notion of habitus aims to supplant. By making habitus’
essential logic of practice unreflective, Bourdieu denies the ability of practicing agents
to critique, reinterpret, and thereby revise their practical logic and behaviour, thus
compelling them to sustain the social domination incorporated in the habitus that
allegedly directs their practical reasoning.455
As this passage illustrates, for Bourdieu the habitus is so deeply internalised that it
operates beyond individuals’ conscious intentions. Bourdieu defines ‘practical
reasoning’ as combining cognition and action; thereby he regards practices of
knowledge as stemming  from practical activities as much as from intellectual
frameworks defining norms of scientificity.456 By emphasizing aspects of intellectual
work that, because highly routinized, are often taken for granted, Bourdieu’s theory of
                                                 
455 Richard Shusterman, ed., Bourdieu. A Critical Reader, pp.6-7.
456See in particular Pierre Bourdieu, Science de la science et réflexivité (Paris!: Raisons d’ Agir, 2001) as
an example of Bourdieu’s contribution to sociology of science.
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intellectual practices clearly draws attention to the normative component that orient
intellectual and scholarly enquiry.
As this study has illustrated, intellectual creativity involves questioning,
challenging, and sometimes transgressing disciplinary boundaries. 457 If there is an
academic discipline that Bourdieu has admittedly challenged while remaining closely
attached to it, to its tradition and to its spirit, it is certainly philosophy. In Méditations
Pascaliennes (1997) Bourdieu develops a criticism of the intellectual posture
characterizing academic philosophy. Bourdieu’s sociology of the academic field
purports to cast a critical gaze on the limits and boundaries of the academic discourse.
As Shusterman notes:
Bourdieu’s  metaphilosophical project of tracing philosophy’s limits is advanced by
his very practice of going outside philosophy’s conventional limits (as if to view them
from the outside) in pursuing his theoretical inquiries through  the methods of
sociology and anthropology.458
When analysing the deontology of professional philosophers in Méditations
Pascaliennes Bourdieu adopts the metaphor of the game. As Bourdieu maintains,
individuals dispose of a sense of the game under the form of internalised schemes of
action and cognition (i.e. the habitus); their sense of the game allows them to adopt
social strategies which reveal their adaptability to both predictable and unpredictable
situations. Just like the habitus, the sense of the game is internalised and embodied, and
it operates in conjunction with social conventions defining the field:
La logique spécifique du champ s’institue à l’état incorporé sous la forme d’un habitus
spécifique, ou, plus précisément, d’un sens du jeu, ordinairement désigné comme un
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‘esprit’ ou un ‘sens’ (‘philosophique’, ‘littéraire’, ‘artistique’, etc.) qui n’est
pratiquement jamais posé ni imposé de manière explicite.459
When individuals intend to be part of particular fields, Bourdieu argues, they might
experience either a degree of empathy with the field or a feeling of misplacement due to
the lack of convergence between the way in which the field is structured and their
psychological or intellectual dispositions. When individuals are successfully integrated
within a field, this is generally due, as Bourdieu points out, to the long social
apprenticing during which they incorporate a particular type of savoir faire which
happens to be fostered by the field they enter.
In the pages of Médiations pascaliennes Bourdieu underscores the relation
between institutional configurations and the intellectual dispositions that individuals
develop over time. As pointed out, Bourdieu argues that cognitive and intellectual
dispositions individuals acquire along their biographical itinerary allow them not only to
be successful within the field of their choice, but also to experience a feeling of self-
satisfaction deriving from playing an active and self-rewarding role in this field.460 For
Bourdieu the social role of the professional philosopher is defined in terms of a socially
acquired intellectual posture as much as by an attitude towards life in general. As
Bourdieu point out:
La situation scolastique (dont l’ordre scolaire représente la forme institutionnalisée)
est un lieu et un moment d’apesanteur sociale où, défiant l’alternative commune entre
jouer (paizein) et être sérieux (spoudazein), on peut jouer sérieusement (spoudaiôs
paizein), comme dit Platon pour caractériser l’activité philosophique, prendre aux
sérieux des enjeux ludiques, s’occuper sérieusement de questions qu’ignorent les gens
sérieux, simplement occupés et préoccupés par les affaires pratiques de l’existence
ordinaire. (p.28)
                                                 
459 Pierre Bourdieu, Méditations pascaliennes (1997), 2nd edn (Paris: Seuil, 2003), p.25. Page numbers in
the text in the next paragraphs refer to this edition.
460 See also Randall Collins’s notion of emotional energy as developed in The Sociology of Philosophies
in order to account for the energy that intellectuals receive from successfully participating to debates
within academia.
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The professional posture of the philosopher, his or her relationship with knowledge and
material culture, as Bourdieu points out, is not based on pure material necessity, but
presupposes the possibility of playfully engaging with ideas. This playful relationship
would not be possible without the leisure to adopt a detached stance at things; but such
opportunity is not often given to someone who would live under the sole obligation of
‘les affaires pratiques de l’existence ordinaire’. Bourdieu points out that ‘il faut (donc)
rapporter les différents espèces de “worldmaking” aux conditions économiques et
sociales qui les rendent possibles’ (p.32). Historically speaking, the disciplinary
framework of contemporary philosophy has emerged gradually within the process of the
autonomisation of disciplinary territories within the academic field. As Bourdieu
argues, a feature of this historical development is the opposition between the intellect,
seen as a privileged instrument of knowledge, and the body.
6.7 Bourdieu’s self-reflexive epistemology
Bourdieu contends that the social factors impacting upon the conception and the
production of knowledge can be transformed, by the self-reflexive gaze of the
researcher, into occasions to refine (and perhaps redefine) disciplinary frameworks by
means of which knowledge gets conceptualized. The goal of this self-reflexive exercise
is to be able to objectify the very instruments of knowledge that the researcher utilizes
in order to frame his or her research object.461 To this end Bourdieu in H o m o
academicus proposes a methodological approach that aims to address a set of un-
reflexive and unconscious practices or deontological codes that inform scholarly
practices of knowledge. As Bourdieu argues, the social scientist should, ideally, be able
to perceive him or herself at the centre of a network of social forces contributing to the
shaping of his or her experience of the social world:
En réalité, la liberté à l’égard des déterminismes sociaux qui pèsent sur lui est à la
mesure de la puissance de ses instruments théoriques et techniques d’objectivation et
surtout, peut-être, de sa capacité de les retourner, en quelque sorte, contre lui-même,
d’objectiver sa propre position au travers de l’objectivation de l’espace à l’intérieur
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duquel se définissent et sa position et sa vision première de sa position et des positions
opposes; de sa capacité d’objectiver du même coup l’intention même d’objectiver, de
prendre sur le monde, et notamment sur le monde dont il fait partie, un point de vue
souverain, absolu, et de travailler à exclure de l’objectivation scientifique tout ce
qu’elle peut devoir à l’ambition de dominer en se servant des armes de la science; de
sa capacité enfin d’orienter l’effort d’objectivation vers les dispositions et les intérêts
que le chercheur doit lui-même à sa trajectoire et à sa position et aussi vers sa pratique
scientifique, vers les présupposés qu’elle engage dans ces ses concepts et ses
problématiques, et dans toute les visées éthiques ou politiques associées aux intérêts
sociaux inhérents à une position dans le champ scientifique.462
There is something in this passage that speaks about Bourdieu’s methodological rigour
when discussing notions such as objectivation and objectivity. There is also an attempt
at diversifying critical detachment into several operations. Bourdieu’s call for what
seems to be an act self-disengagement from the social world introduces a certain
number of potential questions aimed at redefining the accuracy of the sociological
method. Nevertheless, Bourdieu’s methodological reflections also raise potential
paradoxes such as: how can the knowledge of the social world be the result of an act of
detachment and at the same time claim to preserve, in some form or another, the logic
whereby social actors do what they do and act as they act?
Conforming to the principle of self-reflexivity that lies at the heart of his
sociological approach, Bourdieu concedes that in order to be able to successfully
objectify the logic that governs the academic field, it is necessary to include the
methodological operations carried out by the researcher to construe his or her
conceptual view. As Bourdieu points out:
Je ne suis pas loin de penser que la vertu principale du travail scientifique
d’objectivation consiste en ce qu’il permet, à condition, bien sûr, qu’on sache en
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analyser le produit, d’objectiver l’objectivation. En effet, pour le chercheur soucieux
de savoir ce qu’il fait, le code, d’instrument d’analyse devient objet d’analyse.463
As Bourdieu notes, the epistemic codes that the sociologist uses in order to construe
knowledge can be turned into objects of analysis. When this condition is met, the
objectivation is maximised. However, insofar as it tries to capture the ways in which the
practice of scientific objectivation is carried forward by the researcher, this operation
constitutes in itself yet another form of objectivation. From here, there are two
possibilities. Firstly, this form of objectivation, one could argue, provides the researcher
with a more accurate view of the social world and a more thorough understanding of
intellectual practices through which knowledge is construed. This is the view that
Bourdieu underscores, and it is also the view that provides ground to introduce the
practise of self-reflexivity as a ground-breaking research technique. On the other hand,
introducing an explicit self-reflexive perspective into the routinized practice of doing
research might also produce the opposite effect. That the researcher gets involved in a
solipsistic exercise supported by some rhetorical arguments calling forth a more solid
form of objectivation.
6.8 Conclusion
In the first part of the chapter I have examined closely how Eco’s understanding of
interpretative practices can offer a framework for addressing some of the ways in which
academic knowledge results from acts of interpretation of reality. Eco’s notion of limits
of interpretation raises the question of the somewhat difficult and complex tasks of (1)
defining criteria, methods and procedures against which knowledge can be tested and
(2) setting epistemological limits within which an academic community can define a
conceptual space in which to address new developments and new directions (some of
which, unexpected) of knowledge. Eco’s understanding of the limits of interpretation, as
well as Eco’s notion of encyclopaedia, can also be discussed against a certain idea of
order. In the case of Peirce’s unlimited semiosis and Eco’s understanding of
encyclopaedia, order is approached under the sing of unpredictability, creativity and
impermanence. The notion of order also appears particularly important in Eco’s
strategic approach towards establishing a difference between hermetic semiosis and
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unlimited semiosis, while allowing to fully preserving the idea (very dear to Eco) that
meaning is subject to unpredictability.
In the second part of the chapter I have started out by referring to Lamont’s work
on academic judgment. I have pointed out how criteria of academic judgement, because
they are deeply internalised, might function in an often non-reflexive way so as to
provide the conditions for academic judgment to be carried out without too many
disruptions. From there onwards, I have discussed the work of Bourdieu by emphasising
the links between the education system and the institutional recognition of intellectual
dispositions. While interpretative practices as discussed in the first part of the chapter
leave ample space for conceptualizing creativity within knowledge, Bourdieu’s work on
education and culture draws attention on how intellectual frameworks (and the ability to
manipulate meaningful symbols in ways that are institutionally relevant) are often
associated with an exclusive form of cultural capital that is distinctive of particular
social groups.
This chapter has deepened the analysis of intellectual narratives. It has enriched
the description of the different modes of intellectual engagement endorsed by Bourdieu
and Eco. In Bourdieu’s case, the discussion developed in this chapter has emphasized
the importance of the education system in the social reproduction of cultural values.
Bourdieu is very emphatic in stressing that the biographical trajectories of individuals
need to be assessed in relation to the particular institutions and cultural fields
individuals engage with, precisely because it is the role of the institutions (i.e the
education system) to provide individuals with the cultural resources that in the last
instance allow them to respond positively to the standards and requirements of social
fields.
In light of Bourdieu’s sociological analysis of education, it is possible to
articulate the relation between the importance that Bourdieu gives marginality and
singularity for the role of the intellectual, as I explore it in the first chapters of this
study, with the realization of the embeddedness of interpretation and thinking in social
contexts as I discuss it in this chapter. The notion of habitus makes this articulation
possible, in that it allows Bourdieu to reconcile two different conceptions of culture.
Through the first one Bourdieu presents culture as a process in which the value of
culture results from the negotiation of externality (i.e. social structures, institutional
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systems) and internality (i.e. cognitive frameworks and perceptive categories).
However, because the education system plays a key role in the social reproduction of
culture, of cognitive mechanisms and mental structures, in the second conception of
culture the articulation of internality and externality does not offer much scope for
social change and for intellectual innovation.
Bourdieu’s intellectual self-narrative stands somewhere in between these two
conceptions of culture. On the one hand, Bourdieu’s intellectual itinerary is the result of
great social and intellectual mobility. From the periphery of his native Béarn a very
young Bourdieu moves to the intellectual, cultural and political centre of Paris in order
to become a student at the ENS. A second key moment occurs when Bourdieu explores
the discipline of ethnology through his fieldwork in Algeria. Thirdly, Bourdieu moves
back to France and undertakes his scholarly career as a sociologist. The underlying
mobility that defines Bourdieu’s intellectual itinerary has fostered the idea of a
sociology that is both strongly rooted in the tradition of the discipline, as well as open to
confront and engage with other disciplines such as psychology, history of art, and
philosophy. In spite of the diversity of social and intellectual experiences that
characterize Bourdieu’s itinerary, one finds that Bourdieu’s intellectual self-concept is
strongly defined through the ideas of marginality and singularity. Singularity and
marginality, as I suggested in the first chapters of this study, hold a positive value for
Bourdieu. These notions are not socially and intellectually disqualifying, but they have
to be understood as elective strategies that allow Bourdieu to define the intellectual as
the spokesperson of the unorthodox, the alternative, and sometimes the radical. To
acknowledge this means to accept the idea that cultural differences serve as a
foundation for different ways of experiencing the world we inhabit. In Bourdieu’s
intellectual self-concept, the themes of singularity and marginality are crucial in
establishing the self-narrative of the intellectual who turns his peripheral position into a
privileged point of view for the production of the discourse of truth and objectivity.
My discussion of the notion of interpretation in this chapter has also highlighted
the presence of two slightly different conceptions of culture within Eco’s exploration of
the interactions between readers and text. On the one hand Eco insists on a conception
of culture in which the reader is a creative agent that can interpret a text in multiple
ways, thus promoting cultural and intellectual innovation within culture. On the other
hand, For Eco a text constitutes a cultural world in which the number of possible
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interpretations might be regulated by logical and semantic inferences as well as by
systems of cultural conventions. This said, Eco’s general understanding of cultural
processes does not consider the idea of social reproduction as directly as Bourdieu’s
sociology does. This is perhaps because Eco has focused much of his intellectual career
in studying possible ways to account for the potential art and literature have to
transcend narrowly conceived definitions of meaning and interpretation. In Eco’s
intellectual self-narrative, the complexity of art and literature fosters the ability of the
intellectual to move freely on cultural maps in order to challenge one-dimensional views
of reality.
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General Conclusion
Put to the test of creativity and interdisciplinarity, the work of Bourdieu and Eco has
shown how disciplines are brought together in a constructive dialogue. Sometimes
interdisciplinarity has appeared to be already constitutive of the development of a
discipline, approach, or theoretical sensitivity. As the case of Eco suggests,
interdisciplinarity is implied in a research agenda that, from the outset, tackles the
discursive homologies of disciplines across the spectrum of modern culture. In this
context, Eco crafts his own theoretical approach on a systematic bridging of different
disciplines whereby he defines the discipline of semiotics. In Eco’s semiotics the notion
of code, as pointed out, plays a vital role in promoting an approach that focuses on the
iterative as much as on the creative aspects of culture.
At times interdisciplinarity can be less diffuse than what Eco’s case suggests,
manifesting itself in a confrontation between disciplines. The “clash” of disciplines
triggered by Bourdieu’s idea of sociology’s place within the intellectual field results in
specific forms of interdisciplinarity that are different from the ones exemplified by
Eco’s semiotic approach. Bourdieu’s interdisciplinary approach is traversed by
epistemological tensions that mirror those between disciplines such as sociology,
philosophy and history of art. As Bourdieu’s sociological project illustrates, one does
not need to conflate disciplines in a tension-free territory in order to produce
interdisciplinarity. Tensions between disciplines, questioning of discipline’s territories,
or transdisciplinary practices in the name of a redefinition of a discipline are equally
productive in the development of creative interdisciplinarity.
This study has illustrated that disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity develop as
parallel forms of knowledge. The cases of Bourdieu and Eco show that disciplinarity
can open up to the possibility of interdisciplinarity, as much as interdisciplinarity can
co-exist with the exploration of a disciplinary agenda. Whether one is trying to
strengthen the knowledge of one discipline, attempts to widen its horizon or tries to
bring a new point of view within it, disciplinarity constitutes a positioning within a field
of knowledge, and represents an implicit statement about the boundaries of disciplines.
The awareness of disciplinary boundaries often brings one to challenge the very raison
d’être of disciplines. My initial hypothesis was, precisely, that creative intellectuals
have an interest in questioning and challenging the idea of disciplinary limits: in this
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study I have illustrated some of the forms that this questioning and challenging can take.
I have claimed, in particular, that by questioning disciplinary limits, creative as much as
interdisciplinary knowledge is enhanced.
I would like to conclude by drawing attention to some of the implications of
interdisciplinarity this study has brought to light. In at least one way this study has
confirmed my initial intuition: that in order to be interdisciplinary and to display
intellectual creativity, one needs to be thoroughly familiar with at least one discipline
and have an interest in confronting this discipline’s framework with that of other
disciplines. From this perspective, the existence of disciplines has proven to be a major
guarantee for the development of creative thinking. Studies on creativity stress that
creativity originates from a combination of different cultural, social, and cognitive
frameworks. For this reason, conceiving of interdisciplinarity as a combination of two
or more disciplinary frameworks makes the creative component of interdisciplinary, its
originality and its novelty all the more apparent.
Because creativity is indissociable from a combination of more or less well
established cultural, social, and cognitive frameworks, it is hard to see how the very
idea of interdisciplinarity can be preserved without acknowledging that disciplines are
the initial framework whose combination results in an original way of producing
knowledge. Furthermore, as many commentators point out, disciplines have a
differential value. They designate a domain of knowledge in relation to or in opposition
to the domain of knowledge of neighbouring disciplines. This differential and
oppositional value enhances, rather than hinders, the creative approach to knowledge
that informs interdisciplinarity. If one were to do without the differential value of
disciplines, it would be difficult to see exactly what is combined, who combines what
and how, and most importantly why disciplines are combined. One cannot do without
the very idea of discipline, for the very simple fact that the history of knowledge is
indissociable from the history of disciplines.
This study has illustrated how disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity are
interlinked sides of a dialogue within the history of knowledge. By highlighting a
fragment of this vast dialogue, I have stressed the importance of creativity within
contemporary academia. Creativity is not an easy thing to attain. It requires intuition
and perseverance. Since it defines itself both in relation and in opposition with the
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normative, it is paramount, for a thorough understanding of its processes, that one is
able to locate the normative as a discourse: that is, one ought to be able to identify
existing disciplines, as well as to codify those epistemological practices that regulate
research cultures within academia. To this end, in my conclusive chapter I have stressed
the importance of the dialectical interplay between creativity and order, between
harmony and randomness, between tradition and novelty. One of the lessons that can be
drawn from this chapter is that Bourdieu and Eco, while highly creative intellectuals in
their respective domains, are also highly aware of the existence of boundaries that shape
the discourse of knowledge within and without academia.
The awareness of such boundaries, and the ability to integrate this awareness
within a coherent intellectual agenda, is peculiar to both Bourdieu and Eco. The kind of
self-reflexivity developed by Bourdieu and Eco shows, precisely, that knowing where
the limit is, being able to identify it, and in a subsequent move being able to verbalize it,
to discuss and elaborate on it, goes hand in hand with the possibility to transcend it and
to reformulate it. Creative interdisciplinarity consists in a balance between a part
destruens (the critique of disciplines) and a part construens (the constructive dialogue
between disciplines). I hope this study has succeeded in bringing to light both a critique
of disciplinarity as well as a more optimistic approach to it; one where disciplinarity is,
precisely, interpreted as a starting platform for the exercise of creative
interdisciplinarity.
Interdisciplinary, some might say, is the future of academia. However, many
obstacles might prevent the development of interdisciplinary practices that are truly
creative and not merely nominal. Some of these obstacles have to do with the protocols,
techniques of investigations and methodologies that have been the object of chapter six.
These methodologies, protocols and techniques often revolve around the idea that new
knowledge adds an extra value to a capital of existing knowledge. Academic
contributions are often regarded as bricks that are added to an edifice called Progress.
The problem is, progress, besides being an extremely ideologically charged notion,
might not always be creative.
A few final questions might be relevant here. Should academics be more critical
of idea of progress of knowledge? Should they be more inclined to question and
redefine the meaning of progress? Should they explore the idea that progress is an
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historical category and, for this reason, only one of the possible ways of conceiving
something we call history and something we call knowledge? Should the idea of
progress be reassessed, and should academia be open to ways of knowledge that might
not relate to the idea of progress?
This is perhaps the big challenge of creative interdisciplinarity. Creativity is a
game that constantly questions and sometimes redefines its rules.
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